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In November, 1945, American Ambassador to China 
Patrick J. Hurley's sudden and dramatic resignation 
"brought the China question into focus" and produced con-
gressional hearings into a reexamination of American policy 
toward China. 1 The short-lived investigation of four days 
by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee did not 
thoroughly explore Hurley's charges or render a "full and 
complete study and investigation with respect to the 
policies, operations, administration and personnel of the 
2 Department of State." 
As President Harry s. Truman announced the 
resignation of Ambassador Hurley, he also announced the 
appointment of General of the Army and former Chief of 
Staff GeorGe c. Marshall as his Special Representative to 
China. To counteract Hurley's charges of America's lack of 
1Richard D. Burns, "James F. Byrnes," in An Uncertain 
Tradition, American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth 
Century, ed. by Norman A. Graebner (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, Inc., 1961), p. 240. 
2u.s., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign 
Relations, United States-China Relations, Hearings on the 
Evolution of U.S. Policy Toward Mainland China, before the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 92d Cong., 1st 
sess., 1971, and in the Appendix, Investigation of Far 
Eastern Policy, Hearings on the Situation in the Far East, 
Particularly China, before the Con~ittee on Foreign 
Relations, Senate, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945. This 
writer has decided to refer to these two hearings 
separately so as not to confuse the reader. This footnote 
is quoted in Investi ation of Far Eastern Polic from s. 
Res. 197 of Senator Kennet Ne ras<a, p. 145. 
iii 
a foreign policy in China, the President assured Americans 
that 11 the basic principles of United States policy in China 
would be laid down in black and \vhite for the entire country 
to read. 113 An American correspondent and adviser to Chiang 
Kai-shek, John Robinson Beal, asserted that this Truman 
statement, the first of three significant China policy 
statements, 11 was playing into the hands of the Communists, 11 
while noted Sinologist Herbert Feis felt that 11 each side 
found in the President's statement . . . justification for 
its attitude. 114 Senate Republican leader Arthur Varidenberg 
emphasized that the fate of the Marshall Mission could be 
traced to the President's first policy statement, parti-
cularly to American attempts to force the National Govern-
ment 11 to bring Communists into the government. 115 
Beginning his mission on a note of hope and ending on 
a note of despair, the Presidential mediator became 
enmeshed in negotiations, proposals and counterproposals 
311 Truman Promises Publicity on China," New York 
Times, Nov. 30, 1945, p. 3. 
4John Robinson Beal, Marshall in China (Garden City, 
New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1970), p. 114; 
Herbert Feis, The China Tan le: The American Effort in 
China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall ~Iission Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1953), p. 424. 
See also Claire Lee Chennault, Way of a Fighter: The 
Memoirs of Claire Lee Chennault, ed. by Robert Hotz (Ne,-., 
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1949), pp. xi, xii. 
SArthur Vandenberg, 
Vandenberg, ed. by Arthur 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 
The Private Papers of Senator 
H. Vandenberg, Jr., (Boston: 
1952), p. 521. 
iv 
which were advocated by the two irreconcilable forces. The 
Marshall Mission convinced Administration leaders that cor-
ruption, incompetence and inefficiency of Chiang 1 s National 
Government necessitated a 11 hands-off 11 approach to Chiang 1 s 
National Government. One correspondent summarized the 
situation in China in 1946: "China has collapsed and all 
of Chiang's horses and all of Chiang's men cannot put it 
together again.11 6 
\~1en Marshall returned to the United States in 
January, 1947, as the newly nominated Secretary of State, 
the Truman Administration attempted to disentangle itself 
from the Chinese civil conflict. The Administration's 
11hands-off 11 policy toward China was sharply challenged by 
Republican leaders, who criticized the European Recovery 
Program of economic and military assistance to Greece and 
Turkey as one-sided. Republican criticism brought about 
the President's designation of Lieutenant General Albert C. 
Wedemeyer as his Special Representative to conduct a fact-
finding mission to China. Political fire raged on the 
floors of Congress as Republican opponents of the 
Administration's China policy seized upon the suppression 
of Wedemeyer's Report 11 as a new issue in their campaign for 
6From John Hersey 1 s article in The New Yorker as 
quoted in Beal, Marshall in China, p. 60. 
larger aid to China. 117 Under pressure from Republican 
criticism, Marshall placated the opponents of the Adminis-
tration's 11 Europe first 11 policy by promising assistance to 
China in November, 1947, and fulfilled this promise in 
February, 1948. 
V 
America's relationship toward China during the post-
war years was aptly described by President Truman's summary 
of his China policy: 11 The role of this government in its 
relations with China has been subjected to considerable 
misrepresentation, distortion, and misunderstanding. Some 
of these attitudes arose because this government was 
reluctant to reveal certain facts •••• 118 Admiral William 
Leahy, Chief of Staff to presidents Roosevelt and Truman, 
acknowledged that America 1 s 11 post,iar attitude toward the 
Government of China is completely beyond understancling. 119 
7Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China 1941-50 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963j, p. 462. 
8Quoted in Lyman P. Van Slyke 1 s Introduction to U.S., 
Department of State, The China White Paper, 2 vols., 
Originally Issued as United States Relations with China, 
with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949, Department 
of State Publication 3573, Far Eastern Series 30, Reissued 
,dth the original Letter of Transmittal to President Truman 
from Secretary of State Dean Acheson (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 1967), page not numbered but 
numbered by this ,~·ri ter as p. I( ntroduction)-v. 
9Aclmiral William D. Leahy 1 s letter of Dec. 1, 1947, 
to Colonel Hogan as quoted in U.S., Congress, House, 
1tLetter from Admiral Leahy, 11 Extension of Remarks of 
Representative Walter Judd, 86th Cong., 1st sess., July 27, 
1959, Congressional Record, CV, A6482. 
vi 
This writer shares these beliefs and deems it necessary to 
reexamine the context of the historical developments within 
which American policy was formulated from the postwar years 
of 1945 through 1948 in order to prove that this mis-
representation, distortion and misunderstanding existed. 
Emphasis is placed on the role of the Department of State, 
including the reports of foreign service officers, the 
President, the Congress, American and Chinese correspond-
ents, Chinese Nationalist and Communist representatives, 
all of whom surveyed the situation in China and helped to 
form and shape our China policy. 
The first chapter of this paper will consist of an 
examination of America's China policy and the alternatives 
to that policy. The second chapter will analyze Ambassador 
Hurley's resignation and the ensuing congressional hearings. 
The third chapter will focus on the appointment of General 
George C. Marshall as the President's Special Representa-
tive to China and will examine the directives which 
Marshall carried with him to China, as well as the pos-
sibility of coalition 6 overnment in China. The fourth 
chapter ,dll scrutinize the thirteen-month Marshall Mission 
and the release of Marshall's farewell statement at the 
time of his departure from China. The fifth chapter will 
analyze the beginning of the end to bipartisan support for 
the Administration's China policy, the termination of the 
ten-month embargo, 'Wedemeyer I s trip to China and his re port. 
The sixth chapter will reveal the height of Republican 
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' ' .1 
CHAPTER I 
THE COMPLICATED WEB OF CHINA POLICY 
AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 
China-born expert John Stewart Service, who was 
Second Secretary of the Embassy in Chungking until April, 
1945, commented on the Chinese situation in 1945 as 11 a 
time bomb ticking steadily toward detonation. 111 In May, 
1945, Edward E. Rice, a foreign service officer stationed 
in China, informed Secretary of State Edward Stettinius 
that 11 full scale" civil war would 11 break out after the 
2 
Japanese menace is removed. 11 Everett F. Drwnright of the 
State Department•s Division of Chinese Affairs concurred 
with Rice•s and Service 1s impressions that civil war was 
imminent and stated that 11 large scale internal strife 11 
would occur as a result of "the formal establishment of 
two distinct political and military entities 11 in China. 3 
1John s. Service, The Amerasia Papers: Some Problems 
in the History of U.S.-China Relations, Chinese Research 
Monographs, Number 7 (Berkeley, California: Center for 
Chinese Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1971), 
P• 164. 
2u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1945, Vol. VII: The Far East (Washington, 
D. c.: Government Printing Office, 1969}, p. 396. 
3~., p. 381. 
1 
2 
While 11 a China disorganized and divided either by 
foreign aggression. • • or by violent internal strife is 
an undermining influence to world stability and peace, 11 
United States policy toward China from 1945 through 1948 
was primarily concerned with the establishment of a strong, 
independent, stable, peaceful and democratic China and 
deemed it of utmost importance to world peace. 4 The defeat 
of Japan produced a most difficult task for China. Acting 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson felt that 11 the task which 
had to be solved by the Chinese Government was ••• how to 
create a nation, and how to have the authority of the 
Chinese Government exercised throughout that nation. 115 
Following the sudden Japanese surrender, American 
planes and warships transported National troops to north 
China and east China to accept the surrender, and to 
demobilize and repatriate the Japanese armed forces even 
though the United States did not wish to intervene in 
China's internal affairs. Defeated Japanese garrisons were 
informed that they must lay down their arms only to 
4u.s., President, Public Papers of the Presidents of 
the United States Harr -s-.-T-r_u_m_a.:..n-..,..i'""9-4""'5-(,..,\'""'va_s.,..h..,.i_n_gt_o_n_,___,D,....... __,,,.C. : 
Of ice of the Federal Register, Nationa Archives and 
Records Service, 1963), Statement by the President: United 
States Policy Toward China, December 15, 1945, p. 543. 
5u.s., Congress, Senate, Joint Committee of Armed 
Services and Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the 
Far East, Hearings, before the Joint Committee of Armed 
Services and Foreign Relations, Senate, 82d Cong., 1st 
sess., 1951, Part 3, Testimony of Dean Acheson, p. 1838. 
3 
representatives of the legal and recognized government, the 
National Government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. 6 In 
a letter to General :Marshall, written on August 19, 1945, 
General Albert c. Wedemeyer, the Commanding General of the 
American Forces in China, revealed America's position: 11 It 
must be recognized that the movement of Central Government 
troops to key areas may be construed as a deceptive 
maneuver designed primarily to cope with the Communists. 117 
The Secretaries of State, War and Navy, who met on 
November 20, 1945, discussed the role of American troops in 
China. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal emphasized 
that Americans were 11 on sound ground if we say that our 
Marines are in North China to complete the task of the 
defeat of Japan. 118 Forrestal noted that there would be 
considerable criticism 11 if we say they are there for the 
purpose of backing Chiang Kai-shek. 11 Secretary of War 
Robert Patterson thought that if the Marine 1 s presence in 
effecting the repatriation of the Japanese aided in 
supporting Chiang Kai-shek•s Government 11 so much the better. 119 
6chung-Gi Kwei, The Kuomintan -Communist Stru ~le in 
China, 1922-1949 (The Hague: Martinas Nijhoff, 1970, P• 99• 
7u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, 
The Far East, p. 532. 
81bid., p. 646. See also James Forrestal, The 
Forresttlniaries, ed. by Walter Hillis (New York-:-The 
Viking Press, 1951), p. 123. 
9rbid., P• 647. 
Correspondents Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby supported 
the presence of Marines in China 11 to preserve, protect and 
defend Chiang Kai-shek 1 s government in the northern areas 
where under attack.ulO 
4 
Chinese Communist leaders Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai 
and Chu Teh protested the presence of the Marines who held 
cities and lines of communication prior to the Nationalist 
Army's arrival. The movement of Chiang's troops northward 
was viewed by Communist leaders as a threat to their expan-
. d . t 11 sion an exis ence. Historian Barbara Tuchman believed 
that American intervention 11 fed their [Communist] hostility 
and eroded American influence as mediator since America 
appeared committed to one side in the intervention. 1112 
lOTheodore H. 
of China (New York: 
p. 318. 
White and Annnlee Jacoby, Thunder Out 
William Sloane Associates, Inc., !946), 
11Kwei, The Kuomintang-Communist Struggle, p. 99. 
12narbara w. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experi-
ence in China, 1911-45 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1970), 
p. 524. Readers may consult the following works: Anthony 
Kubek, How the Far East Was Lost, American Policy and the 
Creation of Communist China, 1941-1949 (Chicago: Henry 
Regnery Company, 1963), p. 317; Foster Rhea Dulles1 China 
and America The Stor of Their Relations Since 17ts4 
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1946), 
p. 254; James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1947), p. 227; Hao Tse-tung, Selected Works, 
Vol. V: 1945-1949 (New York: International Publishers, 
n.d.), p. 20; u.s., Congress, Senate, Military Situation, 
Part 3, Testimony of Dean Acheson, pp. 1846-47; U.S., Depart-
ment of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, The Far East, p. 
528, Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General 
l;'edemeyer on August 10, 1945; Editorial, The Nation, 
September 22, 1945, p. 270; and 11 Explosion in China and the 
Powers," The New Republic, November 12, 1945, p. 619. 
Americans appeared to be serving a dual purpose, with 
Marine actors taking part in a Chinese play and deciding 
what government China should have. 13 Had American troops 
been withdrawn then, as most of them were in early 1947 
after the termination of Marshall's Mission, the United 
States could have silenced widespread criticism that 
America was interfering in the internal affairs of China 
by supporting Chiang Kai-shek against the Communists. 
5 
At the end of the War, the Soviets held a strong 
foothold in Manchuria, partly as a result of the Yalta 
agreements of February, 1945, which granted them certain 
concessions for their entrance into the Japanese War within 
ninety days after the surrender of Germany, and the Sino-
Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of August 14, 
1945. At Yalta, Stalin requested and President Roosevelt 
agreed to the internationalization of the port of Dairen, 
the return of the southern part of Sakhalin and islands 
adjacent to it, the restoration of Russia's lease of Port 
Arthur as a naval base, and the joint Soviet-Chinese 
operation of the Chinese-Eastern and South Manchurian 
1 3u.s., Congress, House, "Bring Marines Out of 
China," Extension of Remarks of Representative Charles W. 
Vursell, 79th Cong., 1st sess., Dec. 3, 1945, Congressional 
Record, XCI, Part 13, A5250. Representative Vursell 
revealed the contents of a letter, which was dated Nov. 13, 
1945, from a soldier of the First Marine Division, Tangku, 
China, to his father. 
i 
A 
Railroads. 14 Harry Hopkins, who returned to the United 
States in June, 1945, from his Moscow conference with 
Stalin, told President Trwnan that Stalin considered 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to be 11 the only Chinese 
leader capable of bringing about the unification of 
China. 1115 Stalin thought that 11 none of the Communist 
leaders was capable of unifying China. 11 As a result of the 
Sino-Soviet Treaty, the Soviet Government pledged its sup-
port to the National Government rather than to the Yenan 
Government, while it abstained from the internal affairs 
6 
of the Chinese people. 16 Stalin pledged himself to render 
Chiang economic assistance and moral support in the postwar 
14Readers may consult the following sources for 
further information on the Yalta Conference: Herbert Feis, 
Churchill Roosevelt Stalin: The War The Wa ed and the 
Peace They Sought Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1957}; Kubek, How the Far East Was Lost; 
Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, !948); Tang Tsou, America's Failure; 
and U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 
(\fashington, D. c.: Government Printing Office, 1955). 
15Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record 
of Forty Years, 1904-1945, 2 vols., Vol. II, ed. by Walter 
Johnson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), p. 1466. 
16sumner Welles, Where Are We Heading? (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1946), p. 298. For the 
provisions of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance 
Between the Republic of China and the Soviet Union, August 
14, 1945, with particular emphasis placed on Articles IV, 
V and VI, consult U.S., Department of State, China tfuite 




period as China agreed to the Far Eastern terms of the 
Yalta Conference. 17 
7 
Realizing the tangled Chinese situation immediately 
after the Second World War, Dean Acheson, who \'las Acting 
Secretary of State in 1946 and Secretary of State in 1949, 
recalled in 1949 in his famous "Letter of Transmittal" to 
the State Department's China White Paper that there were 
three alternatives from which America could choose in order 
to achieve a strong, united, democratic and peaceful China. 
These three alternatives were: 
(1) it could have pulled out lock, stock and bar-
rel; (2) it could have intervened militarily on a 
major scale to assist the Nationalists to destroy 
the Communists; (3) it could, while assisting the 
Nationalists to assert their authority over as 
much of China as possible, endeavor to avoid civil 
w~r by1yorking for a compromise between the two 
sides. 
Dean Acheson believed that the first choice of pull-
ing out of China would have meant that Americans thought 
the Chinese 11 must paddle their own canoe, and we have to 
,-msh our hands of it. 1119 General Joseph Stilwell, a former 
Commanding General of United States Forces in China, 
advocated pulling out of China immediately after the 
17u.s., Department of State, China White Paper, II, 
pp. 586-87. 
18Ibid., I, p. x. 
19u.s., Congress, Senate, Military Situation, Part 3, 
Testimony of Dean Acheson, p. 1842. 
20 Japanese surrender. John Service and John K. Fairbank 
thought that this alternative as opposed to the second or 
third alternatives would have been a 11 wiser choice. 1121 
.Americans were eager to bring their men home and not 
8 
become involved in China's affairs and had to be prepared 
to accept the consequences of this withdrawal policy if it 
resulted in 11 the complete domination of China by a Russian-
supported Communist regime." "With China within the Rus-
sian orbit, 11 historian No-Yong Park believed that Uthe 
United States might feel unsafe in the Pacific. 11 Park 
agreed with Acheson's first alternative and thought that 
the Soviet Union should join the United States in remaining 
neutral ''in word and in action" because through neutrality 
22 
11 China might have been united in one way or the other. 11 
While Acheson's first policy alternative advocated 
11 our best role was no role at all 11 and that we should allow 
China to stew in her own juice, the second Acheson choice 
suggested that the United States Government 11 put into China 
unlimited resources and all the necessary military power to 
try and defeat the Communists, remove the Japanese and 
20u.s., Congress, Senate, United States-China Rela-
tions, Testimony of John Stewart Service, p. 32. See also 
Tuchman, Stilwell, p. 527. 
21u.s., Congress, Senate, United States-China Rela-
tions, pp. 23, 31. 
22 No-Yong Park, 11 America 1 s Role in Tomorrow's China," 
Current History, XI (September, 1946), 216, 219. 
remove the Russians from Manchuria. 1123 In Acheson's 
opinion, 11 the Communists probably could have been dislodged 
only by American arms, 11 but Americans 11 would not have 
sanctioned such a colossal commitment of our armies in 
9 
1945 or later. 1124 Acheson labeled this policy of backing 
China to the hilt as 11 wholly impracticable. 1125 Foreign 
service specialists suggested that American postwar aid 11 if 
given carte blanche to the Nationalist Government, would 
encourage persistent reaction rather than reform and make 
the Nationalists more increasingly less able and less 
willing to compete with the Communists for popular support 
and therefore increasingly more dependent on our aid. 1126 
In John Carter Vincent's memorandum of November 28, 
1945, entitled "Outline of Suggested Course in China, 11 the 
Director of Far Eastern Affairs of the State Department 
emphasized that the United States "cannot support that 
[National] Government by military intervention in an 
23u.s., Congress, Senate, United States-China Rela-
tions, Statement by Senator J. W. Fulbright, p. 23; Service, 
Amerasia Papers, p. 167; and U.S., Congress, Senate, 
Military Situation, Part 3, Testimony of Dean Acheson, 
p. 1842. 
24u.s., Department of State, China White Paper, I, 
Dean Acheson's "Letter of Transmittal" of July 30, 1949, 
p. x. 
25Ibid. -
26J. K. Fairbank, "America and the Chinese Revolu-
tion," The New Republic, August 22, 1949, p. 11. 
internecine struggle. 1127 An editorial in early December 
in The New Republic swnmed up the feelings of many 
Americans: 11 The American people will not stand for 
pouring out American blood and treasure in a war to per-
petuate Chiang Kai-shek 1 s regime. 1128 Chiang's problems 
could not be solved by large sums of money and quantities 
of goods. The tremendous unpopularity of using American 
troops in China was reflected in a large quantity of 
State Department mail which Acting Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson described as "so varied and the geographical 
spread is so great as to suggest that the protests 
represent a strong feeling among the people. 1129 If 
America intervened, her presence in China might provoke 
the intervention of the Soviet Union. Nearly one year 
later, in September, 1946, an editorial in The New 
Republic reported that 11 all-out aid to Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai-shek" would encourage him 11 to wage open war 
against the Communists," while Henry Luce's magazine, 
27 U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 
1945, The Far East, p. 746. 
2811 our Choice in China," The New Republic, 
December lo, 1945, p. 782. 
10 
29u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, 
The Far East, p. 786. Memorandllr.1 of December 20, 1945, 
from Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson to the Charg~ 
in China, Walter Robertson. 
Life, urged the United States to give "continuous, 
wholehearted and plentiful aid to the Chungking Govern-
ment.1130 
11 
The last Acheson alternative, which was chosen and 
implemented by the Trwnan Administration, was the policy of 
' 1friendly persuasion" backed by limited assistance to the 
Nationalists, to assist in preserving the peace in China, 
and to work out a modus vivendi preserving, reestablishing 
and increasing the influence of the National Government. 31 
This piecemeal aid was dependent upon indications by the 
Chungking Government that hostilities had ceased and 
political differences had been resolved. This was the 
China policy which George Marshall attempted to follow in 
China during his thirteen months of untiring efforts to 
broaden the base of the Chungking Government, to eliminate 
one-party tutelage with the inclusion of the rival groups 
in the government, and to reorganize the armies of the 
Nationalists and the Communists. If there appeared to be 
risks in supporting Chiang, there seemed to be greater 
3011 nanger in China," The New Republic, September 2, 
1946, p. 243; Dr. Henry P. Van Dusen, "China in Crisis, 11 
Life, September 2, 1946, P• 37. 
31Akira Iriye, Across the Pacific, An Inner History 
of American East-Asian Relations, Harbinger Book {New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1967), p. 255; U.S., 
Department of State, China White Paper, I, Dean Acheson's 
nLetter of Transmittal,n p. x; and U.S., Congress, Senate, 
Military Situation, Part 3, Testimony of Dean Acheson, 
p. 1842. 
12 
risks in not supporting him. 32 One American observer, 
Harold J. Noble, wrote in the Saturday Evening Post that 
11 the Nationalists were the lesser of the two evils." 33 
American support was to be given to a "regime with acknowl-
edged shortcomings but to ,..,hich there seemed to be no 
adequate alternative.11 34 
China hand John Service believed that Secretary 
Acheson's formulation was incomplete. Service felt that 
there was a fourth alternative which called for the United 
States 11 to work with both sides and to keep ourselves in a 
flexible position so that we could adapt to developments in 
China and work with whichever side proved dominant. 1135 
This choice offered 11 the greatest likelihood of fostering a 
united, and democratic friendly China 11 , .. bile America 
observed the Chinese situation and did not become involved 
. ·t 36 in 1 • This flexible policy would permit ultimate 
32u.s., Congress, House, 11l~1at Should Be Our Policy 
in China, 11 Extension of Remarks of Representative lfalter 
Judd, Text of Judd's radio speech given on the Town Meeting 
of the Air on December 27, 1945, 79th Cong., 2d sess., 
Jan. 18, 1946, Congressional Record, XCII, Part 9, Al08. 
33uarold J. Noble, 11 Should We Pull Out of China," 
Saturday Evening Post, September 28, 1946, p. 166. 
34Lyman P. Van Slyke's Introduction to U.S., Depart-
ment of State, China White Paper, I, p. I-xiii. 
35u.s., Congress, Senate, United States-China Rela-
tions, Testimony of John Stewart Service, p. 33. 
3 6service, Amerasia Papers, p. 104. 
~ 
cooperation with any leadership in China, uncommitted to 
the Nationalist or any other power in China, 11 and ready to 
adjust itself to the further evolution of that country. 1137 
13 
This policy was advocated by foreign service officers 
as early as March 2, 1945, when John Carter Vincent, Chief 
of the Division of Chinese Affairs, Everett F. Drumright, 
also of the Division, and Edwin F. Stanton, Deputy Director 
of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, recommended: 
it would be in the American interest to maintain 
a flexible policy ••• vis-1-vis Chiang for two 
reasons: the United States may wish to be in a 
position to withclraw support from Chiang in the 
event that his government and administration 
deteriorate to a point reaching impotence; and 
second, the United States appears to possess, in 
its discretion to grant or to withhold support 
and assistance, a weapon which may be used to 
induce Chiang to cooperate, reform the adminis-
tration of his government, and put China's 33 
maximum effort into the prosecution of the war. 
T,·:o months later, Everett Drumright reiterated the impor-
tance of the American Government 11 to maintain a degree of 
flexibility of policy to permit cooperation with any other 
leadership in China which may give greater promise of 
achieving our policy with respect to China. 1139 "With as 
uncertain a situation as that which exists in China," 
37Ibid., p. 133. 
38u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, 
The Far East, p. 251. 
391bitl., p. 382. Memorandum of Hay 8, 1945, by 
Everett F. Drumright of the Division of Chinese Affairs. 
~ : , 
observed John Paton Davies, another China hand, 11it may be 
prudent not to commit all of our policy eggs to one 
basket. 11 40 In John Service's testimony before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee in 1971, he recalled that the 
foreign service officers and the State Department itself 
were helpless in making known these views on the 
situation. 41 
14 
In late 1945 when the State Department became 
concerned over developments in China, John Carter Vincent 
submitted a memorandwn suggesting that normal diplomatic 
relations with the National Government be maintained while 
the United States refrain from involvement in China's 
internal affairs. 42 Vincent reviewed this memorandum in 
another memorandum to the Secretary of State on November 12, 
1945, at which time he pointed out that 11 interference in 
the internal affairs of China would not pay dividends and 
involvement in civil strife in China would occasion 
serious difficulties for us without compensatory 
40rbid., p. 337. Memorandum of April 15, 1945, by 
Second Secretary of the Embassy in the Soviet Union, John 
Paton Davies. 
41 U.S., Congress, Senate, United States-China 
Relations, P• 33. 
42u.s., ConGress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, 
Institute of Pacific Relations, Part 6, Hearings, before the 
subcommittee to investigate the aclministration of the Inter-
nal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, S.R. 366, 82d Cong., 2d 
sess., 1952, Testimony of John Carter Vincent, p. 1711. 
15 
advantages. 1143 This policy of noninvolvement in China's 
internal affairs was the topic of many of the speeches on 
the floors of Congress. Representative Mike Mansfield, on 
the floor of the House in December, 1945, emphasized that 
11 the internal situation in China or in any other country 
••• is none of our business. It is purely a Chinese 
situation which the Chinese must themselves clean up. 1144 
Delegate from Hawaii, Joseph R. Farrington, concurred with 
Mansfield's view of the Chinese situation by stating: 11 The 
Chinese must resolve this question of national unity among 
themselves, preferably without further violence. 1145 
President Truman's three statements of December 15, 
1945, December 18, 1946, and February 18, 1948, to the 
American people on his China policy also advocated 
America's noninvolvement in China 1 s internal affairs. In 
President Truman's first statement, he recalled that "the 
United States Government has long subscribed to the 
43u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, 
The Far East, p. 617. Memorandum of November 12, 1945, by 
the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, John 
Carter Vincent. 
44u.s., Congress, House, "Our China Policy," Extension 
of Remarks of Representative Hike Mansfield, 79th Cong., 1st 
sess., Dec. 11, 1945, Congressional Record, XCI, Part 9, 
11853. 
4Su.s., Congress, House, 11 Crisis in China," Extension 
of Remarks of Hon. Joseph R. Farrington, 79th Cong., 1st 
sess., Congressional Record, XCI, Part 13, A5749• 
, ft 
principle that the management of internal affairs is the 
responsibility of the peoples of sovereign nations.n 46 In 
his subsequent statement of December 18, 1946, prior to 
Marshall's return to the United States, Truman forcefully 
emphasized: 
We are pledged not to interfere in the internal 
affairs of China. Our position is clear. lfuile 
avoiding involvement in civil strife, we ,dll 
persevere with our policy of helping the Chinese 
people to bring a2~ut peace and economic recovery 
in their country. 
America had pledged itself not to interfere in China 1 s 
internal affairs even though Special Representative 
George C. Marshall was sent to China to act as mediator 
between the two irreconcilable and unresolvable forces in 
effecting a cease-fire, broadening the government and 
amalgamating the armies of the Nationalists and the 
Communists. 
16 
A fifth alternative, which concerned the territorial 
separation of China between Chiang and the Communists, 
received presidential attention as early as July 3, 1945. 48 
46 U.S., President, Public Papers, Truman, 1945, 
p. 543. 
47~., 1946, p. 504. 
48u.s., Congress, Senate, Institute of Pacific 
Relations, Part 10, Testimony of Owen Lattimore, p. 3388. 
Memorandum of Owen Lattimore 1 s interview with President 
Harry Truman on July 5, 1945. Lattimore gave the President 
a foreign policy memorandum on China. See also Tsou, 
America's Failure, p. 371. 
~ 
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Professor Paul Linebarger suggested the creation of a 
Chinese buffer zone between Nationalist China and the 
Soviet Union or 11 the establishment of Communist self-
governing enclaves within China. 1149 In November, 1945, 
General Albert C. Wedemeyer recommended to Chief of Staff 
Dwight Eisenhower the establishment of a "trusteeship under 
United States, Russia, Great Britain and China over 
Manchuria ••• Wedemeyer believed that Chiang could 
not 11 stabilize the situation in North China for several 
months perhaps years unless a satisfactory settlement with 
the Communists is accomplished. 11 Wedemeyer advised the 
Generalissimo that he attempt to hold China south of the 
Yangtze Valley ,dth the assistance of foreign administra-
tors and technicians to undertake political, economic and 
social reforms under the direction of competent and honest 
officials. 51 Wedemeyer thought that Chiang should consoli-
date his position in a part of China which he knew he could 
definitely hold. 
In Aucust, 1946, lvedemeyer's trusteeship proposal Has 
supported by Canadian Ambassador Victor Otllum, who advo-
cated United States or United Nations trusteeship over the 
49 raul Myron Anthony Linebarger, 11 The Complex Problem 
of China," The Yale Review, X).'"VI (Spring, 1947), 513. 
50u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, 
The Far East, p. 660. Memorandum of November 20, 1945. 
51rbid., p. 652. 
11 clisputed areas. 1152 One year later in his report, which 
\·,as submitted to the President as a result of his fact-
18 
finding mission to China, Wedemeyer reiterated his proposal 
for a trusteeship. in Manchuria. "Should France, Great 
nritain, the United States or Russia refuse to participate 
in the Manchurian Guardianship," he firmly believed that 
11 China might then request the General Assembly of the 
United Nations to establish a trusteeship, under the 
provisions of the Charter. 1153 Joseph Alsop endorsed this 
proposal by declaring that 11 Two-thirds of a loaf is better 
than none. 1154 
As early as February 16, 1945, Dr. Sun Po, son of the 
renowned Sun Yat-sen, suggested the possibility of another 
alternative [sixth] which was reported in a Chinese ne,'lS-
paper, Hsin Hua .Jih Pao. Sun Fo noted that "China was 
beset with grave internal political problems" and he sug -
gested 11 the possibility that these problems be brought up 
. . t t' 1 t' 1155 in an in erna iona mee ing. . In Au6ust, 1945, Ed,dn 
52 Beal, Marshall in China, p. 171. 
53u.s., Department of State, China Vlhite Paper, II, 
p. 767. 
54Joseph Alsop, 11Why ,-:e Lost China," Saturday Evening 
Post, Part III: 11 The Foredoomed Mission of General 
Hnrshall, 11 January 21, 1950, p. 114. 
55u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, 
The Far East, p. 236. Memorandum of February 19, 1945, by 
the Charg6 in China, George Atcheson, .Jr., to the Secretary 
of State. 
Locke, Personal Representative of the President, informed 
President Truman of a proposal, similar to Sun Fo 1 s 
proposal, for averting civil war in China. 
I think real results could be obtained through a 
suggestion from you to the Generalissimo that he 
request the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union 
to name representatives to an Advisory Commission 
that would appoint to make recommendations to him 
for the settlement of the existing disputes 
between the ~entral Government and the 
Communists.5 
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The Advisory Commission was to be composed of two repre-
sentatives of the Chungking Government, two representatives 
of the Yenan Government, one representative of the United 
States, Great Britain and Russia, all of whom would make 
recommendations to the Generalissimo. Locke believed that 
11 Chiang need not necessarily be bound by the findings of 
the Commission, but if arrangements were made that its 
proceedings and report be published by him, the moral 
effect would be exceedingly powerfu1. 1157 
In late 1945, John Carter Vincent also suggested "an 
international conference of interested powers to seek 
56rbid., p. 452. Memorandum of August 20, 1945, by 
Edwin A. Locke, Jr., Personal Representative of President 
Truman in charge of American Production Mission in China, 
to President Harry Truman. This letter was forwarded to 
Secretary of State Byrnes by Matthew J. Connelly, Secre-
tary to President Truman, with Connelly's unprinted memo-
randum of September 4 requesting "any comments you may care 
to make. 11 No reply to this memorandum was found in the 
State Department. Edmund Locke was Assistant to the 
Chairman of the War Production Board. 
57Ibid. 
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solution" as an approach to our China policy. 58 A proposal 
for an international conference to terminate the civil war 
was endorsed in December, 1946, by Senators Ralph E. 
Flanders of Vermont and James E. Murray of Montana in 
addition to Owen Lattimore of the Johns Hopkins University, 
Harley F. MacNair of the University of Chicago, H. H. 
Fisher of the Hoover Library at Stanford University and 
Foster Rhea Dulles of Ohio State University. 59 An inter-
national conference, composed of the United States, Great 
Britain, the Soviet Union and China, was to be held and 
attended by all political parties in China. President 
Truman refused to reply when he was asked to comment on 
Senators Murray and Flanders' suggestion of a three-nation 
board in an international conference. 60 In a speech on the 
floor of the House on February 3, 1947, a member of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Mike Mansfield, who had 
recently returned from a thirty-one day trip to the Far 
East, suggested that an international conference, similar 
58 U.S., Congress, Senate, Institute of Pacific 
Relations, Part 6, Testimony of John Carter Vincent, P• 
1712. 
59u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations of 
the United States, 1946, Vol. X: The Far East: China 
(Washington, n.c.: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 
672. Memorandum of January 1, 1947, from Ambassador John 
Leighton Stuart to the Secretary of State. 
508. 
press 
60u.s., President, Public Papers, Truman, 1946, p. 
This statement was issued by President Truman at his 
conference at the White House on December 18, 1946. 
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to the 1922 Washington Conference, of interested powers 11 be 
called by President Trwnan to consider some workable 
arrangement in China's behalf. 1161 Mansfield's speech 
62 
"elicited no positive response from the State Department. 11 
By 1947, Secretary of State Marshall had ruled out inter-
national mediation as America's policy toward China. 
A seventh possible China policy alternative, which 
was espoused in early 1945 and increasingly after the Sino-
Soviet Treaty, was for the joint cooperation of Soviet 
Russia, the United States and Great Britain to intervene 
11 if they really desire not only to preserve world peace but 
also to remedy the causes of this menacing conflict.11 63 
This proposed common policy was quite evident in General 
Wedemeyer 1 s telegram to General Marshall on July 9, 1945, 
when ,vedemeyer commented: 
If Uncle Sugar, Russia, and Britain united 
strongly in their endeavor to bring about coali-
tion of the~e two political parties in China by 
coercing both sides to make realistic conces-
sions, serious post-war disturbance may be 
averted and timely effective military employment 
of all Chinese may be obtained against the 
Japanese. I use the term coerce advisedly 
because it is my conviction that continued 
61u.s., Congress, House, "Report on Conditions in the 
Far East," Extension of Remarks of Representative Mike 
Mansfield, 80th Cong., 1st sess., Feb. 2, 1947, Congres-
sional Record, XCIII, Part 1, 767. 
62Tsou, America's Failure, p. 445. 
63"Explosion in China and the Powers," The New 
Republic, November 12, 1945, P• 619. 
appeals to both sides couched in polite diplomatic 
terms will not accomplish unificatign. There must 
be teeth in the Big Three approach. 4 
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Five months later, ,iedemeyer suggested that China accept 
the assistance of foreign administrators and technicians to 
aid in political, economic and social reforms. 
Beli~ving that Soviet-American cooperation was of the 
utmost importance in uniting China, No-Yong Park felt that 
teeth could be put in this approach only by 11 telling the 
Chinese factions in plain and honest language that neither 
power will give them support, moral or material until they 
t f . ht. h th 11 65 sop ·ig ing eac o er •••• President Truman was 
questioned by one reporter during a press conference on 
August 23, 1945: 11 Are the Big Three ••• planning joint 
action to avert civil war in China? 1166 Truman responded 
that he had not heard anything in regard to a Big Three 
approach of common policy toward China and declared that it 
was a matter which should be discussed with the Secretary 
of State. 
64u.s., Department of the Army, Office of the Chief 
of Military History, United States Army in ,vorld ,var II, 
China-Burma-India Theater, Vol. III: Time Runs Out in 
CBI, written by Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland 
(Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1959), 
p. 383. 
65 rark, 11 America 1 s Role, 11 p. 218. 
66 u .s.' President, Public Papersz Truman 2 1945, 
p. 233. 
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An article in the New York Herald Tribune of 
October 30, 1945, analyzed the approach which the United 
States and the Soviet Union should take if their efforts 
toward cooperation in China were unsuccessful in preventing 
civil war. 67 The Tribune announced that there should be a 
firm agreement between the United States and Russia 11 not 
to use their tremendous military power to support either 
faction," realizing that "any military interference from 
the outside world might create larger disputes in which all 
current efforts for world peace would be endangered." Like 
the Tribune, Representative Mike Mansfield emphasized the 
importance of a unified China. 68 Mansfield observed that 
' 1it would be the best policy for us to go along with Russia 
and Britain, to use our collective ability to get those 
groups together because all of us, especially this country, 
want to see a united China, a strong China. We want to 
see China become a bastion of peace in the Far East. 1169 
67 "The Catastrophe in China," New York Herald 
Tribune, Oct. 30, 1945, p. 26. See also Incoming Message 
of Nov. 7, 1945, in the Douglas MacArthur Papers in the 
Douglas MacArthur Memorial Library, Norfolk, Virginia, 
Incoming Message File, Record Group No. 9, Russia, 
August 1945-August 1946. 
68u.s., Congress, House, 11 0ur China Policy," 
Extension of Remarks of Representative Mike Mansfield, 79th 
Cong., 1st sess., Dec. 11, 1945, Congressional Record, XCI, 




An eighth alternative for the United States 11 would 
have been to attempt a rapprochement with the [Chinese] 
Communists in the hope of preventing their complete com-
mittal to Russia and to establish semi-friendly relations 
with the United States. 1170 The State Department's China 
White Paper, which focused on American-Chinese foreign 
relations between the years 1944 and 1949, suppressed and 
distorted pertinent material relating to the :Mao Tse-tung--
Chou En-lai overtures to the United States. Dean Acheson's 
noted "Letter of Transmittal" pointed out that the Chinese 
Communists were subservient 11 to a foreign power, Russia," 
when in reality the Communist leaders of Yenan attempted to 
establish relations with the United States and endeavored 
to remain as 11 free agents totally independent from the 
Soviet Union. 1171 
Reporting from Yenan on August 23, 1944, John Service 
spoke of his first long conversation with Mao Tse-tung in 
which Mao emphasized: 
70Ross Y. Koen, "The China Lobby and the Formulation 
of American Far Eastern Policy--1945-1952 11 (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Florida, 1958), p. 82. 
71u.s., Department of State, China White Paper, I, p. 
x; Service, Amerasia Papers, p. 176; U.S., Congress, Senate, 
Committee on Foreign Relations, State Department Employee 
Loyalty Investigation, Part 1, Hearings, before a subcommit-
tee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, on S.R. 
231, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950, Testimony of John Stewart 
Service, p. 1329; "Mao Courted U.S. in 1945, Panel Told, 11 
lfashington Post, June 29, 1971, p. A6; and Murrey Marder, 
"Chou, Mao and the u.s.--Lost Chance in 1 45? 11 Washington 







China must industrialize. This can be done--in 
China--only by free enterprise and with the aid 
of foreign capital. Chinese and American inter-
ests are correlated and similar. They fit 
together economically and politically. We can 
and must work together.7 2 
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Mao convinced Service of his 11 desire for American under-
standing.u73 One month later, Service reported again from 
Yenan that the United States was the only country which 
would be in a position to render economic assistance and 
to finance large-scale intlustrialization. 74 Mao Tse-tung 
and Chou En-lai repeated this desire for American assist-
ance to General Albert C. Wedemeyer in late 1944. 75 
In January, 1945, Ambassador Patrick Hurley informed 
President Franklin Roosevelt that he had discovered a plan 
of the Chinese Communists in which they had applied to 
General Wedemeyer 11 to secure secret passage for Mao Tse-tung 
72John Stewart Service's report of August 23, 1944, 
as printed in Service, Amerasia Papers, p. 173. In E. J. 
Kahn, Jr., 11 Profiles [John Service]," The New Yorker, 
April 8, 1972, p. 60, Professor Lyman P. Van Slyke, head of 
the Center for East Asian Studies at Stanford University, 
said that the intelligence material furnished by John 
Stewart Service while he was in Yenan "was ••• the most 
accurate and most revealing the United States had access 
to up to that time. 11 
7" ~u.s., Congress, Senate, United States-China 
Relations, p. 11. 
74service 1 s report of September 28, 1944, as printed 
in u.s., Congress, Senate, State Department Employee Loyalt~ 
Investigation, Part 1, Testimony of John Service, pp. 1307- 8. 
75Albert c. Wedemeyer, \·ledemeyer Reports! (New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 1958), P• 285. 





and Chou En-lai to Washington for a conference with you.11 76 
The second mention of the Mao-Chou overtures to the United 
States occurred in a telegram from Hurley to Secretary of 
State Stettinius in February, 1945. Hurley's telegram 
mentioned the contents of 11 an eyes alonell telegram from 
Chairman :Mao and General Chou to General Wedemeyer. :Mao 
and Chou offered two proposals: 
(1) that the Yenan Government dispatch an 
unofficial group to the United States to 'inter-
pret and explain' the problems of China to 
interested American civilians and officials, and 
( 2) that .Mao and Chou were available to proceed 
to Washington immediately for an explanatory 
conference in event that the President should 
express a desire to receive them at the \'lhite 
House,, leaders of a primary Chinese political 
party. 
Some experts on China contended that the prime 
purpose of Mao and Chou's projected trip to Washington was 
that China's Communist leaders were more interested in 
11 outmaneuvering and outflanking Chiang Kai-shek and his 
76u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, 
The Far East, p. 176. This memoranclum was dated January 14, 
1945. See also Marder, 11 Chou, ~~o and the u.s., 11 p. AB, 
and Barbara W. Tuchman, 11 If Mao Had Come to \'lashing-ton: An 
Essay in Alternatives," Foreign Affairs, LI (October, 1972), 
44-64. Historian Tuchman ·showed that Ambassador Hurley 
thwarted any Chinese Communist efforts for the Mao-Chou 
overtures to the United States. 
77u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, 
The Far East, p. 209. This memorandum was dated February 7, 
1945, and paraphrased a message, dated January 9, 1945, 
from Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai to General Wedemeyer. 
The January 9 memorandum was not printed in U.S., Department 
of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, The Far East. 
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Government. 1178 This leadership struggle was of the highest 
priority as opposed to warming relations with the United 
States. China hand John Service did not 11 know of any solid 
evidence" to support the Mao-Chou overtures for a confer-
ence with President Roosevelt. 79 He questi~ned why the 
Chinese Communist leaders worked through Wedemeyer and not 
through Hurley flbecause at this time the actual breach with 
Hurley had not yet come about. 11 Service stated that the 
only source of this incident was Ambassador Hurley, who 11 was 
80 not the most reliable source. 11 He believed that Hurley 
11 got this information through someone else who was not a 
disinterested party. 11 Service, who had been in close con-
tact with the Chinese Communists in Yenan, never heard any 
mention in Yenan of the Mao-Chou bid and General Wedemeyer 1 s 
memoirs, Wedemeyer Reports!, failed to mention any sub-
stantiating information, while Admiral William Leahy 1 s 
memoirs, I Was There, noted the Mao-Chou proposal to come 
to Washington to meet with President Roosevelt. 81 Another 
foreign service officer with experience in China, John 
78Marder, 11 Chou, Mao and the u.s., 11 p. A8. 
79u.s., Congress, Senate, United States-China 
Relations, P• 47. 
80~., p. 3. 
81william D. Leahy, I Was There: The Personal Story 
of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman 
Based on His Notes Made at the Time (New York: McGraw-Hill 
nook Company, Inc., 1950), P• 289. 
j 
0 
Paton Davies, recalled that possibly "the Mao-Chou request 
. "82 was genuine. 
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In speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee in June, 1971, Professor Allens. Whiting, former 
State Department Research Director for the Far East, said 
that Mao Tse-tung hoped the United States would use its 
economic and military support during the War to bring 
about a coalition government between the Communists and the 
Nationalists. 83 As a result of two lengthy conversations 
with Chairman Mao, Foreign Service Officer John Service 
felt that the Chinese Communists 11were intensely interested 
in developing relations with the United States, in winning 
American support during the war, and I believe quite 
clearly in the postwar period. 1184 Chairman Mao 11 wanted to 
determine Washington's willingness to work with a Communist 
China should coalition fail and they prevail in civil 
war.11 85 Mao 11 was thinking of the future, 11 said Service, 
82 U.S., Congress, Senate, United States-China 
Relations, P• 48. 
83u.s., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign 
Relations, United States Relations with the People's 
Republic of China, Hearings, before the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Senate, S.R. 18, 37, 48, 92d Cong., 1st sess., 
1971, Statement by Allens. lfuiting, p. 194. See also 11 O1d 
China Hands, 11 Time, August 2, 1971, pp. 14-15. 
84u.s., Congress, Senate, United States-China 
Relations, P• 3. 
85u.s., Congress, Senate, United States Relations 
with the People 1 s Republic, p. 194. 
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11 and he was thinking of a China which was not going to be a 
Russian satellite. 1186 Service surmised that Mao realized 
China's relationship with Russia would be quite different 
11 from the conventional idea of a Soviet satellite. 1187 Mao 
believed that a Communist China would have substantial 
independence and freedom of action and choice in the 
conduct of foreign relations. 88 
In March, 1945, John Service reiterated in a lengthy 
Yenan memorandum Chairman Mao's views which had been 
expressed to him in August and September of 1944. Service 
emphasized that 11 American policy is a decisive factor in 
influencing the actions of the Chinese Communist Party. 1189 
In recalling his conversation with Mao, Service said that 
the Chairman believed that "America would eventually 
realize that support of the Central Government was not 
the best way to ••• ensure post-war stability in the 
Far East. 11 "America and China," declared Mao, "comple-
ment each other economically: they will not compete. 11 
86u.s., Congress, Senate, United States-China 
Relations, p. 8. 
87service, Amerasia Papers, P• 176. 
88Ibid.; U.S., Congress, Senate, United States-China 
Relations, p. 48. 
89u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, 
The Far East, p. 273. Service's Yenan memorandum was 
written on March 13, 1945, and was entitled 11 The Views of 
Mao Tse-tung: America and China. 11 
Mao outlined "his grand design for Sino-America rela-
tions11:90 
China's greatest post-war need is economic 
development. She lacks the capitalistic founda-
tions necessary to carry this out alone. Her own 
living standards are so lo,.;, that they cannot be 
further depressed to provide the needed capital. . . . . . . . . . . -• . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
America is not only the most suitable country to 
assist this economic development of China. She 
is alij~ the only country fully able to partici-
pate. 
30 
Mao concluded by stating that "there must not and cannot be 
any conflict, estrangement or misunderstanding beth'een the 
Chinese people and America." Mao h.id clearly and unequivo-
cally stated to Service his desire to receive economic 
assistance from the United States and he had excluded any 
mention of Russian assistance from his conversation. 
In John Service's final report from Yenan of his 
conversations with Communist leaders prior to his departure 
from China for the United States, he recalled his t~rch 
memorandwn. "The Communists will continue to seek American 
friendship and understanding," Service announced, "because 
it will be needed by China in the post-war period of recon-
tion.1192 Communist leaders had again indicated their 
90u.s., Congress, Senate, United States Relations with 
the People 1 s Republic, Statement by Allen S. ,vhiting, p. 194. 
91u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, 
The Far East, PP• 273-74• 
92rbid., p. 314. Memorandum of Conversation in Yenan 
on April-r,-1945, by Second Secretary of the Embassy in 
China, John Service, with Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh and Chou En-lai. 
determination to avoid dependence on the Soviet Union. 
John Service left Yenan for the United States in April, 
1945. He repeated his conversations of August and Septem-
ber, 1944, March, 1945, and April, 1945, with Chairman Mao 
in a memorandum to John Carter Vincent, Chief of the 
Division of Chinese Affairs. 93 Service emphasized that 
Yenan 1 s Communist leaders looked to America for large-
scale postwar foreign aid. 
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Three other incidents substantiated John Service's 
reports of Yenan's request for American assistance. At the 
founding conference of the United Nations in San Francisco, 
Chen Chia Kan, member of the Chinese Communist Party, 
adviser at the United Nations and Chou En-lai 1 s private 
secretary, informed his old Yenan acquaintance, Foreign 
Service Officer John K. Emmerson, that 11 all Communists 
accept the same philosophy, the same doctrines, and the 
same ultimate goal" while differing in their policies and 
programs. 94 
The next incident occurred in December, following the 
Hurley resignation and the appointment of George C. 
Marshall as Special Representative of President Truman to 
China. A member of the Chinese Communists, ,vang Ping-nan, 
talked to the counselor of the American Embassy in Chungking 
93Ibid., p. 404. Memorandum of June 6, 1945. 
94Ibid., p. 370. Memorandum of April 28, 1945. 
and made a statement similar to that of Chen Chia Kan. 
Wang emphasized that "Soviet policy is one thing but that 
Chinese Communist policy is their own and independent of 
Soviet policy. 119 5 Wang said that "Chinese Communists are 
particularly desirous of maintaining cordial relations 
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with the United States, recognizing that China must have 
American assistance in postwar period. 1196 The last inci-
dent occurred in 1946 when General Chou En-lai told General 
George Marshall: 11 0f course we will lean to one side. But 
how far we lean depends upon you. 1197 
When Chairman J. William Fulbright of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee learned in June, 1971, of Mao 1 s 
leaning to the United States• position, he felt that 11 by 
not having the full record and only being given the offi-
cial version then you create a psychological atmosphere in 
the country that creates obstacles to any change. 1198 One 
possible reason for the United States' inability to accept 
Mao's offer may be found in the little-noted and recently 
95Ibid., p. 465. Memorandwn of December 3, 1945, by 
the Counselor of the Embassy in China, Robert L. Smyth, 
to the Secretary of State. 
96Ibid. 
97Quoted by Foreign Service Officer John F. Melby to 
Allen S. Whiting in U.S., Congress, Senate, United States 
Relations with the People's Republic, Statement by Allen S. 
Whiting, p. 195. 
98 . U.S., Congress, Senate, United States-China 
Relations, p. 32. 
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published letter from a commercial attach~ in China, 
Alonzo B. Calder, to Walter Robertson, the Charg~ in China. 
Calder spoke of a captured Soviet document which was 
addressed to the Shanghai Soviet Consulate and which 
indicated "that both the Soviets and Chinese Communists 
will 'lie low• for a period of about two years, disarming 
suspicion of ultimate aims. 11 This letter noted that once 
the United States had been ''sucked in" by spending billions 
of dollars and had been drained of its resources, "then 
the Soviets will launch their active campaign to rob us of 
our gains and will use China as a base for sovietizing all 
Asia. 1199 
Whatever the reason may have been, Washington did not 
respond to the Yenan leaders' overtures for assistance and, 
instead, suppressed and distorted documentation and altered 
American understanding of these developments, which led to 
11Mao 1 s exclusive reliance on Stali~'and an extension of the 
Ch . . · 1 100 1nese c1v1 war. John Service, to whom Mao expressed 
his early rejection of Russia, believed that the evidence 
of this rejection was contained in Mao and his lieutenants• 
conversations with foreign service officers as well as the 
99u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, 
The Far East, p. 721. Memorandum of January 3, 1946. 
lOOu.s., Congress, Senate, United States Relations 
with the People's Republic, Statement by Allens. Whiting, 
P• 196. 
fact that Mao had just concluded a long "rectification 
campaign," which eliminated the influence of Russian-
trained leaders and established the party doctrine of 
101 Chairman Mao Tse-tung. Service recalled that Mao had 
34 
11 always hated the Russians and the Russians always disliked 
him.11102 Stalin would have preferred a weak and disunited 
China under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek rather than a 
strong, united, effective China under Mao's Communist 
Party. 103 Most assuredly, the United States had many 
China policy alternatives from which to choose and consider 
prior to and immediately following the termination of the 
Second World War, even though Americans usually remember 
only the three well-known alternatives mentioned by Dean 
Acheson in his "Letter of Transmittal. 11 
101 U.S., Congress, Senate, United States-China 
Relations, p. 29. 
102Marder, 11 Chou, Mao and the u.s., 11 p. A8. 
l03u.s., Congress, Senate, United States-China 








HURLEY 1 S RESIGNATION 
On November 26, 1945, Major General and American 
Ambassador to China Patrick J. Hurley dramatically resigned 
his post, attributing the 11 failure of American foreign 
policy in Asia to the weakness and opposition of the 
United States Foreign Service. 111 "The astonishing feature 
of our foreign policy," declared Hurley, 11 is the wide 
discrepancy between our announced policies and our conduct 
of international relations. 11 General Hurley attacked 
American foreign service officers as the cause of his 
unsuccessful mission. His assault pinpointed foreign 
service officers who had been stationed in China during 
the Second World War and were in the Far Eastern and Chinese 
Divisions of the State Department. Hurley's explosive 
resignation informed the American people that the United 
States' position in China was 11 misunderstood 11 and he 
suggested that the American Government needed a complete 
1u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, 
The Far East, p. 722. Major General Patrick Hurley's 
letter of resignation of November 26, 1945, to President 
Harry s. Truman. 
35 
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reorganization of its 11 policy-making machinery beginning at 
the lower official levels. 112 
Although this letter of resignation was dated 
November 26 and was addressed to President Truman, Hurley 
handed it to Secretary of State James Byrnes, who refused 
to deliver it to the President. 3 Hurley asked for the 
Secretary's views on China and Byrnes informed Hurley that 
American policy toward China had not changed since his 
arrival in the United States in September. 4 Secretary 
Byrnes agreed to prepare for Hurley a memorandum on 
America's foreign policy toward China to be given to Hurley 
on November 27. Satisfied that his long sought-after China 
policy memorandum was forthcoming, Hurley left the 
Secretary's office and agreed not to resign but to return 
to China immediately after a speech before the National 
Press Club. 5 
2Ibid., p. 725. There is some question as to when 
Hurley's letter of resignation reached President Truman. 
In u.s., President, Public Papers, Truman, 1945, p. 512, 
Harry Truman said that he received this letter on November 
29 while Don Lohbeck 1 s Patrick J. Hurley (Chicago: Henry 
Regnery Company, 1956), p. 428, contradicted this informa-
tion. Lohbeck included a letter from President Truman, 
dated November 27, accepting Hurley's resignation. 
3Feis, China Tangle, p. 408. 
4u.s., Congress, Senate, Investigation of Far Eastern 
Policy, Testimony of James F. Byrnes, p. !54. 
5Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: 
w. w. Norton and Company, Inc., 1969), p. 134. 
-
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Noted for his Choctaw war whoop, Hurley evoked the 
same response of shock in the announcement of his resigna-
tion before the National Press Club in Washington, D. c., 
on the 27th of November. To a stunned audience of news-
papermen, Hurley emphasized that Soviet Russia had said 
that 11 the Chinese Communists are not in fact Communists at 
6 all. 11 Hurley felt that foreign service career men "con-
tinuously told the Communist party and the world that they 
were betting on the wrong horse. 11 He attacked these career 
men by declaring they 11 either did not know the American 
policy in China or they were deliberately opposing the 
policy. 117 
When Patrick Hurley delivered his dramatic speech, 
President Truman, who was attending a Cabinet luncheon, 
informed the Cabinet of the contents of Hurley's speech. 
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal said that Hurley's 
action 11 was a complete surprise to both the President and 
the Secretary of State," both of whom believed that Hurley 
was going to return to China. 8 Harry Truman recalled in 
his Memoirs that he had persuaded Hurley on November 27, 
the day of his announcement of resignation, to go back to 
6u.s., Congress, Senate, Investigation of Far Eastern 
Policy, Testimony of Patrick J. Hurley, p. 70. 
7~., P• 69. 
8Forrestal, Forrestal Diaries, P• 163. 
China, even though Patrick Hurley denied that he had 
spoken with the President on that day. 9 Truman described 
Hurley's 11 impetuous 11 actions as 11 an utterly inexplicable 
about-face. 1110 
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Secretary of State Byrnes informed the President that 
the Hurley resignation 11 was a mistake. 1111 President Truman 
discussed with his Cabinet the choice of a successor to 
General Hurley. Secretary of Agriculture Clinton Anderson 
suggested the former Chief of Staff, General George c. 
Marshall. Anderson judged that Marshall's appointment 
"would take the headlines away from Hurley's resigna-
tion.1112 Anderson's suggestion was agreed upon unanimously 
by Truman and his Cabinet. Following the Cabinet meeting, 
the President announced and accepted the resignation of 
Ambassador Hurley and then he announced the appointment of 
George Marshall as presidential representative to China. 
9narry s. Truman, Memoirs, 2 vols., Vol. II: Years 
of Trial and Hope (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and 
Company, Inc., 1956), p. 65; Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, 
p. 428. 
lOTruman, Memoirs, II, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 66. 
President Truman said that Hurley 1s letter of resignation 
had been given to the press. 
11 U.S., Congress, Senate, Investigation of Far 
Eastern Policy, Testimony of James F. Byrnes, p. 155. 
12Forrestal, Forrestal Diaries, p. 113. See also 
Margaret s. Truman, Harry s. Truman (New York: William 
Morrow & Company, Inc., 1973), P• 301; Lohbeck, Patrick J. 




Why Hurley had taken so long to resign from his post 
since his arrival from Chungking in late September must be 
investigated in order to discover the reason or reasons 
Hurley decided not to return to China and proceeded to 
attack the Truman Administration's China policy in his 
National Press Club Speech. Ambassador Hurley returned to 
the United States in late September and promptly informed 
Secretary Byrnes that he wished to resign from his post for 
reasons of health. 13 Hurley's subsequent checkup at Walter 
Reed Hospital indicated that his health had improved, and 
he told President Truman and Secretary Byrnes that he had 
decided to return to China following a rest in the United 
States. 14 Hurley requested that a public statement of 
policy toward China be issued by the Administration but no 
statement was issued. 15 
Ambassador Hurley met with President Truman and 
Secretary Byrnes on October 13 and informed them that he 
intended to resign because he was not receiving support for 
American foreign policy from American foreign service 
1 3u.s., Congress, Senate, Investigation of Far 
Eastern Policy, Testimony of James F. Byrnes, P• 152. 
1 4Ibid.; Hedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports?, p. 358. 
1 5u.s., Congress, Senate, Investigation of Far 
Eastern Policy, Testimony of Patrick J. Hurley, p. 90. In 
Don Lohbeck 1 s Patrick J. Hurley, pp. 411, 422, the author 
revealed that Hurley had requested in May and June, 1945, 
a public statement on our policy toward China. 
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ff . 16 o 1.cers. Hurley agreed to remain at his post if the 
career officers, who were sabotaging his efforts in China, 
were reassigned to other positions. The Ambassador again 
asked 11 for either a public statement or a written statement 
of American policy in China, but no such definitive state-
ment was issued. 1117 Hurley returned to his home in Santa 
Fe and remained there for four weeks. He was kept informed 
by the State Department of China's 11 almost hopeless" con-
flict between the Communists and the Nationalists. 18 In 
hopes of obtaining a response from Washington on American 
policy toward China, Hurley delivered his Santa Fe speech 
on November 15. Hurley reviewed America's role in China by 
strongly emphasizing that 11 a free, united, independent 
China has been for many years a strong and consistent tenet 
of u.s. foreign policy.u19 11 The people of China and their 
leaders,11 reflected Hurley, 11 are free to choose their own 
form of Government, furnish their own leadership, make 
their own decisions, and be responsible for their own 
1 . . 1120 po 1.c1.es. Unknown to Hurley, the Administration was 
16Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, p. 421. 
l7Ibid., p. 422. 
18Feis, China Tangle, P• 407. 
19u.s., Congress, Senate, Investigation of Far 
Eastern Policy, Testimony of Patrick J. Hurley, p. 62. 
20~., P• 63. 
reexamining its China policy which would be released to 
the American people in the President's statement of 
December 15. 
21 
Hurley traveled to Washington and on November 25 he 
22 
discussed his resignation twice with Secretary Byrnes. 
Byrnes asked him to reconsider his resignation in view of 
the serious situation in China. Hurley agreed to return 
to his post immediately after his speech before the 
National Press Clu~ on November 27. He recalled that he 
had unsuccessfully requested a conference with President 
Truman on November 25 and again, two days later. 23 
41 
Hurley's decision not to resign was reversed by a 
series of events. First, Everett Drumright, head of the 
Chinese Division of the State Department, showed Hurley a 
letter addressed to President Truman which attacked 
Hurley's policy as 11 not the policy of the United States. 1124 
According to Hurley, John Carter Vincent, head of the Far 
Eastern desk in the State Department, declined to send out 
21 Tsou, America's Failure, p. 341. 
22u.s., Congress, Senate, Investigation of Far 
Eastern Policy, Testimony of James F. Byrnes, p. 154. 
23Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, p. 503. There is no 
mention of this request in Truman's Memoirs, II, Years of 
Trial and Hope. 
24u.s., Congress, Senate, Investigation of Far 
Eastern Policy, Testimony of Patrick J. Hurley, PP• 90, 96; 
Lohbeck, ratrick J. Hurley, P• 443. 
- ----------------------------------~ : 
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Drumright 1 s proposed reply and ordered a short two-sentence 
acknowledgment of the letter. This incident augmented 
Hurley's mistrust of foreign service officers, who he 
suspected were attempting to undermine his work. Second, 
Hurley was attacked on the floor of the House by 
Representative Hugh DeLacy, who noted that "step by step 
Ambassador Hurley's reversals of the Roosevelt-Gauss policy 
in China have made the present war unavoidable. He and 
General Wedemeyer have now committed us to armed interven-
tion.1125 Hurley thought that DeLacy 1 s speech contained 
unpublished information which had been passed from the 
State Department to DeLacy. 
Although Hurley labeled the DeLacy speech as his 
prime reason for resignation, he recalled at the 1951 
MacArthur Hearings that the Chinese Minister of Foreign 
Relations, Wang Shih-chieh, had told him that Secretary 
Byrnes was 11 going to give my place to a deserving 
26 Democrat." Hurley also noted that the publication of his 
statements in the Daily Worker and several newspapers 
25u.s., Congress, House, Extension of Remarks of 
Representative Hugh DeLacy, 79th Cong., 1st sess., Nov. 26, 
1945, Congressional Record, XCI, Part 8, 10995. See also 
Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, p. 425. 
26u.s., Congress, Senate, Military Situation, Part 4, 
Testimony of Patrick J. Hurley, p. 2937. Patrick Hurley 
was warned by Dr. Quo, who was working at the United Nations, 
that "if I would go to China, the idea was to get me over 
there and find some pretext of public disgrace. 11 
proved to him those statements had originated in the State 
Department. 27 Noted Far Eastern expert Herbert Feis sur-
mised that Hurley's insecurity about the completion of his 
. . h t .b t d t h' · · 28 mission may ave con ri u e o is resignation. Hurley 
might have perceived his inability to unite the two 
irreconcilable groups into a united and democratic China. 
43 
Hurley thought that the urgency of the Far Eastern 
situation and the inability on the part of Washington 
officials to take a definite stand on American policy in 
China demanded that he bring this matter before the 
American people. He believed that the State Department was 
11 covering itself with a veil of secrecy that prevents the 
public from getting at the facts. 1129 He felt that he was 
left 11 naked to my enemies 11 and decided to "commence firing 11 
because 11 it was futile for me to try to uphold the American 
policy while I had such great odds against me in the State 
Department. 1130 
Although Hurley's resignation and the ensuing accusa-
tions brought him to the attention of the American people, 
President Truman refused to comment on Hurley's charges. 
27Ibid. 
28Feis, China Tangle, P• 409. 
29Felix Belair, Jr., 11 Congress Inquiry Demanded as 
Hurley Adds to Charges, 11 New York Times, Nov. 29, 1945, p. 3. 
30u.s., Congress, Senate, Investigation of Far 
Eastern Policy, Testimony of Patrick Hurley, pp. 90., 96. 
::i 
0 
Senator Tom Connally, a leading Democrat, judged that the 
DeLacy speech 11 is the greatest achievement any member of 
the House of Representatives has attained in my time in 
Congress. 1131 Connally was amazed that 11 one little speech" 
had driven 11 a great Ambassador from his post in China. 11 
Washington Post correspondent Edward T. Folliard wondered 
whether Hurley was "launching a Hurley-for-President when 
he resigned and cut loose with his broadside.11 32 
44 
Whether Hurley was running for the Senate, the Presidency 
or possessed no political ambitions, Major General Claire 
Lee Chennault spoke for many Americans when he praised 
Hurley for 11 placing the issue of American foreign policy 
squarely before the American people. 1133 In an article in 
the Atlanta Journal of November 28, former Foreign Service 
Officer Hugh Grant praised the former Ambassador for 11 a 
3lEdward T. Folliard, 11 What Are the Facts about the 
Furor over China?," Washington Post, Dec. 2, 1945, sec. II, 
P• lB. 
32Ibid. See also editorial by Richard Lloyd Jones in 
the TulsaTribune on Nov. 30, 1945, as printed in U.S., 
Congress, House, 11 Pat Hurley for President," Extension of 
Remarks of Representative George W. Schwabe, 79th Cong., 
1st sess., Dec. 4, 1945, Congressional Record, XCI, Part 13, 
A5277, and Drew Pearson, 11 The Washington Merry-Go-Round, 11 
Washin~on Post, Dec. 11, 1945, P• 8B. Mr. Pearson stated 
that "riends say that Hurley will run for the Senate from 
New Mexico and two years hence would like to make a stab at 
the Presidency. Regarding the latter goal, seasoned 
Republican politicos say he won 1 t have a chance. 11 
33Quoted in uchennault Praises Hurley," New York 
Times, Nov. 28, 1945, P• 3. 
---------------------------~ ... 
distinct public service in revealing the destructionist 
tactics of American Foreign Service •career• officers in 
the Far Bast and the State Department.11 34 "This sort of 
business, 11 said Grant, 11 has been going on for a long time 
in our Foreign Service, but few men possessed Pat Hurley's 
courage to speak out. 11 
45 
Hurley's resignation set off a congressional debate, 
with Senators and Representatives lining up, in most cases, 
on a partisan basis. 35 This debate opened "up full blast 
against President Truman and his foreign policy, or what 
many allege, his lack of foreign policy.11 36 Senator 
Kenneth s. Wherry, the Republican Whip from Nebraska, 
demanded on the floor of the Senate that an immediate 
investigation of Hurley's charges against the State 
Department personnel be initiated. Senator Wherry reported 
that the conduct of those State Department employees 
34Hugh Grant, "Few Men Have Courage," Atlanta Journal, 
Nov. 28, 1945, as printed in U.S., Congress, Senate, 
Investigation of Far Eastern Policy, p. 125. Hugh Grant, 
who was a member of the State Department from 1933 to 1942, 
was a former United States Minister to Albania and Thailand. 
Mr. Grant offered to testify before the Foreign Relations 
Committee on foreign service sabotage activities in Thailand 
during the Second World \var. 
35Koen, 11 China Lobby, 11 P• 57. 
36Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Larry H. Lehbras of 
the Bureau of Public Relations of the War Department in 
Washington, D. c., Nov. 30, 1945, to General Douglas 
MacArthur, in the Douglas :MacArthur Papers, s.c.A.P. File, 







11 skirts the edge of treason. 1137 The Republican Whip 
concluded his address by introducing a resolution calling 
for a special committee of five Senators 11 to make a full 
and complete study and investigation with respect to the 
policies, operations, administration, and personnel of the 
Department of State. 1138 Another Republican, Senator 
Raymond E. Willis of Indiana, called for "some explaining 
and housecleaning" by the State Department. 39 Senator 
46 
Tom Connally, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Conunittee, 
recommended that Ambassador Hurley appear before his com-
mittee to explain 11 his extraordinary and dramatic resigna-
tion.1140 Connally announced: 11 I 1 d like to have General 
Hurley come up here and look us in the eye and tell us 
what some of these terrible things are. 11 
In the House of Representatives, Congresswoman Edith 
Nourse Rogers of Massachusetts and Congressman Carl T. 
Curtis of Nebraska, both Republicans, called for an 
investigation of the State Department. Mrs. Rogers wished 
37Quoted in Belair, Jr., 11 Congress Inquiry Demanded, 11 
P• 1. 
3 8s. Res. 197 as printed in u.s., Congress, Senate, 
Investigation of Far Eastern Policy, P• 145. 
39"Hurley Eager for China Quiz if It's Public, 11 
Washington Post, Dec. 1, 1945, P• 1. 




that the Foreign Affairs Committee, of which she was a 
member, would summon Hurley 11 to give us the facts in the 
charges he made, since the country is entitled to know. 1141 
Representative Hugh DeLacy, a Democrat, also urged that the 
Foreign Affairs Committee investigate the "rotten Hurley 
policy 11 in China. 42 Members of the House, particularly 
Albert Gore, Democrat from Tennessee, Christian A. Herter, 
Republican from Massachusetts, and Chester E. Merrow, 
Republican from New Hampshire, introduced resolutions in 
the House for a complete investigation into Hurley's 
charges. 
While congressmen advocated an investigation into 
Hurley's attacks, other congressmen, like Pat Hurley, felt 
that too little information on our China policy was given 
to the American people. In a speech on the floor of the 
House, Representative Frances P. Bolton, a Republican from 
Ohio and a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, pro-
tested that 11 all too little information is given the people 
of the United States in the matter of what we are doing 
41Quoted in Ibid. See also U.S., Congress, House, 
Representative Edith N. Rogers' H. Res. 443 requesting 
Secretary Byrnes to render information regarding Hurley's 
resignation "and the sabotage of our foreign policy in 
Chinatr to the Foreign Affairs Committee, 79th Cong., 1st 
sess., Nov. 30, 1945, Congressional Record, XCI, Part 9, 
11280. 







and we are attempting to do in the foreign fields.11 43 A 
Republican member of the House, Robert F • .Jones of Ohio, 
demanded that the "entire field of American policy be 
investigated and that General Hurley be invited to address 
a joint session of Congress in recess.11 44 
48 
As a result of the Senate resolution introduced by 
Senator Wherry, the Senate Foreign Relations Conmli ttee held 
hearings to investigate Ambassador Hurley's charges and to 
determine whether to reject or report the Wherry Resolution. 
As the star witness of the first two of the four days of 
hearings, General Patrick Hurley appeared before the 
Foreign Relations Committee on December 5 and 6. On 
December 5, Secretary of State .James Byrnes' press release 
of that day was taken from the text of a letter, dated 
November 30, from the Secretary to Representative .Jack z. 
Anderson, a Republican from California, in an8'ver to 
Anderson's inquiry on the clarification of America's China 
policy. Representative Anderson's letter to the Secretary 
of State noted that our relations toward China were 11 a 
subject of utmost importance to every citizen of the 
United States who is entitled to be kept fully informed of 
43u.s., Congress, House, 11 0ur Foreign Service in 
China II Extension of Remarks of Representative Frances P. 
Bolto~, 79th Cong., 1st sess., Nov. 28, 1945, Congressional 
Record, XCI, Part 13, A5269. 




our foreign relations policies throughout the entire 
world. 1145 "If the united support of our country's policies 
abroad is necessary and desirable," reflected Anderson, 
11 and surely it is, then we must be kept fully informed of 
all future developments.11 46 The Secretary's reply to 
Anderson's letter reiterated American policy toward China: 
We favor the creation of a strong, united, and 
democratic China which will contribute to peace 
and stability in the Far East and which will 
enable China effectively to support the United 
Nations. 
In line with this policy, we deem it 
desirable and essential that China solve her 
internal problems. • • • [W]e seek by all 
appropriate and practicable means to pursue such 
policies and actions as will best facilitate 
China's ac2~evement of internal unity and 
stability. 
This statement was expected to serve as the basis in the 
future for a more extensive statement from President Harry 
Truman. 48 
In a question posed to Hurley during the Foreign 
Relations hearings on the significance of Byrnes' letter to 
45u. s., Congress, House, 11 Our Chinese Policy, 11 
Extension of Remarks of Representative Jack z. Anderson, 
79th Cong., 1st sess., Dec. 4, 1945, Congressional Record, 
XCI, Part 13, AS269. 
46~., A5270. 
47Ibid., u.s., Congress, Senate, Investigation of Far 
Eastern PoITcy, pp. 60-61. 
48nu.s. Backing China, Byrnes Declares," Nmv York 









Representative Anderson and the ensuing press release, 
Hurley stated that if the contents of Byrnes' letter "had 
been issued by the State Department before I returned from 
China, I would not have returned.11 49 11 If that public 
statement had been made by the State Department before I 
tendered my resignation," said Hurley, 11 I would not have 
resigned. 11 Hurley repeatedly told committee members that 
he had been asking for a foreign policy pronouncement. while 
he was in China and upon his return from China. 50 
Responding to Hurley's accusations that he had 
requested but not received a public statement on China, 
Secretary Byrnes told the members of the Foreign Relations 
Committee that "I can state categorically that he has never 
made such a request in conversation with me. 1151 In a 
conversation with the President, Byrnes noted that 
President Truman had not been requested orally or in writ-
ing in regard to a public statement. Byrnes pointed out 
that he had responded to Representative Anderson's letter 
because "when a member of Congress requests an explanation 
of some aspect of our foreign policy, I take it as a matter 
49u.s., Congress, Senate, Investigation of Far 
Eastern Policy, P• 61. 
SO~., pp. 84, 90, 101, 103. 
Sl~•, P• 148. 
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of course that the request should be answered.11 52 Byrnes 
emphasized that if such inquiries were not made, he would 
issue a public statement 11 only as occasion may demand." 
51 
In testifying before the Foreign Relations Committee 
on December 7, Secretary Byrnes revealed to the committee 
members a preview of the upcoming presidential speech by 
informing them that China's Government must be broadened 
to include those groups which were not presently repre-
sented.53 Byrnes then examined General Hurley's attacks 
on foreign service officers and defined their right to 
report what they had observed. Secretary Byrnes testified: 
Whenever an official honestly believes that 
changed conditions require it, he should not 
hesitate to express his views to his superior 
officers. I should be profoundly unhappy to 
learn that an officer of the Department of State, 
within or without the Foreign Service, might feel 
bound to refrain from submitting through proper 
channels an honest report or recommendation for 
fear of offending me or anyone else in the 
Department. If that day should arrive, I will 
have lost the very essence of the assistance and 
guidance I require for the successful disch~Egc 
of the heavy responsibilities of my office. 
Even though the reports of foreign service officers 
weakened ttfaith in the power of the Generalissimo and his 
groups to govern China, 11 Representative Mike Mansfield felt 
52Ibid. 
53~., P• 146. 
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that State Department career officers• "interests first and 
foremost must have been in our country's behalf.1155 
Foreign service officers had maintained a flexible policy 
toward China by repeatedly advising in their in-depth 
reports against unqualified support of a corrupt regime. 
These men reported what they saw in Yenan and Nationalist 
China and 11 warned their superiors of the danger of tying 
the United States irrevocably to a regime that was rapidly 
discrediting itself and might well be unable to survive.11 56 
Washington Post correspondent Marquis Childs recalled in 
1971 that these foreign service officers 11 reported the 
truth as they saw it.n 57 
While Secretary Byrnes and Representative :Mansfield 
endorsed the honest and analytical fact-finding reports by 
foreign service officers, career officers not only criti-
cized the Chungking Government of Chiang Kai-shek but also 
5 Su. s. , Congress, House, 11 0ur China Policy, 11 
Extension of Remarks of Representative Mike Hansfield, 79th 
Cong., 1st sess., Dec. 11, 1945, Congressional Record, XCI, 
Part 9, 11852. 
56Lyman P. Van Slyke 1 s Introduction to U.S., 
Department of State, China White Paper, I, P• I-xi. 
S7Marquis Childs, 11 01d China Truths Deserve Reward," 
Washington Post, .July 23,_1971, P• A23. See a~so lette: 
from Theodore H. White, Richard Hatts, .Jr., Eric Sevareid, 
Annalee Jacoby and Jack Belden to Senator Tom Connally in 
regard to foreign service officers' reports from China as 
printed in u.s., Congress, Senate, Investigation of Far 
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criticized Ambassador Patrick Hurley's handling of 
America's foreign policy toward our ally. In April, 1945, 
the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, 
Edwin A. Stanton, noted that Ambassador Hurley's approach 
to China's complicated political problems was characterized 
11 by an intransigent and inflexible attitude.11 58 State 
Department officials encouraged Hurley to have a "com-
pletely flexible and realistic approach 11 to China's policy 
matters. Edwin Stanton's memorandum was an "attempt to put 
a high level curb on Hurley," who was giving 11 blank check" 
support to Chiang Kai-shek and his one-party government. 59 
Stanton also voiced deep concern over Hurley's restrictions 
upon political reporting by foreign service officers in 
China. "We have definite reason to believe," said Stanton, 
11 that Hurley has ordered that only political events favor-
able to the Chinese National Government may be made to the 
Department." Stanton continued: 
This means that the Department will receive 
restricted and incomplete information concerning 
developments in China and it is apparent that we 
can no longer count on receiving factual and 
objective reports in regard to all aspects of_ 
the situation which the Department must have if 
S8u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, 
The Far Bast, p. 349. Memorandum of April 28, 1945, from 
Edwin A. Stanton to Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew 
and Assistant Secretary of State Holmes. 
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it is to conduct its foreign relat~sns in an 
intelligent and successful manner. 
The State Department had bluntly and clearly stated that it 
was most concerned with Hurley's handling of China policy 
matters. John Service noted that the "unusual situation 
••• in which the government in Washington had one policy 
and its ambassador in China a different one persisted until 
H 1 ' d t. . t. I 61 ur ey s rama ic resigna ion. 1 
To support and substantiate the assertions he made 
in his National Press Club Speech, Pat Hurley often asked 
Chairman Connally to obtain from the State Department thir-
62 teen documents. Hurley believed that it was unfair for 
committee members to question him on unavailable documents 
which would support his assertions. Professor Anthony 
Kubek judged that Senator Connally would not release the 
documents because it would be detrimental to national 
security. 63 In a closed meeting of the Foreign Relations 
60 U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, 
The Far East, pp. 349-50. 
61service, Amerasia Papers, P• 121. 
62u.s. Congress, Senate, Investifation of Far 
Eastern Poli~y pp. 94, 109. In Lohbeck 1 s Patrick J. 
Hurley, p. 1442, the author mentioned thirteen documents. 
At the 1951 MacArthur Hearings, Hurley recalled that he had 
asked for twelve documents (U.S., Congress, Senate, 
Military Situation, Part 4, P• 2888). In How ~he Far East 
Was Lost, p. 310, Professor Anthony Kubek mentioned that 
Hurley had requested thirteen documents. 
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Committee on December 10, after the fourth and final ses-
sion of hearings, Senator Styles Bridges of New Hampshire 
said that 11 what we saw in the secret documents 'sub-
stantiated in a general way• Hurley's complaints about his 
troubles in China.11 64 
At the three-hour closed meeting of the Foreign 
Relations Conunittee, Chairman Connally rejected the Hherry 
Resolution to investigate Hurley's charges. Connally 
55 
stated that 11 there would be no more hearings on the Hurley 
charges, and no immediate action--maybe none at all--
growing out of the committee's short-lived investigation. 1165 
The committee was in a state of 11 suspended recessn with the 
options of either forgetting the Hurley case or reopening 
the case. The top-to-bottom investigation of the State 
Department had terminated and the State Department had 
received "a virtual vote of confidence" by 11 dismissing the 
troublesome Hurley case of Patrick Hurley versus the State 
Department. 11 66 
One pertinent document, which Hurley had requested 
during the hearings, was the secret Far Eastern agreements 
64James Chinn, nnurley Case Shoved Aside by 
Committee," Washington Post, Dec. 12, 1945, P• 6. 
65Ibid. 
661bid.; nnurley Charges Dropped in Senate, 11 New 









of the Yalta Conference. He wanted the American people to 
learn of these agreements and he had originally included 
some information about the role of secrecy at the Yalta 
Conference in his letter of resignation. Senator Arthur H. 
Vandenberg, who was to be a representative of the United 
States at the Moscow Foreign :Ministers• Meeting in mid-
December, persuaded him not to mention it in his letter of 
resignation. Hurley agreed on the condition that after the 
Foreign Ministers• Meeting "the Yalta ageeement [be] made 
public and ••• changes in that document would be secured 
to preserve China's independence and territorial integ-
rity.1167 Hurley requested this document at the Foreign 
Relations Committee hearings, but Senator Vandenberg, a 
member of that committee, told him that possession of the 
Yalta document and a discussion of the Yalta Conference 
would hamper the efforts of Byrnes and himself at Moscow. 
Vandenberg asked Hurley: 11 Why don 1 t you wait until it is 
over and you will be given an opportunity to say everything 
68 you wish to say.u This idea of n temporary postponement 
was also evident in Senator Styles Bridges' suggestion on 
December 10 for a thorough investigation of Hurley's 
6 7Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, P• 427. 
68 U.S., Congress, 
Testimony of Patrick J. 
Hurley, P• 439 • 
senate, Military Situation, Part 4, 
Hurley, P• 2836; Lohbeck, Patrick J. 
--
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charges II in a month or two.'' 69 Hurley was not to testify 
again before a congressional committee until 1951. 
Hurley wanted the American people to know the Far 
Eastern agreements within the Yalta document, but he 
trusted Senator Arthur Vandenberg and agreed that the 
exposure of Yalta 1 s controversial provisions would harm 
the Foreign Ministers' Meeting in :Moscow. President 
Roosevelt had believed that Soviet participation in the 
57 
Far East was necessary to defeat Japan and agreed to the 
inclusion of the secret agreements. Stalin insisted that 
these agreements be put in writing and contain the follow-
ing statement: 11 The Heads of the three Great Powers have 
agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be 
unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.11 70 
If unrepresented China refused to agree to the Yalta 
agreement, the United States and Great Britain "would have 
been compelled to join in enforcing them. 1171 There is no 
record of conversation between Stalin and Roosevelt indi-
cating the possibility that Chiang might not accept the Far 
Eastern provisions. Far Eastern expert Herbert Feis has 
said that "the whole record suggests that neither Roosevelt 
69"Hurley Charges Dropped in Senate, 11 p. 1. 
70u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 
Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 984. 
7lSher,wod, Roosevelt and Hopkins, P• 984. 
I'. 
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nor Stalin thought it unlikely that Chiang Kai-shek would 
refuse his consent. 1172 Chiang was not informed of the 
contents of the Yalta document at the time of the confer-
ence or immediately following it "for fear knowledge of 
Stalin's intention to enter the Pacific War would reach 
the Japanese. 1173 
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The existence of these Far Eastern agreements was not 
disclosed in the joint communique which was published at 
the end of the conference or in President Roosevelt 1 s 
address to a joint session of Congress on March 1, 1945. 
Secrecy was a military necessity and was maintained by the 
participants at the conference. 74 Ambassador Hurley was 
not informed of the secret agreements until March and was 
not allowed to mention them to the Generalissimo until 
June. Hurley strongly opposed these agreements and 
emphasized that Chiang's Government was our ally. He 
objected to these agreements because they "gave away 
72Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, p. 515. See 
also Kubek, How the Far East \'las Lost, p. 165. 
73Koen "China Lobby, 11 p. 51. At the Roosevelt-
Stalin meeti~g of February 8, 1945, as recorded in U.S., 
Department of State, Foreign Relations, Conferences at 
Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 768, }>resident Roosevelt ~aid 
that "one of the difficulties in speaking to the Chinese 
was that anything said to them was known to the whole world 
in twenty-four hours. 11 
74 -u.s., Congress, Senate, Military Situation, Part 5, 
Testimony of lv. Averell Harriman, P• 3334. 
--
another's property.n 75 Hurley was infuriated that the 
contents of these agreements were kept secret from the 
Chinese people, Chiang Kai-shek and the American people. 76 
Even State Department Far Eastern specialists had no 
knowledge of the existence of any Yalta agreements per-
taining to China. 77 The head of the Far Eastern Division 
of the State Department did not learn of them until July, 
1945. 
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During the month of May there was active considera-
tion, particularly initiated by Assistant Secretary of 
State Joseph Grew, as to whether the Yalta decision should 
be reconsidered or carried into effect. 78 In late April, 
President Truman had told Secretary of State Stettinius to 
inform Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov that if "one part" 
of the Yalta agreement t1was breached he would consider the 
entire Yalta agreement was no longer binding on any of the 
parties interested. 1179 President Truman believed that 
75Ibid., Part 4, Testimony of Patrick J. Hurley, 
p. 2840.-
76rbid., p. 2836. 
77Service, Amerasia Papers, p. 130; Grew, Turbulent 
~' II, P• 1444• 
7 8service, Amerasia Papers, P• 129. Memorandum of 
May 5, 1945, from Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew 
to Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal. 




11 our agreements with the Soviet Union so far had been a 
So 
one-way street. 11 This temporary reconsideration of 
American policy produced the decision not to revise the 
Yalta agreements but simply to have Stalin reclarify his 
·t· d" Ch" · · 81 posi ion regar ing 1.nese sovereignty in Manchuria. 
60 
Even though General Hurley told Secretary Dyrnes that 
he 11 did not ask for any hearing, 11 he did want a hearing to 
air his views so that secrecy would not continue to prevail 
in our China policy. The American people did not learn 
much from the Foreign Relations Committee's investigation 
into the formulation and implementation of United States 
foreign policy. rrior to the termination of these hearings, 
Representative Hugh DeLacy, who had a most important part 
in Hurley's resignation, called on the floor of the House 
for Americans to learn the story of China not only from 
General Hurley but also from 11 those who know it well, 11 
particularly General Joseph Stilwell, former Ambassador 
Clarence Gauss, and American correspondents and business-
men who had returned from China. 82 Only General Patrick 
Soibid. 
81Tsou, America's Failure, P• 259. 
82u.s., Congress, House, Extension of Remarks of Hugh 
DeLacy 79th Cong., 1st sess., Dec. 7, 1945, Congressional 
Record' XCI Part 9, 11695. An article entitled "Hurley 
Eager for China Quiz if It's Public" in the Wa~hington Post 
revealed that President Truman had conferred with General 
Joseph Stilwell and former Ambassador Clarence Gauss on 
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Hurley, Secretary of State James Byrnes, Under Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson and war correspondent Theodore H. ,vhite 
testified before the Foreign Relations Committee. Not one 
foreign service career officer testified at these hearings, 
although their reports were criticized by General Hurley 
and praised by Secretary Byrnes. 
Hurley's clashes with committee members during the 
hearings did not make for a pleasant atmosphere. Hurley 
was difficult to talk to and in many instances Chairman 
Tom Connally and his Senate colleagues found that Hurley 
chose not to answer their questions in a straightforward 
manner. John Service questioned Hurley's 11 balance 11 while 
Maxwell Stuart, a correspondent for Nation, attacked Hurley 
for 11 his attempt to shift the balance for his failure to 
his subordinates" as a reflection both of his vanity and of 
h . . 83 is incompetence. 
The suppression of State Department documents 
deprived former Ambassador Hurley from presenting evidence 
to support his charges. A top-to-bottom investigation, as 
November 30, 1945. This newspaper article did not give any 
information about this meeting. 
83u.s. Congress, Senate, United States-China 
Relations p: 45; Margaret Truman described Hurley in her 
book Har;y s. Truman p. 300, as an 11 excitable, unstable 
' ~;.;;.....1_'--:--;;;..;.__,;;:""r-;"--:-' • f d . man .o-iven to ,.,ild statements and accusations o is-
loy~lty"; Maxwell s. Stuart, 11 Exit Pat Hurley, 11 The Nation, 






originally envisioned by Senator Kenneth Wherry, might have 
thoroughly investigated America's Far Eastern foreign 
policy. The originators, reporters, proponents and 
opponents of this policy might have provided a constructive 
inquiry into that policy. Representative Mike Mansfield of 
Montana delivered a speech in the House one day after the 
Foreign Relations Committee had ended its investigation 
into Hurley's charges. Mansfield stated that he did not 
know what America's postwar Far Eastern policy was and 
emphasized that Americans had a right to know what it 
was. 84 11 The American people must be kept more fully 
informed of our foreign policy," said .Mansfield, ''so that 
they may know in what direction we are heading. 1185 He 
declared that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and 
the House Foreign Affairs Committee should be kept informed 
on American foreign policy developments, with each commit-
tee meeting at regular intervals with the Secretary of 
State or the Under Secretary of State• 
Had the American people learned at this time of 
Chiang's corrupt government and the inability of that 
government ever to govern China, our China policy might 
84u.s. Congress, House, "Our China Policy," 
Extension of'Remarks of Representative Mike Mansfield, 79th 
Cong., 1st sess., Dec. 11, 1945, Congressional Record, XCI, 
Part 9, 11850. 
85~., p. 11853. 
~ 
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have been quite different. If the Foreign Relations 
Committee's hearings had investigated the role of the 
career officers, who were stationed in China and were in 
the Far Eastern and Chinese Divisions of the State 
Department, those men could have been returned to their 
jobs instead of moving from one unsuitable job to another 
until their retirement. Hurley's attack was successful in 
one aspect: it destroyed the careers of many of America's 
foreign service officers stationed in China and deprived 
the State Department of valuable information on the Yenan 
and Chungking Governments. 
-
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CHAPTER III 
THE APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL 
On November 27, 1945, in 11 a shrewd political counter 
stroke, 11 President Harry Trwnan announced and accepted the 
resignation of Major General Patrick J. Hurley as 
Ambassador to China while he announced the appointment of 
former Chief of Staff and General of the Army George C. 
Marshall as Special Envoy of the President to China. 1 The 
selection of Marshall confirmed the importance President 
Truman assigned to the explosive situation and aided in 
"canceling the effect of Hurley's explosion. 112 Speaking of 
this appointment at a press conference, the President noted 
that "he is a Special Envoy to China for a Special job and 
it is .temporary.11 3 Whether or not the President remembered 
Personal Representative Edwin A. Locke's report of August, 
1945, he did employ one of Locke's proposals to avert civil 
war by the appointment of a personal envoy to China, 
"preferably some experienced negotiator with a •middle of 
1 uour Choice in China," P• 781. 
2Tuchman, Stilwell, P• 526. 
3u.s., President, Public Papers, Truman, 1945, 
p. 512. President Harry Trwnan•s press conference ~f . 
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--
the road 1 reputation and who is well regarded in China, 
Russia and Great Britain.114 
65 
Public reaction to Truman 1 s appointment of George 
Marshall was quite favorable. Commanding General of the 
American Forces in China Albert C. Wedemeyer felt that "few 
men in the United States are better equipped to evaluate 
the situation [in China] than General Marshall," who would 
determine how much American military aid was to be extended 
to the Chinese National Government. 5 Senator Torn Connally 
believed that Marshall "would make an ideal emissary 
because he is such an outstanding military rnan. 116 11 If we 
don 1t send a peacemaker," said Connally, "we will either 
have to pull out of China entirely or fight a full-scale 
war on the side of Chiang Kai-shek 1 s corrupt and reaction-
ary government.11 7 In a speech on the floor of the House, 
Mike Mansfield announced that Marshall knew 11 far more about 
4u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, 
The Far East, p. 452. Memorandum of August 20, 1945, from 
Edwin A. Locke, Jr., Personal Representative of President 
Truman in charge of American Production Mission in China, 
to President Truman. 
511wedemeyer Sees Big Marshall Job," New York Times, 
Nov. 30, 1945, P• 3. 
6Tom Connally, My Name Is Tom Connally (New York: 







the Chinese situation than many Chinese experts.11 8 
Mansfield reasoned that 11 his appointment shows how impor-
tant we consider China and how difficult the Chinese 
problem is. 11 '' Perhaps the problem is not capable of solu-
tion," loudly voiced Mansfield, 11 but if we ever have any 
66 
one man who can unlock the key to the Chinese puzzle that 
man is General Marshall. 11 At the Foreign Ministers' Meet-
ing in Moscow in mid-December, 1945, Stalin lauded Marshall: 
11 If any man could settle the situation it would be General 
Marshal1. 119 Foreign Minister Molotov thought that the 
United States "could have found no better person for this 
difficult task" and 11 that he was there as a special 
representative of the President and not an Ambassador. 1110 
Although public reaction to General Marshall's 
appointment was generally favorable, two Americans opposed 
President Truman's choice. The Supreme Commander of 
American Forces in the Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur, 
8u.s. Congress, House, 11 0ur Choice in China," 
Extension of Remarks of Representative Mike Mansfield, 79th 
Cong., 1st sess., Dec. 11, 1945, Congressional Record, XCI 
Part 9, 11852. 
9u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, 
The Far East, p. 849. Memorandum of Conversation on 
December 23 1945, between Secretary of State Byrnes and 
Generalissi~o Stalin. See also Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, 
p. 228. 
10u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, 
The Far East p. 842. Memorandum of Conversation on 










believed that Marshall "will do more harm than good.11 11 
Representative Ellis Patterson, a Democrat from California, 
thought that Truman's selection of Marshall was a "poor 
appointment" because he 11 doesn•t know anything about China 
and he is a soldier.1112 
·while Marshall did "possess unique qualifications and 
rare skill," the General neither anticipated his appoint-
ment nor 11 was he particularly keen about it. 1113 Marshall 
wanted to retire to his home in Leesburg, Virginia. In a 
conversation with Mrs. George Marshall, American correspond-
ent and adviser to Chiang Kai-shek during 1946, John 
Robinson Beal, learned of Mrs. :Marshall's bitterness that 
her husband trshould be assigned, just at the moment of 
retirement, •to be a messenger boy between the Generalissimo 
and the Communists., because that's all it is.• 1114 
It was rumored in late November that an important reason 
Marshall accepted his appointment 11 was to lay the ground 
11aeneral Douglas MacArthur made this statement to 
General Wang Chih Chinese liaison officer., who informed 
Chung-Gi Kwei., as'reported in Kwei, The Kuomintang Communist 
Struggle., p. 115. 
12 11Hurley Eager for China Quiz if It's Public," PP• 
1, 3; "U.S. Envoy to China Target of Criticism," Japan 
[Nippon] Times., Dec. 2., 1945, P• 1. 
1 3Truman, Memoirs., II, Years of Trial and Hope, 
p. 66. 
14Beal., Marshall in China, P• 156. 
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for his appointment as Secretary of State if and when 
Byrnes decides to step out. 1115 Chinese correspondent Hoh 
Chih-hsing recalled that Marshall accepted his appointment 
"mainly at the request of President Truman and out of a 
sincere desire to work for the common good of China and 
America. 1116 Hoh continued: 
He had apparently no great personal ambitions and 
his sole reward, as perhaps he had foreseen, would 
be the goodwill of the peoples of the two coun-
tries. Actually the mission was thrust into his 
hands, but he was not aware of the difficulties 
and comp1ications involved when he consented to take it. 7 
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On November 30, 1945, three days after his appointment, 
George Marshall commented on the China situation that the 
United States would find itself 11 on the horns of a 
dilemma.11 18 Marshall noted that the United States Government 
15i.etter from Lieutenant Colonel Larry H. Lehbras of 
the Bureau of Public Relations of the War Department in 
Washington, n. c., Nov. 30, 1945, to General Douglas 
MacArthur, in the Douglas MacArthur Papers, S.C.A.P. File, 
Record Group No. 5, Box 1. 
16Hoh Chih-hsing, "Marshall's Mission to China: 
Impressive Achievements Were Recorded in First Three 
Months," The Peiping Chronicle~ Feb. 24~ 1947, P• 2, in the 
Seedlock Collection in possession of MaJor General Robert F. 
Seedlock, U.S.A., Ret., 1629 Nottingham Way, Atlanta, 
Georgia 30309. 
17Ibid. -
18u.s., Department of state, Foreign Relations, 1945, 
The Far East, p. 748. Memorandum of November 30, 1945, 
from General George c. Marshall to Fleet Admiral William D. 




was reluctant 11 to make as plain or bold a statement" which 
must indicate 11 what we mean so that the people at home and 
the people in China, and the Russians also, will clearly 
understand our intentions.1119 
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As General Marshall appeared before the Pearl Harbor 
congressional investigating committee, the White House and 
the State Department prepared four directives for 
Marshall 1 s Mission to China. One of these directives 
became the presidential statement on China which was 
delivered on December 15, the day on which Marshall 
departed for his new post. This statement 11 laid down in 
black and white" for America and the world the principles 
of United States policy toward China.
20 
John Carter 
Vincent, Secretary of State Byrnes, Under Secretary of 
State Acheson, Generals John E. Hull, Louis A. Craig and 
Thomas T. Hardy, Fleet Admiral William Leahy, Time corre-
spondent James Shepley and George Marshall assisted in the 
. t . t t· Ch" 21 preparation of Marshallls writ en ins rue ions on 1na. 
2011Trwnan Promises Publicity on China, 11 P• 3. 
21Readers may consult the following sources for 
further information on Marshall 1 s China directives: 
Acheson Present at the Creation, P• 142; U.S., Congress, 
Senate 'Military Situation, Part 1, Testimony of George C. 
Marshall pp. 459-00; Feis, China Tangle, P• 413; and U.S., 
Departme~t of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, The Far East, 
pp. 745-73. 








The State Department had been reanalyzing its China policy 
since October and foreign service officers had prepared 
numerous memorandwns on our China policy. 
70 
On November 26, Secretaries Forrestal and Patterson 
presented a long memorandum on the military departments• 
proposals on the situation in China to Secretary of State 
Byrnes. The Patterson-Forrestal memorandum called for the 
State Department to 11 provide a definitive policy to cover 
the period of the next few years in China.n
22 
The two 
Secretaries recognized that it was "impossible to support 
Chiang [in demobilization and repatriation] against the 
Japanese without also supporting him against the Chinese 
Communists'' and "firmly elected to accept the risks of the 
latter course.n 23 To assist in repatriating the Japanese, 
the Secretaries recommended that the Marines remain in 
China in spite of their probable involvement in internecine 
warfare. 
On the following day, the Secretaries of State, War 
and Navy met to study the situation in China. Secretary of 
War Robert Patterson was perplexed over General Wedemeyer 1 s 
view that the General was unable to demobilize and repatri-
ate the Japanese "without becoming involved in the Chinese 
22Forrestal, Forrestal Diaries, p. 111 • 
,. 
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civil conflict. 11 Secretary Byrnes believed that the wisest 
course for the United States 11 was to try to force the 
Chinese Government and the Chinese Communists to get 
together on a compromise basis, perhaps telling 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek that we will stop the aid 
to his government unless he goes along with this." Byrnes 
indicated the possibility that the United States could 
establish a common policy with Russia toward China. 
Secretary Patterson interjected that it was 11 clearly in 
our interests to see China united under Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai-shek if that is possible.11 24 
On November 28, John Carter Vincent prepared a 
memorandum entitled 11 0utline of Suggested Course of Action 
in China." This memorandum was used in the preparation of 
the presidential statement of December 15. Vincent empha-
sized that the United States 11 is prepared to assist the 
National Government in effecting the rapid demobilization 
and repatriation of Japanese troops in north China.
1125 
Even though the United States recognized and supported the 
National Government of China as the only legal government, 
Vincent reasoned that 11 it cannot support that Government 
24u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, 
The Far East, PP• 685-86. 
25u.s., congress, Senate, Institute of Pacific 
Relations, Part 7, Testimony of John Carter Vincent, 
p. 2207 • 
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by military intervention in an internecine struggle.11 26 
Vincent said that 11 the United States is prepared to arrange 
•• •fora truce between the opposing forces" if this 
country was requested by the National Government. 2 7 For 
this truce to be effective, it should be accompanied by the 
immediate convocation of a national conference to seek a 
peaceful solution to China's political strife. Vincent 
labeled the National Government a 11 one-party government" 
and thought that military, political and democratic reform 
could only be attained 11 if the basis of that Government is 
broadened to include other political elements in the coun-
try11 with the existence of autonomous armies hampering this 
· 28 endeavor. Vincent's last recommendation, which was 
definitely included in the December presidential statement, 
emphasized the if-then pattern by declaring that 11 if the 
Chinese Government is able to bring about peace and unity 
along the lines described, the United States is prepared 
261bid. In u.s., Department of State, Foreign 
Relations,L945 2 The Far East, P• 755, this point was 
reiterated in a State Department memorandum dated 
December 8 1945 with Secretary Byrnes noting that it 
contained his vi;ws of American policy toward China. 
27u.s., congress, Senate, Institute
1
of Pacific Rela-
tions, Part 7, Testimony of John Carter Vincent, P• 2208. 
28rbid. see also u.s., Department of State, Foreign 
Relations,1945, The Far East, P• 772, e~pecially the 
memorandum by Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern 
Affairs, James K. Penfield. 
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to assist the Chinese Government in every reasonable 
29 
way. • • •" China must accomplish reform or America 
would not provide assistance to her. 
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At a presidential news conference on December 7, 
1945, the President was asked if General Marshall would try 
to get 11 the two factions together again.11 30 President 
Truman replied: 11 I hope so. 11 One day later, Secretary 
Byrnes told General Marshall that before his departure for 
China 11 a firm and unequivocal policy [would] be pub-
lished.1131 11 0therwise," said Byrnes, 11 you, the JCS [the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff] and the War and Navy Departments may 
continue to be hamstrung by the vague, indecisive, delaying 
tactics which have characterized U.S. policy toward China 
since Japanese capitulation. 11 
Vincent's late-November memorandum was echoed by 
Secretary Byrnes in his memorandum of December 9, 1945. 32 
Byrnes' memorandum was one of the four directives which 
29 u.s., Congress, Senate, 
Relations, Part 7, Testimony of 
2208. 
Institute of Pacific 
John Carter Vincent, p. 
30u.s., President, Public Papers, Truman, 1945, P• 528. 
31u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, 
The Far East, p. 758. Memorandum by Lieutenant General 
John E. Hull of the War Department to General Marshall with 
Secretary Byrnes' proposed draft of United States policy 
toward China. 
32 Ibid., pp. 760-61. :Memorandum of December 9, 1945, 
from secretary Byrnes to the War Department. 
) 
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Marshall took with him to China. Byrnes strongly urged 
that "the Central Government of China as well as the 
various dissident elements approach the settlement of their 
differences with a genuine willingness to compromise.11 33 
Again, like Vincent, Byrnes called for the cessation of 
hostilities and the convocation of a national conference 
of representatives of divergent political elements. 
Following General Marshall's departure for Chungking 
on December 15, President Harry Truman issued his statement 
on United States policy toward China. The President laid 
down the principle that 11 a strong, united and democratic 
China" was most important to the success of the United 
Nations as well as to the success of world peace. 34 Truman 
labeled the National Government of the Republic of China as 
the only legal government of China and called it a 11 one-
party government" whose political, military, and democratic 
reform would "be furthered if the basis of the Government 
is broadened to include other political elements in the 
country.1135 "A China disorganized and divided by ••• 
internal strife," said the Commander-in-Chief, was 11 an 
undermining influence to world stability and peace, now and 
34u.s., President, Public Papers, Truman, 1945, 
p. 543. 









in the future. 113 6 Truman felt that China's internal 
affairs were the responsibility of China alone and encour-
aged the Chinese to solve their internal differences by 
peaceful negotiation. The President deemed it essential 
that the fighting between the armies of the Communists and 
the Nationalists cease with the subsequent convocation of a 
national conference of representatives of China's diverse 
political parties. If China achieved peace and unity 
along Truman 1 s prescribed lines, the United States would 
render financial assistance to the National Government in 
postwar reconstruction and rehabilitation. 
President Truman announced that the National 
Government had the only alternative of bringing the 
Communists into the government or continuing civil war. 37 
Truman's statement clearly enunciated that there would be 
no United States military intervention to influence the 
outcome of the Chinese civil conflict while American 
Marines remained in north China for the surrender, demobi-
lization and repatriation of Japanese troops. Secretary of 
State Byrnes recalled that Marshall was informed verbally 
by the President that 11 the Chinese Nationalists were not to 
36~., p. 543. 
37u.s., Congress, Senate, 
Relations, Part 6, Testimony of 
1722. 
Institute of Pacific 
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be left entirely without help, regardless of the success 
or failure of his efforts to promote a peaceful settle-
ment.1138 11All factions," said Byrnes, "were to be 
76 
impressed • • • that if China was ravaged by civil war, the 
United States would not intervene." The Truman statement, 
an outgrowth of Vincent's draft of late November, was a 
continuation of the American Government's policy of condi-
tional aid to Chiang Kai-shek with a new dimension or shift 
of emphasis that no aid would be rendered to the Chinese 
Government unless it settled its differences with the 
Communists. 
The President's announcement noted that the existence 
of the armies of the National Government and the armies of 
the Chinese Communist Government made political unity 
impossible in China. 39 This issue would continue to be 
one of the main obstacles to agreement between the 
Nationalists and the Communists, with the Nationalists 
desiring full control over the Communist armies prior to 
any reorganization of the Government and the Communists 
insisting that the coalition should come first. 
38James F. Byrnes, All in One Lifetime (New York: 
Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1958), p. 330. Historian 
Barbara Tuchman reported in Stilwell, p. 526, that Marshall 
"was instructed to use the movement of troops [Nationalist] 
to north China as his lever." 
39u.s., President, Public Papers, Truman, 1945, 
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The Kuomintang and Communist reaction to the 
presidential statement was one of general approval as 
revealed by New York Times correspondent Tillman Durdin, 
who expressed the view that even though the announcement 
11 buoyed hopes for a peaceful settlement, commentators were 
not inclined to assert that the declaration provided cer-
tain means of solution. 1140 11 It is clear that much will 
depend on the forcefulness and astuteness,'' said Durdin, 
11 with which General George C. Marshall works within the 
terms of his directive. 11 Communists were pleased that 
President Trwnan had, for the first time, referred to the 
Chinese Government as a one-party government and they also 
applauded Mr. Trwnan 1 s pledge of nonintervention in Chinese 
internal affairs.
41 
In a series of six articles on Marshall's Mission to 
China, Chinese correspondent Hoh Chih-hsing recalled in 
1947 that American journalists had referred to Truman's 
China statement as a 11 big stick statement.
1142 
These 
journalists believed that General George Marshall 11 was 
40Tillman Durdin, 11 Chinese Welcome Truman's Policy, 
Peace Talks Near," New York Times, Dec. 17, 1945, P• 1. 
4libid., p. 3; Barnet Nover, 11 China Policy--General 
Marshall"'f"s""Mission, 11 \fashington Post, Dec. 18, 1945, P• 
10. 
42Quoted in Hoh Chih-hsing, 11 Impressive Achievements, 11 
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going to China with a club in his hands, with which he was 
to bring the rival parties there together.11 43 Correspond-
ent Hoh emphasized that the "big stick" was the promised 
American loan to China. 
American-educated Lo Lung-chi, a member of the 
Democratic League, felt that the Chinese words "Hu Yin" or 
11 Call and Answer 11 described China's situation after the 
announcement of the American statement of policy toward 
China. 44 Lo declared: 11We have called, America has 
answered. 11 Historian Kenneth Scott Latourette stated that 
Marshall's presence was a violation of our intention not 
to intervene in Chinese internal affairs. 45 Marshall's 
China Mission was to be a most difficult task for the 
General. :Many Americans agreed with Darnet Nover 1 s 
analysis: "It is not too much to say ••• that not only 
the future of China but the peace of the world depend on 
the success or failure of his mission. 1146 The American 
people earnestly believed that General Marshall's 
prestige could not fail to break down the interparty 
78 
44Tillman Durdin, 11 China Continues Debate on Policy, 11 
New York Times, Dec. 18, 1945, P• 2. 
45Kenneth Scott Latourette, The American Record in 
the Far East~ 1945-1951 (New York: Macmillan Company, 
1952), P• 10 • 









If Marshall could not succeed, then no one 
would be able to accomplish this formidable task, even 
though the presence of Marshall and the Marines was a 
violation of our intention not to intervene in Chinese 
internal affairs. Even Marshall's old friend, General 
Joseph Stilwell, cautioned him on the success of his forth-
coming mission: 11 0nce Chiang Kai-shek sensed the situation 
he would become more intransigent. Don 1t you realize the 
Chinese respect only power?u 48 
When General Marshall left for Chungking, he carried 
with him as one of the directives a highly important letter 
from President Truman in which he told him to speak to all 
Chinese leaders, including Chiang, 11 with the utmost frank-
ness.1149 Marshall was to inform them 11 that a China dis-
united and torn by civil strife could not be considered 
realistically as a proper place for American assistance • 
• • •" Trwnan admitted that :Marshall's presence in China 
was "the clearest evidence" of his great concern for the 
47A. T. Steele, The American People and China (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company for the Council on Foreign 
Relations, 1966), p. 32. See also U.S., Congress, Senate, 
Institute of Pacific Relations, Part 6, Testimony of John 
Carter Vincent, p. 1722. 
48Tuchman, Stilwell, P• 527. 
49u.s., Department of 
p. 605. Letter of December 
General George Marshall • 
State, China White Paper, II, 
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troubled and equally complicated situation. President 
Truman recalled in his Memoirs that he had sent the General 
to China "not to intervene in the affairs of that country 
but to render whatever aid \'{e could to the cause of peace 
there. 1150 To Truman, the alternatives to a strong, united 
and democratic China, ,.,.hich Marshall was to assist in 
achieving, would be either "disunity or prolonged civil 
war, neither of which would be in our interests nor in the 
interests of international peace. 1151 The American Govern-
ment was starting on its last determined effort to bring 
about peace and unity in China but was uncertain, according 
to Herbert Feis, 11 as to how firmly to support Chiang Kai-
shek, and unwilling to risk the involvement of our fast 
waning forces in the threateninG civil war. 1152 
President Truman, a great admirer of General George 
Marshall, called the General 11 the greatest living 
SOTrwnan, Memoirs, II, Years of Trial and Hope, P• 92. 
In u.s., Congress, Senate, Military Situation, Part 1, 
Testimony of General George C. Marshall, PP• 396-97, General 
Marshall recalled that he had been sent to China with the 
instructions that the 11 only hope of China, long-run view of 
it, was to bring about an integration of the Communists 
with the Nationalist force." 
51u.s., Department of state, Foreign Relations, 1945, 
The Far East p. 773. Letter of December 15, 1945, from 
11resident Tr:UUan to General Harshall. This letter is not 
the same letter as recorded in footnote 49• 
52Feis, China Tangle, P• 428. 
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American." 53 One of Truman's biographers, Jonathan 
Daniels, thought that "Truman had ••• more confidence in 
Marshall than in anybody in the government and probably 
anybody in the world. Truman completely trusted 
Marshall. 1154 Following Truman's statement on China, he 
notified all United States agencies which were transacting 
business with the Chinese to suspend their discussions 
immediately. Marshall would coordinate all negotiations 
with China and 11 have complete control of America's China 
policy.11 55 Marshall exercised a free hand and called the 
shots for President Truman while he was in China as the 
President's Special Representative but found his role 
difficult, thankless and troublesome. 56 He acted as 
81 
53Alexander De Conde, "George Catlett Marshall, 11 in 
An Uncertain Tradition, American Secretaries of State in 
the Twentieth Century~ ed. by Norman A. Gracbner (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1961), p. 246. 
54Jonathan Daniels, The Man of Independence (New 
York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1950), pp. 316-17. 
55Lloyd c. Gardner, Architects of Illusion, Men and 
Ideas in American Forei n Polic 1941-1949 (Chicago: 
Quadrangle Books, 1970, p. 14 • 
S6u.s., Congress, Senate, Institute of Pacific 
Relations, Part 6, Testimony of John Carter Vincent, p. 
1718. See also Benjamin Welles, 11 Recollections of an Asian 
Truce 11 ,·1ashington Post, Feb. lo, 1973, p. A14; u.s., 
Congr~ss Senate, Institute of Pacific Relations, Part 7, 
Testimon; of John Carter Vincent, PP• 2215-16. In Vincent's 
testimony before the subcommittee of the Committee of the 
Judiciary, he said that 11 the whole matter was entirely in 
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intermediary, adviser, referee, errand boy, postman and 
peacemaker between the National Government and the Chinese 
Communists. 57 
82 
As General Marshall began his efforts toward 
political, military and democratic reform in China, the 
Council of Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great 
Britain and Russia concluded its meeting in Moscow. The 
final communiqu~, which was issued, supported the Sino-
Soviet Treaty and "reaffirmed their adherence to the policy 
of non-interference in the internal affairs of China. 1158 
Marshal Stalin felt that if the Chinese people knew Chiang 
was depending on foreign troops, he would lose his influ-
ence.59 Foreign Minister Molotov and Secretary Byrnes 
agreed 11 to the desirability of withdrawal of Soviet 
and American forces from China at the earliest practicable 
5 7The terms, "errand boy, 11 "postman, 11 "organizer" 
and "peacemaker," are found in Robert Payne, The Marshall 
Stor A Bio raph of General Geor e C. Marshall (New 
York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951, p. 274. The term, 
"referee II is found in Shen Yun-Kung, 11 American Official 
Attitude~ Toward Governments in China, 1898-1947 11 (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1948), 
p. 158. 
58Nathan Ausubel, ed., Voices of History, 1945-46, 
Speeches and Papers of Roosevelt, TrumanB Churchill, 
Attlee, Stalin, DeGaulle, Chiang, and Ot er Leader~ 
Delivered during 1945 (New York: Gramercy Publishing 
Company, 1946), p. 788. Final Communique by Big Three 
Foreign Ministers after the :Moscow Conference on 
December 27, 1945. 
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60 
moment •• • •" George Kennan, who had predicted in 
April, 1945, the Soviet Union's 11 fluid, resilient" policy 
toward China, felt that Russia 11 sought predominant influ-
ence in China" through noninterference, intrigue and sup-
port of a coalition government in which the Communist Party 
would capture control of the governrnent. 61 Stalin's 
outward show of cooperation could be a tactical move on 
his part to serve the Soviet Union and assist the Chinese 
Communists to extend their influence. Marshall would face 
this predicament in his many exasperating attempts to seek 
a political and military solution to war-torn China. 
The role which America was to play in this Chinese 
tangle was spelled out in Truman's December statement, 
which Marshall attempted to carry out in China. The United 
States desired Generalissimo Chiang to broaden the govern-
ment to include other political elements. Foreign service 
officers had informed their superiors of the growing influ-
ence of the Kuomintang's rival since August, 1944. In a 
letter to President Franklin Roosevelt in January, 1945, 
60Ausubel, Voices of History, P• 788. For further 
information on the Moscow Conference, readers are referred 
to Incoming :Message from the War Department, Dec. 28, 1945, 
to General Douglas MacArthur, in the Douglas MacArthur 
Papers, Incoming Message File, Blue Binders, F.E.C. [Far 
Eastern Commission], October, 1945-April, 1946. 
61u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, 
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Secretary of State Edward Stettinius evaluated the Chinese 
situation. 
China is in a dilemma. Coalition would mean an 
end of conservative Kuomintang domination and 
open the way for the more virile and popular 
Communists to extend their influence to the point 
perhaps of controlling the Government. Failure 
to settle with the Communists, who are daily 
growing stronger, would invite the dag~er of an 
eventual overthro,-i of the Kuomintang. 
84 
Secretary Stettinius was not the first or the last official 
to inform President Roosevelt of the Communist influence in 
China. Sinologist Edgar Snow observed that President 
Roosevelt was quite concerned about the situation in China 
and informed Snow of his solution: 11 I 1 ve been working with 
two governments there. I intend to go on doing so until we 
63 can get them together." 
In late February, 1945, Foreign Service Officer John 
Service reported to his superiors his conversation with 
General Claire Lee Chennault 1 s aide, Captain Joseph Alsop. 
Alsop put little faith in a coalition of the two rival 
groups, declaring that the Communists are not 11 really 
willing to accept any compromise or coalition short of 
. 62Quoted in James MacGregor Burnes, Roosevelt: 
Soldier of Freedom (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
Inc., 1970), p. 589. See also Tuckman, Stilwell, p. 
514. 
63Quoted in Edgar Snow, Journey to the Beginning 




complete control of China.11 64 Congressman Walter Judd also 
rejected the idea of Communist participation in the forma-
tion of a coalition government. 65 General Albert Wedemeyer 
never thought that a coalition of the Communist forces with 
Chinese forces could be obtained. 66 John Paton Davies, in 
a report from his new post as Second Secretary of the 
Embassy in :Moscow, said that the Communists desired coali-
tion 11 because it would mean a relatively cheap acquisition 
of control over most if not all of China.1167 Wedemeyer con-
curred with Davies• statement.
68 11 If coalition was not 
forthcoming," reported Davies, 11 they can afford to wait. 1169 
Time was on the Communists' side. 
At the end of the Second World War, Edwin A. Locke 
submitted to President Truman a proposal to avert impending 
64Quoted in Service, Amerasia Papers, P• 185. 
Service interviewed Captain Alsop on February 28, 1945. 
65u.s., Congress, Institute of Pacific Relations, 
Part 7A, Appendix II, P• 2397• 
66u.s., Congress, Senate, Military Situation, Part 3, 
Testimony of General Albert C. Wedemeyer, P• 2463. 
67u.s., Department of State, Forei~ Relations, 1945, 
The Far East, p. 335. Memorandum of Apri 15, 1945, from 
the Second Secretary of the Embassy in the Soviet Union, 
John Paton Davies. 
68u.s., Congress, Senate, Institute of Pacific 
Relations, Part 3, Testimony of General Albert C. \'l'edemeyer, 
p. 797. 
69u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, 
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civil war in China. 11 The only alternative to civil war," 
said Locke, . "is some far-reaching adjustment and compromise 
between the two factions resulting in a genuine democratic 
government. 1170 Locke was not the only official following 
the War to propose coalition as a solution to China's 
internal civil war. In 1948 Stalin informed Eduard 
Kardelji, a chief aide and official biographer of Marshal 
Tito: 
After the war we invited the Chinese comrades to 
come to Moscow and we discussed the situation in 
China. We told them bluntly that we considered 
the development of the uprising in China had no 
prospect, and that Chinese comrades should join 
the Chiang Kai-shek government and dissolve their 
army. The Chinese comrades agreed here with the 
views of the Soviet comrades, but went back to 
China and acted otherwise. They mustered their 
forces, organized their armies, and now, as we 
see, they are beating the Chiang Kai-shek army. 
Now, in the case of China, we admit we were 
wrong. It proved that the Chinese comrades and 
not the . Soviet comrades were right.71 
In testifying before the subcommittee of the 
Committee of the Judiciary in 1952, John Carter Vincent 
70Ibid., p. 449. Memorandum of August 20, 1945, from 
Edwin A. Locke, Jr., Personal Representative of President 
Truman in charge of the American Production Mission in 
China, to President Truman. 
71vladimir Dedijer, Tito (New York: Simon and 
Schuster 1953), p. 322. s'eealso John Paton Davies, Jr., 
Foreign !nd Other Affairs (New York: W.W. Norton & Com-
pany, Inc., 1964), pp. 133-35. In Charles B. McLane 1 s 
Soviet Polic and the Chinese Communists 1931-1946 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 195 , PP• 2 4- 5, the 
author questioned the authenticity of this statement • 
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recalled that the proposal for coalition was an attempt to 
avoid "the worst possible disaster that could come to 
Chiang, which was the outbreak of general civil war.1172 At 
the time of Trwnan 1 s proposal for broadening the base of 
the Chinese Government, civil warfare had not broken out 
throughout China. Vincent believed that this proposal "was 
not the perfect solution" although 11 it was better than civil 
war. 1173 He thought that civil war 11 would have been a direct 
advantage to the Communists. 1174 Vincent observed that the 
President's proposal for a broadening of the base of the 
National Government would have brought the Communists into 
the government on a minority basis,and with American sup-
port of Chiang's Government the United States "could 
eventually strengthen the Chinese Government enough to 
eliminate the Communists. 1175 Chiang would. retain control 
of this government, particularly since President Truman had 
classified Chiang's Government as the only legal Government 
in China. 
In the United States' efforts to broaden the base of 
the Chinese Government, many Americans feared that the 
72u.s., Congress, Senate, Institute of Pacific Rela-
tions, Part 6, Testimony of John Carter Vincent, P• 1714. 
73~., Part 7, P• 2217. 
74~., Part 6, P• 1722. 





United States faced a dilemma. Sinologist John K. Fairbank 
believed that America faced two intertwining objectives: 
to encourage the Chinese leaders to reform their government 
by decreasing their influence and power to bring internal 
peace to their country, and to strengthen the Kuomintang 
regime 11 as a step toward political stability in East 
Asia. 1176 Fairbank viewed these objectives as both building 
up the Kuomintang regime and tearing it down. Marshall was 
supposed to apply pressure solely upon the Kuomintang 
Government. Historian Anthony Kubek thought that pressure 
could have been exerted upon the Yenan Government by inform-
ing Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai that 11 unless they recog-
nized the supremacy of Chiang's Government, the United 
States would assist Chiang without reservations.11
77 Sumner 
Welles, a former Under Secretary of State, felt that 
General Marshall tried irto browbeat Chiang Kai-shek 11 into 
admitting the Communist Party into the Chinese Govern-
ment.78 General Claire Lee Chennault reported that the 
Generalissimo understood that a Communist minority in a 
coalition government 11 would actually result in complete 
76John King Fairbank, The United States and China 
(3rd ed.; Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1971), P• 310. 
77Kubek, How the Far East Was Lost, P• 342. 
78sumner l·lelles, seven Decisions That Shaped History 




Communist domination of China. 1179 At the 1951 Senate 
hearings into America 1 s Far Eastern policy, General Douglas 
MacArthur recalled that the coalition proposal was 11 one of 
the greatest blunders in American diplomatic history.11 80 
MacArthur believed that it 11 at once weakened the government 
and materially strengthened the Communist minority. 11 
79chennault Way of a Fighter, p. xv. In the Foreign 
Relations' hearin~s on July 21, 19?1, as re~orded in U.S., 
Congress, senate, United States-China Relations, P• ~2, 
Senator Clifford P. Case of New Jersey spoke of the impos-
sibility of reform by Chiang Kai-shek 1 s Governme~t. 
Senator Case said: UHe [Chiang] had to reform hJ.tnself out 
of existence which is too much to ask any man to do. 11 
80Quoted in u.s., Congress, Senate, Military 
Situation, Part 3, P• 2249• 
.... ,, ___ ,, ....... ..----... ~--~---------------------------- - --
CHAPTER IV 
THE MARSHALL MISSION 
When General George C. Marshall arrived in Chungking 
on December 20, 1945, General Albert Wedemeyer compared 
attempts to obtain a coalition government in China to mix-
ing oil with water and informed Marshall that it would be 
• 
0 bl l 1.mposs1. e. The Nationalists were determined not to 
relinquish any of their power to the Communists. Marshall 
reported to Wedemeyer that he would accomplish the goals of 
his mission with Wedemeyer 1 s assistance. 2 Marshall 
immediately conferred with political leaders, correspond-
ents and American embassy personnel. He learned from these 
conferences that everyone favored a united China but no 
one offered a solution as to how this might be accom-
plished.3 Generalissimo Chiang contended that 
1u.s., Congress, Senate, Military Situation, Part 3, 
Testimony of General Albert C. Wedemeyer, pp. 2305, 2323, 
2327, 2422; Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!, PP• 363, 370. 
General Douglas MacArthur also used this phrase in u.s., 
Congress, Senate, Mili~ary Situation, Part 1, p. 32. 
2
Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!, P• 363. 
3-rruman, Memoirs, II, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 73; 
U.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945 1 The 
Far East, p. 825. Letter of December 29, 1945, from 







Soviet Russia would play a significant role in the 
formation of a peaceful and united China. 
91 
Acting as an intermediary, General Marshall, in the 
words of historian Shen Yun-Kung, 11 made his experience and 
wisdom available to the Chinese leaders in their efforts to 
reach a solution of China's internal difficulties." 4 
Marshall succeeded in bringing the Communist and 
Nationalist representatives together for a meeting at which 
time the Communist representative, Chou En-lai, proposed a 
cessation of hostilities. Marshall firmly believed that 
the solution to China's difficulties rested with a cease-
fire. This cease-fire .would serve as 11 a psychological 
prelude" to the convocation of the Political Consultative 
Conference which would be represented by China's diverse 
political elements. 5 Marshall• s progress depended on the 
success of a compromise between both sides instead of 
allowing the civil war to continue until one side achieved 
victory. 
The Nationalists and the Communists asked General 
Marshall to be the presiding member of a three-man 
4shen, IIAmerican Official Attitudes," p. 160. 
5Acheson Present at the Creation, p. 145. In u.s., 
Congress, Senate, Institute of Pacific Relations, Part 6, 
p. 1717 John Carter Vincent recalled that General Marshall 
llimmedi~tely set about organizing ••• truce teams to stop 
the fighting; that was his own idea. 11 
·, 
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committee, to be named the Committee of Three, and .repre-
sented by General Chang Chun of the Kuomintang and General 
Chou En-lai of the Communist Party to create a useful truce 
plan. The Committee of Three met for the first time on 
January 7, 1946, and reached an agreement on January 10, 
ordering a cessation of hostilities and the freezing of 
military positions by January 13. 6 Upon signing this 
agreement, Marshall, who 11 was a very powerful and moving 
speaker," made his first public statement in China. "I 
have been instructed by President Truman to come to China 
to help her achieve unity and democratization. 
represents the first of our labors.11 7 
The truce 
To enforce this cease-fire agreement, an Executive 
Headquarters was established in Peiping to supervise the 
implementation of the cease-fire orders. The Executive 
Headquarters was to be headed by three commissioners, each 
6u.s., Marine Corps Headquarters, Historical Branch, 
History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, 
Vol. V: Victory and Occupation, written by Denis M. Frank 
and Henry I. Shaw, Jr. (Washington, D. C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1968), P• 594. 
7stephen E. Ambrose, 11 The Measure of a Model 
General 11 review of George C. Marshall, Organizer of 
Victory' 1943-1945, by Forrest C • Pogue, in the lfashington 
Post, B~ok World, Jan. 21, 1973, P• 5; Quoted in Hoh Chih-
hsing "Impressive Achievements," P• 2, in the Seedlock 
Colle~tion. See also Incoming Message from the War Depart-
ment's Office of Far Eastern Information, Jan. 24, 1946, 
to General Douglas MacArthur, in the Douglas MacArthur 









representing the two opposing sides with the mediating 
side, the United States, serving as chairman. The 
Executive Headquarters• responsibility for maintaining 
the cease-fire was directed by subsidiary three-member 
field truce teams which were dispatched to those areas 
where fighting continued. 8 
Historian Tang Tsou admitted that the announcement 
of a cease-fire provided a favorable atmorphere for 
the convocation of the delegates to the Political 
Consultative Conference on January lo. 9 This conference 
had been established by an agreement between the 
Communist and Kuomintang representatives following 
Ambassador Patrick Hurley 1 s departure and was composed of 
delegates from the Kuomintang, the Communist Party and 
the splinter parties. The delegates agreed on the 
immediate organization of a coalition government with an 
interim State Council of all political parties to govern 
93 
8u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1946, Vol. IX: The Far East: China 
(Washington, D. c.: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 
4 Document Prepared by the Staff of General Marshall on 
J~nuary 1 1946; Truman, Memoirs, II, Years of Trial and 
Hope, pp. 
1
73-74; u.s., Congress, Senate, ~1ilitary Situa-
tion Part 3 Testimony of Dean Acheson, p. 1849; and U.S., _, ' . 137 Department of State, China White Paper, I, P• • 
9Tsou, America 1 s Failure, PP• 406-07 • 
··' . 
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until a freely elected constitutional government was 
established.lo The delegates adopted a resolution setting 
May 5 as the date for the convocation of a National 
Assembly, which would adopt the new constitution, and they 
also agreed to accept the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek 
and the necessity for the reduction and ultimate 
amalgamation of the Government and Communist armies. 11 
With the conclusion of the Political Consultative 
Conference on January 31, the China situation seemed to be 
improving and the Marshall Mission reached the height of 
10u.s., Congress, Senate, Military Situation, rart 
3, Testimony of Dean Acheson, p. 1850. u.s., Department 
of State, China White Paper, II, pp. 610-11. The 
Resolution on Government Organization, adopted by the 
Political Consultative Conference, revealed that the State 
Council, which was composed of forty councillors, met 
every two weeks unless it was called into session by the 
President of the National Government for emergency 
meetings. One-half of the State Council was represented 
by Kuomintang members, while the remaining half was 
represented by members of other political parties. The 
State Council, an interim council, must not be confused 
with the People's Political Council, an advisory body which 
had been set up in 1938 to provide representation in the 
government to non-Kuomintang groups. For further informa-
tion on the People's Political Council, see Tsou, America's 
Failure, p. 451. 
11china and U.S. Far East Policy, 1945-1967 
{Washington, D. c.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1967), 
p. 39; Shen, "American Official Attitudes," P• 161. In 
Ross Y. Koen's 11 China Lobby, 11 P• 62, the author noted 
that the resolutions of the Political Consultative Con-
ference were not approved 11 by the governing bodies of the 
various parties as required by the agreement establishing 
the council." It was the objective of all parties during 









Marshall now "seemed very close 
to pulling the marble cake out of the oven," and he turned 
his attention to the difficult problem of the consolida-
tion of the Nationalist and Communist armies. 13 He had 
informed the Generalissimo in late January that it was 
imperative "for him to find an agreement with the 
Communists for a unified government and army at an early 
date. 1114 Marshall concluded that China was "very 
vulnerable to ••• Russian infiltration methods to the 
strengthening of the Communist regime and the progressive 
weakening of the Nationalist Government's position that it 
is apparent that United States military and naval forces 
cannot be continued for long in China.11 15 Chiang told 
Marshall that his talks with the Communists could be com-
pared to negotiating 11with the tiger for its skin. 1116 
12Gardner, Architects of Illusion, p. 156. 
13Ibid. 
14u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1946, 
IX, p. 143. Letter of January 24, 1946, from General 
Marshall to President Truman. 
15Ibid. -
16chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China (New York: 
Farrar Straus and Cudahy, 1957), P• 162. Historian Tang 
Tsou•s'America•s Failure, p. 402, emphasized that the 
Communists believed that the integration of their forces 
into a national army would take place 11 only after the 
establishment of a democratic coalition government and a 
constitutional regime.11 See also Harold M. Vinacke, The 
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Marshall's second triumph occurred on February 25 
when a military agreement, which provided for the gradual 
unification of the Nationalist and Communist armies was , 
signed in Chungking. With a substantial reduction in both 
armies, the new force would consist of sixty divisions--
fifty Central Government divisions and ten Communist divi-
sions. The agreement requested both sides to submit a list 
of army strengths, positions and weapons. The National 
Government submitted a list while the transient Communists 
never submitted a list. This was a warning to General 
Marshall of further difficulty in his efforts to bring 
d . h" 17 peace an unity to Cina. 
On March 9, General Marshall reported to Chiang that 
it was nof paramount importance that the unification of 
China be speeded to a successful conclusion.
1118 
Marshall 
had been continually emphasizing to Chiang and his repre-
sentatives throughout the months of January and February 
the importance of the unification of China. Marshall 
thought that unification would eliminate China's 
California: Stanford University Press for the American 
Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., 1952), P• 46. 
1 7Payne Marshall Story, P• 263. See also U.S., 
Congress, Sen:te, Military Situation, Part 3, Testimony of 
Dean Acheson, p. 1850. 
18u.s., Department of state, Foreign Relations, 1946, 
IX, p. 513. Letter of March 9, 1946, from General Marshall 






"vulnerability to Soviet undercover attack, which exists 
so long as there remains a separate Communist Government 
and a separate Communist Army in China.u 19 
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Following the signing of the military reorganization 
agreement, Marshall recommended to President Truman that he 
be recalled to the United States to report on the situation 
in China, especially the issue of assistance to China.
20 
In a subsequent letter to the General, President Truman 
thought that Marshall's trip would keep 11 Congressional 
public opinion solidly in line 11 with the China policy. 
21 
Prior to Marshall's departure for the United States on 
March 11, he traveled to northern China with Chou En-lai 
and Nationalist General Chang Chi-chung. At the end of 
this tour, which included Marshall's first encounter with 
19Ibid., p. 427, Letter of February 9, 1946, from 
General Marshall to President Truman. Quote taken from 
General Marshall's conversation with Chinese Foreign 
Minister Wang Shih-chieh. In an earlier letter, which 
was written on January 24, 1946, P• 143, General Marshall 
informed President Truman of 11 low level Russian infil-
tration methods" which strengthened the Communist regime 
in Yenan. President Trwnan recalled in Memoirs, II, 
Years of Trial and Hope, p. 76, General Marshall's con-
versation with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh 
on February 1 in terms similar to State Department document 
of February 9. 
20u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1946, 
IX, p. 446. Letter of February 26, 1946, from General 
Marshall to President Truman. 
21Ibid., P• 511. Letter of March 7, 1946, from 







Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, Marshall predicted at Hankow: 
''Last month and the next two months are the most critical 
months in the history of China.11 22 
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General Marshall must not have realized the signifi-
cance of his Hankow statement and it is indeed difficult to 
understand why he would leave at such a critical time in 
his discussions for a month's trip to the United States for 
consultation with Administration leaders and Congress. 
Since both interim government and army integration appeared 
to be 11well on their way to acceptance" as well as Chiang's 
approval to allow tripartite truce teams into Manchuria, 
Marshall reasoned that he 11 could be spared in China.11
23 
Marshall's presence in China had produced a calming effect 
on the two irreconcilable forces. ,vith his departure 
from China "the flood dikes broke open11 and his absence 
proved a fatal mistake.
24 
Appearing before the United States Congress on 
March 16, General Marshall proclaimed: 
The United States is I think at the present time 
best able to render material assistance to China. 
We are asking no special preference of any kind 
22Quoted in Payne, Marshall Story, P• 266. 
23Acheson, Present at the Creation, P• 146; Truman, 
Memoirs, II, Years of Trial and Hope, P• 78. 
24Jules Davids America and the World of Our Times: 
United states Diplom~c in the Twentieth Centur (2d ed.; 
New York: Random House, 19 4, P• 39 • 
~ 
-----
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whatever regarding economic or similar matters. 
We are placing no price on our friendship. I 
must say ••• that we have a vital interest in 
a stable government in China •••• 2s 
Marshall concluded his speech by reiterating his Hankow 
statement: 11 The next few months are of tremendous impor-
tance to the Chinese people and ••• to future world 
peace. 1126 
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General Marshall testified before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
in early April. Marshall reported on his mission and tried 
to convince the committee members to send loans and surplus 
property to China. Assistance to China through Lend-Lease 
would end on June 30, 1946, and Marshall thought that China 
should receive $500,000,000 to repair the railroads and 
revive the economy. 27 One of Marshall's biographers, 
Robert Payne, said that the General emphasized that he 
needed the support of the legislators who could "demon-
strate that America had a stake in the peaceful recovery of 
2 5Quoted in u.s., Department of State, Foreign 
Relations 1946 IX p. 577. :t-Iemorandum of the Minutes 
' ' ' b ' h 18 -o-,:f~a~:t-""'1e_e_t~i_n_g ___ o __ f.,,. the Military Su comnu. t tee on Marc , 
1946. See also Shen, 11 American Official Attitudes," PP• 
161-62. 
2 6Quoted in u.s., Department of State, ForeiGn 
Relations, 1946, IX, P• 577. 
27welles, "Recollections," P• Al4. 
...... 
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Ch . u28 A 1 f ina. s a resu to his personal report to these two 
committees, Marshall had the impression that his mission 
"was being supported11 by both Houses of Congress. 29 His 
testimony before the committees was not disclosed to the 
American people for fear that 11 it might embarrass General 
Marshall. 1130 Secrecy once again prevailed until General 
Marshall authorized the release of information regarding 
his congressional testimonies, his talks with the President 
and his subsequent talks with officials of the Treasury 
Department, at which time President Truman said that 11 the 
whole thing will be turned loose for the benefit of 
everybody.1131 
Marshall was successful in obtaining the transfer of 
surplus property to the National Government and in extend-
ing to Chiang's Government $66,000,000 for emergency 
rehabilitation. 32 Marshall thought that these emergency 
measures were inadequate and he reached an agreement 
28 Payne, Marshall Story, P• 268. 
29u.s., Congress, Senate, Military Situation, Part 1, 
Testimony of General George C. Marshall, P• 570. 
30u.s., President, Public Papers, Truman, 1946, 
p. 193. 
31Ibid. -
32shen, "American Official Attitudes," P• 1~3~ Shen 
revealed that the $66,000,000 was to be spent on six 
specific proJ·ects chiefly for the purchase of raw cotton, 
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with the Treasury Department for a loan of $500,000,000 to 
the Central Government. 33 The Generalissimo's speech on 
April 1 to the People•s Political Council, in which he 
announced to the representatives of the Council "in effect 
a call to arms 11 following the withdrawal of Russian troops 
from Manchuria, dissuaded the Treasury Department from 
extending the $500,000,000 loan. 34 
On April 18, General Marshall returned to China to 
find renewed outbreaks of civil strife, which impaired the 
success of the truce agreement, as well as a continuing 
crisis in Manchuria aggravated by the slow withdrawal of 
Russian troops from Manchuria and compounded by the 
Nationalist Army's difficulty in entering Manchuria. 35 
Marshall had been kept informed by his staff concerning 
the dangerous developments in China. On April 3, a member 
33u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations{ 1946, 
X, p. 613, Letter of December 11, 1940, from Colone 
Marshall s. Carter to General Marshall; Truman, Memoirs, 
II, Years of Trial and Hope, P• 79. 
34Truman Memoirs, II, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 
79· U.S. Depa~tment of State, Foreign Relations, 1946, IX, 
p. '789 t1emorandwn of the Minutes of a Meeting on April 22, 
1946 between General Marshall and General Yu Ta-wei. See 
also'footnote 10 for the explanation of the People's 
Political Council. 
35u.s., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 
Nomination of General of the Army George C. Marshall to be 
Secretary of Defense, Hearings, before the Committee on 





of Marshall's staff, Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade, 
had urged :Marshall's immediate return to China for only 
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his "position and prestige can handle this situation.1136 
Three days later, American Commissioner Walters. Robertson 
also urged the General to return to China at once to 
prevent his mission from being "dangerously jeopardized.u37 
Marshall remained in the United States for another week 
despite the ominous situation in China. 
The Manchurian situation was climaxed by the 
Communist capture of the Manchurian capital, Changchun, on 
the day of Marshall's arrival in Chungking. With their 
victory at Changchun, the Communists not only were confi-
dent that they could defeat the Nationalists, but they 
were also Uno longer as amenable to compromise as they had 
been during the previous months. 1138 This Communist victory 
encouraged the Generalissimo to order his troops to regain 
Changchun by launching 11 an all-out attack in Manchuria to 
defeat the Communists.11 39 
3 6u.s. Department of state, Foreign Relations, 1946, 
IX, p. 727. 'Letter of April 3, 1946, from Brigadier 
General Henry A. Byroade to Lieutenant General Alvan C. 
Gillem, Jr. This letter was classified by American Conunis-
sioner Walter Robertson as an 11 eyes alone" message. 
37Ibid., p. 736. Letter of April 6, 1946, from 
Walter Robertson to General Marshall. 
38navids, America, P• 399. 
39Tsou, America's Failure, P• 419 • 
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Despite General Marshall's opposition, Chiang 
"decided to pursue a policy of force in dealing with the 
Communists. 1140 Marshall at first believed that Chiang 
would not advance into north China, but he soon discovered 
that the Generalissimo wanted to reoccupy Changchun and 
defeat the Communists in :Manchuria. 41 Marshall learned 
from Chiang that no settlement of the Manchurian crisis 
would be made on Chiang's part until the Communists 
evacuated Changchun and Nationalist troops had complete 
sovereignty in Manchuria. 42 The General noted that 
there existed between the t,v-o rivals 11 a complete lack of 
faith and a feeling of distrust on both sides. 1143 
According to Marshall, 11 each side saw behind all proposals 
from the other an evil motive. 1144 He doubted whether the 
civil war could be halted and the suggestion of a 
cooling-off period was unacceptable to either the 
Nationalists or the Communists, who attempted to hold what 
41u.s., Department of State, China White Paper, I, 
p. 150. 
42~., P• 152. 




ground they held and to expand the territory within their 
possession. 45 Chiang's troops pushed toward Harbin and 
recaptured Changchun without opposition on May 23. 
104 
Prior to the Nationalist troops' capture of 
Changchun, sixty American citizens affixed their names on 
May 15 to the "Manchurian Manifesto," in which they 
reported that Soviet actions in Manchuria were in viola-
tion of the Yalta Far Eastern agreements and the Sino-
Soviet Treaty. These Americans emphasized in this 
extensive docwnent that Manchuria was 11 the key to the 
future of China. 1146 This Manifesto reiterated what some 
State Department career officers, particularly Joseph Grew, 
had announced a year earlier. 11 \'le must request Russia to 
punctiliously live up to the terms of the Sino-Soviet Pact 
we helped to force on China by secret agreement at 
Yalta.11 47 The sixty signatories, including Representatives 
45u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1946, 
IX, p. 806. A cooling-off period was suggested by Chinese 
Ambassador Wei in a conversation with the Director of the 
Office of Far Eastern Affairs, John Carter Vincent. Sec 
also U.S. Department of State, China White Paper, I, p. 
153 for General Marshall's suggestion of a cooling-off 
period with the management of Changchun by a tripartite 
team from the Executive Headquarters. 
46u.s., Congress, House, 11 Manchurian Manifesto," 
Extension of Remarks of Representative Walter Judd, 79th 
Cong., 2d sess., May 17, 1946, Congressional Record, XCII, 
Part 11 A2763. The title of this Ham.festo was "America 
Must Not Abandon Open Door Policy in China. 11 




Clare Boothe Luce and Walter Judd, called for, among other 
demands, complete revision of the Yalta Far Eastern agree-
ments.48 While the "Manchurian Manifesto" reflected the 
views of sixty Americans, it was not successful in 
influencing the State Department or Congress to voice sup-
port for the revision of the Yalta Far Eastern agreements. 
Negotiations in China were at a standstill, with 
Special Representative Marshall engaged daily in discus-
sions with representatives of Chinese political parties 
about the possible restoration of peace in Manchuria. At 
the time of the Nationalist reoccupation of Changchun, 
Generalissimo Chiang's absence from Nanking made it diffi-
cult for Marshall to keep Chiang informed of the dangerous 
situation in Manchuria. 49 Marshall unsuccessfully appealed 
by radio to both sides for a cessation of offensive opera-
tions. Six days after the Nationalist reoccupation of 
Changchun, on May 29, :Marshall informed Chiang that the 
continued advance of his troops in Manchuria placed his 
mediating role in a difficult and "virtually impossible" 
't' 50 posi ion. 
48other prominent signatories included Alfred 
Kohlberg Norman Thomas, Mrs. Wendell Wilkie, Emily Hahn 
and William Henry Chamberlain. 
49u.s., Department of State, China White Paper, I 
pp. 154-55. 
so~., p. 157. 
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The Manchurian crisis temporarily diminished when 
General Marshall persuaded Chiang and Communist leaders to 
issue a second truce for a period of fifteen days, begin-
ning on June 7, 1946. During the truce, agreements were to 
be reached regarding the termination of hostilities in 
Manchuria, resumption of communications in China and the 
execution of the military reorganization agreement of 
February 25. 51 Lieutenant Colonel Robert n. Rigg has 
called this truce 11 the turning point not only of the 
Manchurian campaign but of the entire civil war. 1152 Chiang 
contended that this cease-fire "turned out to be the 
beginning of the Government forces' debacle in Manchuria.11 53 
Had the Nationalist troops pushed forward instead of being 
halted, the Generalissimo surmised that the Communists 
would have been driven out of Manchuria. Marshall disagreed 
51Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 204. 
52Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Rigg, U.S.A., Red 
China's Fighting Hordes (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: 
Military Service Publishing Company, 1951), P• 254. In 
John Robinson Beal•s Marshall in China, P• 350, the author 
noted that there were ntwo moments during the year 1946 
when coalition with the Communists could have come off. 11 
Beal named the June truce negotiations "when Marshall 
believed that the two sides were within inches of getting 
together." Beal recalled that the second opportunity was 
11 lost by the Communists themselves 11 at the time when 11 they 
boycotted the National Assembly." 
53Quoted in Tsou, America's Failure, P• 421. See 
also Kubek, How the Far East Was Lost, P• 330. 
I 
..... ~ 
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with Chiang because he knew that the Communists had a 
large political following which could not be ignored.54 
Realizing that the Nationalists had made territorial 
. . gains since the first truce, the Communists "proposed. 
the restoration of the status quo in China proper as of 
January 13, in accordance with the order for the cessation 
of hostilities of January 10, and the restoration of 
original positions in Manchuria as of June 7.u 55 General 
Marshall agreed to this proposal, but Chiang disliked it 
and agreed to extend the truce until June 30. 56 
Beginning in June and continuing thereafter, there 
was an often-expressed belief by National Government mili-
tary officers and politicians that "only a policy of force 
would satisfy the situation and that the Chinese Communists 
could be quickly crushed.11 57 By pursuing a policy · of force, 
Chiang would be able to force the Communists to accept the 
terms of a settlement. 58 With the two divergent sides 
54Payne Marshall stor[' P• 283. See also U.S., 
Department of'state, China W ite Paper, I, P• 161. 
55Tsou, America's Failure, P• 422. 
Soibid., p. 423; u.s., Department of State, China 
White Paper, I, p. 161. 
57Ibid. See also u.s., Department of State, Foreign 
Relations,1946, X, p. 54. Letter of August 12, 1946, 
from General :Marshall to President Truman• 
SSTsou, America's Failure, p. 423. See also U.S., 
Department of state, Foreign Relations, 1946, X, P• 110, 
......., 
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unable to reach a decision and unable himself to produce a 
compromise, Marshall told Chiang that the National 
Government 11 was washing its hands of any democratic proce-
dure and was pursuing a dictatorial policy of military 
force.11 59 
Throughout the second truce negotiations, the 
Communists demanded that the United States withdraw their 
troops and military aid from China. The Communists held 
that the United States could not be impartial if American 
aid and troops assisted the Kuomintang Government. The 
Communists contended that American economic and military 
assistance would be given to Chiang's Government 11 irrespec-
tive of whether the National Government offered the 
Communists a fair and reasonable basis for settlement of 
military and political differences. 1160 In late June, 
Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung requested that the 
United States withdraw troops and assistance from China.
61 
Letter of August 10, 1946, from General Marshall to 
President Truman; and in the same reference source, P• 
51 Memorandum of the Notes of a Meeting on August 16, 
1946, of General Marshall with Generalissimo Chiang. 
59u.s., Department of state, China White Paper, I, 
p. 169. 
60~., P• 170. 
6lChina and u.s. Far East Policy, p. 40; Tsou, 
America's Failure, P• 426 • 
....., 
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Replying to Chairman Mao's request, the State 
Department stressed America's neutrality in civil strife 
between the Communists and the Nationalists. United States 
policy "cannot rightfully be interpreted as current support 
of any factional military group in China.11 62 Economic 
assistance toward China would be rendered to "a government 
fully and fairly representative of all important Chinese 
political elements., including the Chinese Communists.11 63 
Chairman Mao Tse-tung and his followers would not 
stop their attacks., which persisted throughout the summer 
and were climaxed by Madame Sun Yat-sen 1 s dramatic plea on 
July 22 to the American people. In speaking to the 
American people., Madame Sun said that they 11 must be told 
that the presence of United States armed forces on Chinese 
soil is not strengthening peace and order among the Chinese 
people.11 64 She thought that American loans should be given 
only to a recognized and representative government. Madame 
62 uA Chronology of United States Policy toward China, 
1941-1971.," written by Larry A. Niksch as quoted in U.S., 
Congress., Senate., United states Relations with the People's 
Republic, P• 393. 
63Ibid. see also China and U.S. Far East Policy, 
p. 40. 
64nMme. sun Ban on Our Aid to China," New York Times, 
July 23 1946 P• 5. See also u.s., Department of State, 
China White P~per I pp. 170-72; Tsou, America's Failure, 
p. 426. In John~- ~eal's Marshall in China, P• 132, the 
author noted that "Madame Sun, as the widow of the 
Republic's founder, is bound to get widespread attention in 
the U.S. 11 
--- MMMMUMNllht'fttitit:1iMW&ittkdM!litMM&¾f.iil4t:H1ltiet+Mt♦!HtftbsHMJtJtJ~-, 
Sun noted that the continuation of the civil war depended 
on the United States. If America ceased her military and 
economic assistance, the civil war would be halted. 
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For seven months, Marshall had been carrying on his 
mediation efforts by himself and was concerned that a long-
range American program in China "be directed by a top 
flight man in the post of Ambassador.11 65 In July, he 
recommended to President Truman that John Leighton Stuart 
be appointed Ambassador to China, a post which had not been 
filled after Patrick Hurley's resignation. Dr. John 
Leighton Stuart, a seventy-year-old President of Yenching 
University in Peiping and fluent in Chinese, was confirmed 
by the Senate on July 11, 1946. 
General Albert Wedemeyer, who was also well 
experienced in China's problems, was considered for the 
post and his possible appointment had been mentioned in 
Ambassador Patrick Hurley's conversation with President 
Truman in September, 1945. 66 ,vhen General Marshall arrived 
in China in December, 1945, he suggested to the President 
6Su.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1946, 
IX, p. 446. Letter of February 28, 1946, from James R. 
Shepley to General Marshall. 
66wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Repo~ts!, P• 358; u.s~, 
Congress Senate ~iilitary Situation, Part 3, Testimony of 
General Albert C: \vedemeyer, P • 2 309 • 
............. __ ~ 
-
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that Wedemeyer be appointed Ambassador. 6 7 As late as 
February 20, 1946, Wedemeyer had not been recommended to 
Pres1.dent Truman. 68 I • n a conversation with President 
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Truman in March, James R. Shepley, a member of Marshall's 
staff, noted that the President placed considerable empha-
sis on recent press comments on the appointment of another 
military officer to a diplomatic post. 69 On May 29, 
General Wedemeyer asked Marshall to clarify his future 
status. 70 In July, Marshall finally informed Acting 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson that Wedemeyer 1 s appoint-
ment had "greatly disturbed" the Communists and "should be 
indefinitely postponed. 1171 Chinese Nationalist leaders, 
67wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!, p. 364; U.S., 
Congress, Senate, Military Situation, Part 3, Testimony of 
General Albert C. Wedemeyer, p. 2311. 
68u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1946, 
IX, p. 446. Letter of February 28, !946, from James R. 
Shepley to General Marshal.l.. 
69Ibid., pp. 511-12. Letter of March 7, 1946, from 
James R. Shepley to General. Marshall. Shepley listed the 
appointments of the foll.owing military men: Lieutenant 
General Walter Bedell Smith as American Ambassador to 
Russia and Major General. .John H. Hilldring as Assistant 
Secretary of State in charge of occupation affairs. 
70ibid., p. 927. Telegram of May 29, 1946, not 
printed in this book. 
7libid., p. 1298. Letter of .July 5, 1946, from 
General Marshall to Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson. 
See also Beal, Marshall in China, P• 110; Acheson, Present 
at the Creation, p. 206; Wedemeyer Reports!, PP• 366, 369, 
381; u.s., Congress, Senate, Military Situation, Part 3, 
Testimony of General Albert C. Wedemeyer, P• 2311; and 
-
...., 
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particularly Foreign Minister T. v. Soong, were disap-
pointed with the appointment of Stuart, who they claimed 
was "not a big enough man.,, 72 
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After Dr. John Leighton Stuart's appointment as 
Ambassador to China, historian Robert Payne contended that 
General Marshall no longer "found himself in a position 
where he could exert his influence. 1173 General Marshall 
reached "the point of no return" and switched from his 
role as an active participant to that of a spectator. At 
this point, Payne believed that Marshall should have 
returned to the United States. 
During the month of July there also occurred "a 
gradual worsening of the military situation with the spread 
of hostilities to various points in China proper.11 74 In 
addition to this worsening situation, Chiang's new policy 
of force which started during the June truce negotiations, 
Communist statements against American assistance to the 
National Government and Madame Sun's appeal to the American 
reprint of an article by George E. Sokolsky in Times Herald 
on July 22, 1946, in U.S., Congress, House, 11 Jlow Huch Longer 
Are We To Abuse our Ally," Extension of Remarks of 
Representative Walter Judd, 79th Cong., 2d sess., July 26, 
1946, Congressional Record, XCII, Part 12, A4480-81. 
72Beal, Marshall in China, P• 124. 
73Payne, Marshall Story, P• 275. 
74u.s., Department of State, China White Paper, I, 
p. 171 • 
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people, American officials were at that time considering 
a shutdown on arms and munitions shipments to Chiang's 
Government 11 in the hope that such a move might assist their 
efforts to unify China. 1175 This shutdown on combat items 
from the United States and its Pacific bases became 
effective in the United States on July 29, 1946, and in 
the Pacific one month later. 76 
During the ten-month period that this embargo was in 
effect, the United States, according to Tang Tsou, entered 
into a period of partial withdrawal from China. 77 Marshall 
suggested a period of withdrawal to be followed by a two-
or three-month period of reappraisal and reevaluation of 
American policy toward China if the June negotiations 
broke down. 78 He had been placed in a most difficult 
position of mediating between the two Chinese political 
groups while the American Government supplied one group, 
75uMay Stop Shipments," New York Times, July 22, 
1946, p. 2. See also u.s., Department of State, Foreign 
Relations, 1946, IX, P• 1297, Letter of July 4, 1946, 
from Acting secretary of State Dean Acheson to General 
Marshall and drafted by John Carter Vincent, the Director 
of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs; "Propping Up Chiang 
Kai-shek," The Nation, September 14, 1946, P• 284. 
7 6u.s., Department of State, China White Paper, I, 
p. 356. 
77Tsou, America's Failure, P• 453. 
78Forrestal, Forrestal Diaries, P• 174. 
....., 
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the Chungking Government, with arms and ammunition.79 At 
this time, the Russians supplied the Chinese Communists 
with Japanese war munitions. The General recalled in the 
1951 MacArthur Hearings that the embargo was a "final 
effort to try to bring to a halt the military operations 
that were then going on and which were developing into a 
general war over all China. 1180 This embargo was to become 
a subject of great controversy in the history of America's 
Chi'na pol.icy. 81 
While Chiang and his military leaders pursued their 
policy of force after the second truce, Marshall emphasized 
to a high National Government official that 11the United 
82 States would not underwrite a Chinese civil war. 11 At 
a Cabinet meeting on August 2, 1946, Secretary of Labor 
Louis B. Schwellenbach argued that we should not continue 
to interfere in China's internal affairs. 11 If they wanted 
to have a civil war," said Schwellenbach, 11 they should have 
it, but ••• we should not be in the position of trying to 
79u.s., Department of State, China White Paper, I, 
p. 181. 
8ou.s., Congress, Senate, Military Situation, Part 1, 
Testimony of General George C. Marshall, P• 698. 
8lin How the Far East Was Lost, PP• 337, 339, 386 
409, historian Anthony Kubek was most critical of the 
embargo. 
82u.s., Department of State, China White Paper, I, 
p. 173 • 
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impose any form of government on any nation. 11 83 Secretary 
of the Navy Forrestal interrupted Schwellenbach to inform 
the Cabinet members that the chaotic conditions of civil 
war would attract other powers, especially Russia, "to 
come in and dominate China. 1184 Under Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson thought that American policy should 
support Marshall 11 to the limit" until the General admitted 
there was no hope of obtaining the objectives outlined 
in President Truman's China policy speech of December, 
1945. 85 This Cabinet meeting reflected an attempt by some 
of its members to redefine America's China policy. 
Another and more significant attempt to redefine 
American policy toward China was reflected on August 10 
in both a joint statement and a personal letter. The 
joint statement of Marshall and Stuart, two tireless 
and persevering explorers for peace, was an attempt 11 to 
arouse public pressure for the termination of hostilities" 
S3Forrestal, Forrestal Diaries, P• 190. Louis B. 
Schwellenbach served as Secretary of Labor from July, 1945, 
to August, 1948. 
841!?!£· 
85Ibid. Dean Acheson served as Under Secretary of 
State fromAugust 27, 1945, to July 1, 1947. In Present 
at the Creation p. 143, Dean Acheson recalled that General 
George Marshall,chose him 11 as his rear echelon man who 
would have right of access at any time to the President and 
Marshall could communicate through him. 11 
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from the war-stricken Chinese people. 86 Both writers 
noted that it seemed impossible for the two sides to reach 
a settlement for the cessation of hostilities. One Chinese 
correspondent for The Peiping Chronicle, Hoh Chin-hsing, 
recalled that this joint statement 11 was generally inter-
preted as a virtual admission on the part of General 
Marshall of the failure of his mission of mediation in 
China.u 87 Hoh also said that this statement was regarded 
in China as the General I s 11 farei<1ell statement" to China. 88 
Should Marshall's Mission fail, Colonel Marshall s. Carter, 
Marshall's aide in Washington, told the General that 11 the 
United States must resort to the status of an interested 
bystander rather than that of an active participant in 
Chinese affairs.11 89 
President Harry Truman's seething confidential letter 
of August 10 to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek expressed a 
change in American foreign policy toward China. "There 
86u.s., Department of State, China White Paper, I, 
p. 175. 
S7Hoh Chih-hsing, ":t-Iarshall Is Mission to China: 
Month of May Found China at Crossroads of Wa: and Peace," 
The Peiping Chronicle, Feb. 26, 1947, P• 2, in the Seedlock 
Collection. 
88Quoted in~• 
89u.s., Department of state, Foreign Relations, 1946, 
X, p. 28. Letter of August 14, 1946, from Colonel 
Marshall s. Carter to General Marshall. 
.... 
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exists in the United States," said the President, nan 
increasing body of opinion which holds that our entire 
policy toward China must be reexamined in the light of 
spreading strife. 1190 Truman pointed out that the American 
people had been shocked by the assassinations of prominent 
Chinese liberals and the Central Government's suppression 
of freedom of the press. 11 Unless convincing proof is 
shortly forthcoming that genuine progress is being made 
toward a peaceful settlement of China's internal problems," 
stressed President Truman, 11 it must be expected that 
American opinion will not continue in its generous atti-
tude toward your nation.11 91 Truman continued: 11 It will, 
furthermore, be necessary for me to redefine and explain 
the position of the United States to the American people. 11 
The threat of a reexamination and appraisal of American 
policy toward China had been sounded again in stronger 
terms, which pointed to Chiang's responsibility for the 
't' 92 Th d breakdown of the June truce negotia ions. ree ays 
later, on August 13, Chiang replied to the President's 
90ibid. P• 21. Letter of August 10, 1946, from 
PresidentTr~an to Chinese Ambassador Wellington Koo, who 
transmitted it to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. 
91Ibid. 
92u.s., Congress, senate, Institute of ~acific 
Relations Part 7 Testimony of John Carter Vincent, P• 
2253. Se; also B~al, Marshall in China, P• 163. 
-
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letter by issuing a public statement which placed the 
blame for the breakdown of negotiations on the Communists.93 
In this atmosphere of talk over the possibility of 
reappraisal of our foreign policy toward China, the United 
States signed an agreement on August 30 for the sale of 
American surplus property to the Central Government. The 
Chinese Communist Party violently protested this agreement 
by saying that the surplus property would be used in the 
civil war or sold with the proceeds used for military 
purposes.94 Marshall stated that the surplus property con-
sisted of non-combat items, especially machinery, vehicles 
and communications equipment. 95 This agreement definitely 
"threw away the only effective weapon available to General 
Marshall in his effort to prevent China from being 
d d . ·1 1196 evastate by civi war. America had no intention of 
withdrawing from involvement in China or of washing its 
hands of the China problem. 
American policy toward China was aimed at not 
encouraging the Soviet Union to become involved in the 
93u.s., Department of state, China White Paper, I, 
p. 177. See also same reference source, II, PP• 649-51, 
for Chiang's statement of August 13, 1946. 
94~., p. 180. 
95Kubek, How the Far East Was Lost, P• 338. 
96uPropping Up Chiang Kai-shek," P• 284. 
~ 
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Chinese conflict. 97 American leaders who did not advocate 
the policy alternative of washing our hands believed that 
it was of the utmost importance that the United states 
remain in China to achieve the creation of a unified China 
and discarded a policy of 11 all-out support" to Chiang.98 
General George Marshal1 1 s efforts to bring the two sides 
together were pursued with unrelenting and tireless energy. 
The Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, John 
Carter Vincent, aptly stated that 11we had every intention 
of staying with the problem and at the same time staying 
out of China's civil war.11 9 9 
Marshall found that his and Stuart's efforts were 
frustrated by the departure in mid-September of Chiang 
Kai-shek and Chou En-lai from Nanking. General Chou 
demanded that the United States freeze all supplies and 
shipments under the surplus property agreement and 
97u.s. Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1946, 
x, p. 147. Draft Policy Memorandum prepared in the Embassy 
in China and forwarded to W. Walton Butterworth in early 
September. 
9Sibid. p. 115. Memorandum of Conversation on 
Septembei:--3 i946 between John Carter Vincent and H. A. 
' ' · . h E b 11 D • Graves, Counselor of the Britis m assy; anger in 
China,11 P• 243• 
99u.s., Department of State, F~re~gn Relations, 1946, 
x, p. 115. This view was stated again in the same refer-
ence source P• 163 by John Carter Vincent on September 9, 
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recommended to Marshall that the Committee of Three be 
convened to discuss an order for the cessation of hostili-
t . 100 ies. Chou's recommendations went unheeded as Chiang's 
troops attacked a Communist political and military center, 
Kalgan. This attack infuriated Communist leaders, who 
thought that the attack was an indication of "a total 
national split" and an abandonment of a policy of peaceful 
Settlement • lOl I th C ' t I h . 1 · n e ommunis s eyes, t e Nationa ists 
desired 11 to launch unrestricted war. 11102 Chiang had 
allowed the Communists in June to retain control of Kalgan 
and now, four months later, he reversed this agreement. 103 
With the Nationalist capture of Kalgan, the Communist 
Party refused to announce the names of their delegates to 
the opening of the National Assembly on November 12. 
In light of these conditions, General Marshall felt 
that his tightrope-walking role as mediating middleman in 
100u.s., Department of State, China White Paper, I, 
P• 184. 
lOlibid., p. 188 and II, p. 622. Memorandum of 
September 30, 1946, from the Head of the Chinese Communist 
Delegation, Chou En-lai, to General Marshall. 
l02Truman, Memoirs, II, Years of Trial and Hope, 
p. 86. 
l03u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 
1946, x, p. 269, Memorandum of October 2, 1940, of the 
Minutes of the Meeting between General Marshall and 
Ambassador Stuart; and same reference source, P• 273, 
Letter of October 2, 1946, from General Marshall to Under 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson • 
..... 
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the complicated series of negotiations had almost ended. 
On October 1, General :Marshall informed the Generalissimo 
that "unless a basis for agreement is formed to terminate 
the fighting without further delays of proposals and 
counterproposals, I will recommend to the President that I 
be recalled and that the United States Government terminate 
its efforts of mediation. 11104 Marshall refused to nego-
tiate while the Nationalists battled for Kalgan. 105 
Foreign Minister T. v. Soong, Madame Chiang Kai-shek 1 s 
brother, admitted to Ambassador John Leighton Stuart that 
the Government wanted to capture Kalgan before terminating 
hostilities. 106 :Marshall was convinced that his continued 
participation in negotiations with the two proponents was 
merely tra cloak to the continued conduct of a military 
campaign.ul07 He repeated the contents of his October 1 
letter to the Generalissimo and stated that he would 
request his recall unless hostilities were terminated. 
l04u.s., Department of State, China White Paper, II, 
pp. 662-63. Letter from General Marshall to Generalissimo 
Chiang. 
lOSu.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 
1946, p. -269. ?-lemorandwn of October 2, !946, Meeting 
between General Marshall and Ambassador Stuart. 
106Ibid., p. 273. Letter of October 2, 1946, from 




Director John Carter Vincent believed that Marshall would 
be successful 11 in calling Chiang's hand."lOS 
122 
Distressed over the possibility of the termination of 
Marshall's Mission, Chiang suggested a ten-day truce in the 
Kalgan military offensive with specific conditions while 
General Marshall pursued his negotiations on Chinese 
political and military problems. 109 The Nationalist 
Government had finally offered this temporary solution only 
to have it rejected by the Communists on the grounds that 
the truce should not have a time limit on the number of 
subjects to be considered at the time of the cessation of 
h t · 1 ·t. 110 os l. i ies. 
Viewing the Communist refusal of the October truce 
and Chiang's continuation of his policy of force with the 
capture of Kalgan, Special Representative Marshall, the 
forceful mediator in the first three months of 1946, became 
only an interested observer of the Chinese situation. In 
l08Ibid., pp. 276-77• Memorandum of October 3, 1946, 
by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, John 
Carter Vincent, to the Under Secretary of State, Dean 
Acheson. 
l09Ibid., p. 290. Letter of October 5, 1946, from 
General Marshall to President Truman. 
llOu.s., Department of State, Chin~ \'/bite Paper, I, 
p. 194; Truman, :Memoirs, II, Year~ of T1.'ial and Hope, P• 
87; u.s., Department of State, China White Paper, II, pp. 
665-67. This statement was written by General Marshall and 
Ambassador Stuart on October B, 1946. 
-
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late October in an interview with Chiang, the General 
emphasized to the Generalissimo that 11 the Communists had no 
intention of surrendering and that, while they had lost 
cities, they had not lost armies, nor was it likely that 
they would lose their armies at any place.11111 
Marshall exerted little influence on Chiang, who 
proposed another unacceptable truce for the cessation of 
hostilities in northeast China. Marshall learned from Chou 
En-lai that Chiang's troops posed a threat to the Communist 
base at Yenan. Whether Chou's suggestion "was just a 
Communist fear, 11 Marshall never heard of any mention by a 
member of the Nationalist Government of a possible attack 
on Yenan. 112 Marshall told General Chou that such an 
attack would terminate his mission and return him to the 
113 United States nfor good. 11 Marshall requested Chou, who 
was returning to Yenan "for orientation and new instruc-
tion," ·to ascertain whether his presence was desired as 
mediator. 114 Marshall wondered whether the Communists were 
111u.s., Department of State, China White Paper, I, 
p. 202. 
112Beal, Marshall in China, P• 283. The Nationalists 
captured Yenan in March, 1947 • 
l13u.s., Department of State, China \'/hite Paper, I, 
p. 208; Beal, Marshall in China, P• 292. 
114Quoted in Beal, Marshall in China, P• 283; U.S., 
Department of state, China White Paper, I, PP• 208-09 • 
... 
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interested in continuing mediation in view of their 
rejection of the October cease-fire. With General Chou's 
departure, the lack of participation by the Communists on 
the Committee of Three as well as the lack of Communist 
participation at the convocation of the National Assembly 
proved to Marshall the futility of the Chinese situa-
t . 115 ion. 
On November 12, John Carter Vincent, a high-level 
official in the State Department, launched an attack on 
American investment in China before the National Foreign 
Trade Council. The Director of the Office of Far Eastern 
Affairs spotlighted our role in China: 
••• I think it worthwhile to mention what has 
been in some quarters a misinterpretation of 
General Marshall's mission as solely political in 
its objective. Chinese economy is in a vicious 
circle. General Marshall is fully aware of this 
state of affairs and it has been his purpose to 
encourage the Chinese to break the vicious circle 
by reaching a political settlement that would 
result in a cessation of civil strife and make 
possible a revival of economic activity. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
• • • [W]hat is unsound for private capital is 
unsound for Government capital; that is, for 
the taxpayers• money. I believe it is unsound to 
invest private or public capital in countries 
where there is widespread corruption in business 
and official circles, where a government is 
124 
115u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 
1946, x, p. 579._ Letter of ~ecember 2, 1946, from the 
Ambassador in China, John Leighton Stuart, to the Secretary 
of State. 
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wasting its substance on excessive armament ~here 
the threat or fact of civil war exists ••• ' .ilo 
Vincent's noted address, which urged that private and public 
capital was an unsound investment in war-torn China, was 
made in the presence of the Chinese Ambassador to the 
United States.117 The influence which this address had on 
the Marshall Mission was reflected in John R. Beal•s 
journal. Marshall thought that Vincent had spoken ''out of 
turn, at least in his timing. ,,llS Marshall informed 
Chinese Nationalist officials not to pay any attention to 
Vincent's speech. 
Following the failure of an unacceptable fourth truce 
in November, Marshall remained in China in order to use his 
influence for the adoption of a democratic constitution by 
the National Assembly. The National Assembly adopted a 
constitution on December 25, 1946, and this action was 
immediately denounced by the Chinese Communists, who had 
chosen not to send delegates to the Assembly "unless there 
116u.s. Congress, Senate, Institute of Pacific 
Relations Pa;t 7, Testimony of John Carter Vincent, pp. 
2256-60. ,Vincent's speech was entitled "American Business 
in the Far East" and was delivered to the Thirty-third 
Convention of the National Foreign Trade Council in New 
York City. 
ll7Ibid.; Bertram D. Wolfe, "What Next in China?," 
American Mercury, April, 1949, P• 495; Ross Y. Keen's 
"China Lobby II PP• 325-26, 362, revealed that John Carter 
Vincent's ca~eer was jeopardized by this address. 
ll8Beal, Marshall in China, P• 283. 
..... 
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was a prior military settlement. 11119 This Assembly had 
departed from the procedures of the Political Consultative 
Conference of January, when the delegates had advocated a 
reorganized multiparty government prior to the convocation 
120 of the National Assembly. With the adoption of this 
constitution, General Marshall requested his recall, which 
was announced on January 6, 1947.121 
George Marshall had asked Chou En-lai in November to 
consult with Yenan leaders as to whether he should continue 
his efforts as mediator. No reply was ever received to 
th . t 122 is reques. In a conversation in December with Chiang 
Kai-shek, General Marshall told Chiang that he knew that 
11 the Communists no longer had any intention of accepting 
American mediation along the former lines and ••• I was 
119u.s., Department of State, China White Paper, I, 
Dean Acheson's "Letter of Transmittal" of July 30, 1949, 
p. xiii. 
120Tsou, America's Failure, P• 427. 
121u.s., Department of state, China White raper, I, 
pp. 215, 217; u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 
1946, x, p. 664. Letter of December 28, 1946, from General 
Marshall to President Trwnan. 
l2 2u.s., Department of State, China White Paper, I, 
pp. 212, 218; u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 
1946, x, p. 591. Memorandwn of the Minutes of the Heeting 
~ecember 5, 1946, between General Marshall and 
Ambassador Stuart • 
.. ; 
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personally persona non grata.11 123 Marshall had been 
attempting to mediate between two opposing sides for almost 
a year when President Harry s. Truman reiterated his 
December 15, 1945, statement of American policy toward 
China on December 18, 1946, and emphasized Marshall's role 
as peacemaker between the two opposing forces. President 
Truman said that China's unification, which could be 
achieved by halting hostilities, broadening China's 
Government and effecting a united and democratic China, 
11 were tasks for the Chinese themselves. 11124 "We are 
pledged," said Truman, 11 not to interfere in the internal 
affairs of China.11 125 Upon completion of these goals, 
economic assistance would be available to China's Govern-
ment. The theme of noninvolvement in China's internal 
affairs permeated this statement repeatedly, even though 
the United States had completed one year of mediation. 
Chiang's adviser on foreign press and political relations, 
John R. Beal, labeled Truman's statement as interference 
123u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 
1946, x, p. 663. Letter of December 28, 1946, from General 
Marshall to President Truman. 
l24u.s., President, Public Papers, Truman, 1946, P• 
499. See also same reference source, P• 207, for President 
Truman's news conference of December 18, 1946. 
-
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between the two forces. 126 The President's speech had 
failed to outline any new United States policy and 
indicated uncertainty and confusion in America's China 
policy. Beal concluded that 11 the United States did not 
know what to do next, 11 while historian Anthony Kubek 
believed that Truman had issued a "hands-off" statement. 12 7 
On January 7, 1947, President Truman announced the 
nomination of George c. Marshall as Secretary of State. 
Marshall departed for the United States on January 8, as 
the State Department released the Special Representative's 
frank personal statement of his year-long mission in China. 
11 The greatest obstacle to peace," announced Marshall, 11 has 
been the complete, almost overwhelming suspicion with which 
the Communist Party and the Kuomintang regard each 
other.11 128 Marshall criticized the 11 reactionaries 11 in the 
National Government as 11 a dominant group ••• who have 
opposed ••• almost every effort I have made to influence 
the formation of a genuine coalition government 11 while 
Communist cooperation in China's Government was 
12 6Beal, Marshall in China, p. 327. See also an 
editorial entitled 11 Report on China, 11 New York Times, 
Dec. 19, 1946, P• 28. 
127Beal, Marshall in China, p. 327; Kubek, How the 
Far East Was Lost, p. 335. See also Beal, Marshall in 
China, p. 317. 
128u.s., Department of state, China White Paper, II, 
pp. 686-87 • 
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inconceivable. 129 The General said that his efforts to 
arrive at a peaceful settlement were 11 frustrated time and 
again by extremist elements of both sides.11 1 3° Marshall 
noted the presence of a liberal group among the Communists 
who turned to the Communist Party as a result of the cor-
ruption in local governments. 131 The solution to war-
torn and party-ridden China, as viewed by the General, 
11would be the assumption of leadership by liberals in the 
Government and in the minority parties, a splendid group 
of men, ••• who as yet lack political power to exercise 
a controlling influence.11
132 
Marshall's "plague on both your houses" speech placed 
his hopes and America's hopes on Chinese liberals 11 to 
destroy the power of reactionaries and bring a liberal 
element into control of the government. 11133 Liberals were 
12911china•s Liberals Unable To End War," World 
Report January 28, 1947, p. 19, in the Seedlock Collection; 
u.s., Department of State, China White Paper, II, p. 687. 
l30Quoted in Alexander De Conde, A History of 
American Foreign Policy (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1963), p. 693. See also 11 Both Sides in China Hit by 
Marshall,11 Washington Post, Jan. 8, 1947, PP• 1, 2. 
1 31 11china•s Liberals Unable To End War, 11 P• 19. 
1 32u.s., Department of state, China \vhite Paper, II, 
p. 688. 
133u.s., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 
1946 x P• 664 Letter of December 28, 1946, from General Marshali to Pre~ident Truman; 11 China's Liberals Unable To 
End War," p. 19. References to 11 plague on both your 
r 
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incapable of providing China with political leadership 
because of disagreements within their own ranks over the 
make-up of a Communist or non-Communist government. Unlike 
the Communists and the Nationalists, the liberals did not 
possess an army or a large membership. Indeed, Marshall 
had overemphasized the role which he wanted them to 
play.
134 
Historian Tang Tsou believed that the role of the 
liberals "might have had a better chance for success if it 
had been vigorously implemented at the beginning of the 
Marshall mission.11 1 35 
George Marshall thought that his departure would 
increase the role of Ambassador John Leighton Stuart, who 
he believed 11 will almost automatically continue to be 
sought by all sides and will increase in importance as time 
houses" may be found in Chennault, Way of a Fighter, 
p. xvi; Beal, Marshall in China, P• 349; U.S., Congress, 
Senate, Institute of Pacific Relations, Part 6, Testimony 
of John Carter Vincent, p. 1718. Robert Payne contended 
in The Marshall Story, p. 2~4? that 11 c:,nly the remov~l o~ 
the Generalissimo and the military clique by assassination 
would have saved the issue. 11 
1 34u.s. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign 
Relations U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China, 
Hearings 'before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Senate 89th Cong. 2d sess., 1966, Testimony of Dr. 
Benjamin I. Schwartz, Professor of History and Government 
at Harvard University, P• 234. 
l35Tsou, America's Failure, P• 376. 




State Department officials pondered whether 
Ambassador Stuart should assume Marshall's role as mediator 
between the two factions. John Carter Vincent considered 
that 11 we should go out of the negotiation business and see 
if the Chinese can•t get together better without a •middle 
man. 111137 Vincent thought that both sides "may endeavor 
with more earnestness of purpose to get together them-
selves." Vincent erred in this premise, as Marshall had 
misjudged Ambassador Stuart's role, because the Chinese 
elements had no intention of getting together. The 
Marshall Mission failed, in the words of correspondent 
Benjamin Welles, 11 because the Orientals wanted no 
Occidental solution to their conflict. 11138 "The Chinese 
Nationalists and Communists wanted nothing from the United 
1 36u.s., Department of State, Forei~ Relations, 
1946, X, p. 664. Letter of December 28, 946, from General 
Marshall to President Truman. In John Robinson Beal 1s 
journal, Marshall in China, p. 207, he revealed that on 
September 27, 1946, "Marshall has concluded that Stuart is 
too naive and is keeping a check on him; perhaps embassy 
underlings are watching Stuart; one cannot rule out the 
possibility that the sabotage that Hurley complained of--
if it existed--is still going on, potentiall.y. 11 
l37Quoted in Acheson, Present at the Creation, P• 
210. see also u.s., Department of State, China White Paper, 
II, p. 695, Press Release Issued by the Department of State 
on January 27, 1947; Byrnes, Speaking
1
FranI;ly, P• 229. 
John Robinson Beal noted in Marshall in China, P• 349, that 
Marshall.'s farewell statement indicated that he "resigned 
himself to a coalition without the Communists." 
1 3 8welles, "Recollections," P• Al4. 
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States," reminisced Welles., "except help in defeating the 
other. 11 
132 
While General George Marshall was in China., President 
Truman left the many problems affecting American foreign 
policy toward China in the hands of his eminent representa-
tive. Marshall's representative in Washington., Colonel 
Marshall s. Carter., recalled a conversation with President 
Truman in which the President spoke of his complete trust 
in his Special Representative. Truman 11 relied entirely and 
only on General Marshall's judgment in the China problem 
and ••• he would continue to do so 1At least as long as I 
am President.•11139 One critic of Truman's reliance on 
General Marshall., Theodore H. White., decried Harsha11 1 s 
tremendous influence: 11 0n those days when Marshall sends 
no cables from Nanking., Washington has no opinion on China. 
Never since the days of Roman proconsuls has a single man 
held in the name of a great republic such personal responsi-
bility for security over its future and fronticr.
11140 
John 
1 39u.s., Department of state, Foreign Relations, 
1946, X, p. 482. Memorandum of November 7, 1946, by Colonel 
Marshall s. Carter to Deputy Chief of Staff., General 
Thomas T. Handy. see also same reference source, P• 446, 
Letter of February 28, 1946, from James R. Shep~ey to 
General Marshall; Acheson, Present at the Creation, P• 208; 
U.S., President., Public Papers, Truman, 1946, P• 213, 
President Truman's news conference of April 18, 1946, and p. 
505, President Truman's news conference of December 18, 1946. 
l40Theodore H. White's article in The New Republic as 
quoted in Beal., Marshall in China, P• 32 • 
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Carter Vincent recalled in 1952 in his testimony before the 
subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary that the 
State Department did not receive any telegrams from the 
General requesting 11 advice 11 on the situation in China. 
Marshall sent the State Department a telegram every ten 
days or two weeks. 1 41 
The provisions enunciated by President Truman in his 
statement of December 15, 1945, emphasized that hostilities 
in China must cease, the government must be broadened and a 
unified army must be created prior to American assistance 
to China. The United States acted as a third party in 
attempting to mediate the conflict between the two bitter 
and distrustful enemies, the Nationalists and the 
Communists. Marshall patiently listened to accusations, 
counteraccusations, proposals and counterproposals in his 
role as mediator. Probably no one except General Marshall 
could have been successful in laying the basis for the com-
pletion of his three objectives. 142 Unfortunately, General 
Marshall chose to return to the United States during the 
crucial month of March and returned to China after one 
month to find violations of the truce agreement and civil 
14lu.s., Congress, senate, Institute of_Pacific 
Relations, Part 6, Testimony of John Carter Vincent, P• 
1718. 
142Robert n. Murphy's introduction to Beal, Marshall 
in China, p. xviii. 




war in Manchur1· a. ~1ar h 11 t · v s a con inued his mediating efforts 
and America later embargoed combat items but permitted non-
combat items to be sent to China. The United States seemed 
to be pursuing a 11 double policy" or a "smoke-screenu policy 
by assisting Chiang Kai-shek 1 s National Government with non-
combat items while evoking the words of peace, unity and 
stability in China with noninvolvement in Chinese internal 
affairs. 143 The Nationalists and the Communists were also 
employing a 11 smoke-screen11 policy of negotiating and maneu-
vering for military position. In view of Generalissimo 
Chiang's policy of force during the summer of 1946, Marshall 
informed Chiang that the Communists could not be defeated 
militarily. In the midst of this policy of force, General 
Marshall's role changed to that of an interested bystander 
who remained in China only to see the National Assembly, 
unrepresented by Communists, adopt a constitution to go into 
effect on December 25, 1947. A disheartened George Harshall 
returned to the United States in January, 1947, with the 
144 
knowledge that "the Kuomintang was beyond salvage. 11 
l43comments by Chou En-lai appeared in Spencer Davis, 
"Truman Warned Chiang of U.S. Disapproval," Virginian-Pilot, 
May 25, 1972, p. D9; Mao, Selected Works, P• 109. 
144u.s., Congress, Senate, St~te Department Emp~oyee 
Loyalty Investigation, Part 1, T:stimony of Owen L~ttimo~e, 
p. 820. Owen Lattimore was appointed as an economic adviser 
to the United states Reparations Hission to Japan on 
October 15, 1945. He served with the Mission un~il 
February 12, 1946. Lattimore later beca~e the Dire~tor of 
the Walter Hines Page school of International Relations at 
the Johns Hopkins University • 





THE REPUBLICANS ATTACK THE 
ADMINISTRATION'S CHINA POLICY 
General George c. Marshall, President Truman's 
Special Representative to China and recently nominated 
Secretary of State, was recalled from China in January, 
1947, after thirteen months• effort to arrange a peaceful 
settlement. Marshall's blunt farewell statement, which was 
critical of both the Communists and the Nationalists, 
reflected "his sense of frustration and discouragement at 
his failure to bring the warring sides in China together.11
1 
His untiring attempts to resolve this Chinese dilemma, in 
addition to his immense prestige, were responsible for the 
reluctance of the American people to criticize American 
policy toward China. 2 Ross Y. Koen commented that during 
1945 and 1946 11there was almost no criticism of American 
policy and virtually no support for increased aid to the 
Kuomintang Government.11 3 Throughout this two-year period 
1 uaoth Sides in China Hit by Marshall," Washington 
Post, Jan. 8, 1947, P• 1. See also De Conde, "George 
Catlett Marshall," p. 246. 
2Koen, "China Lobby," P• 197. 
3Ibid. P• 193. See also H. Bradford Westerfield, 
Forei nPo'Ii~ and Part Politics Pearl Harbor to Korea 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 955, P• 254; Steele, 
American People, PP• 32-33• 
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Representatives Judd and Luce and Senators Wherry and 
Bridges were disturbed about the China situation and 
reflected their concern in their speeches on the floors of 
the House and Senate. The mid-term elections of November, 
1946, had produced a Republican-controlled Congress and the 
expectation that a Republican could capture the White House 
in 1948. With the beginning of the new session of Congress, 
in January, 1947, Republican leaders attacked the Truman 
Ad.ministration's foreign policy toward China. 
As a result of General Marshall's year of experience 
in frustration and discouragement, the Truman Administra-
tion desired to disentangle itself from the Chinese civil 
war. Historian Ross Koen aptly summarized the President's 
position: 
The President apparently felt that the United 
States should not encourage or sanction Chinese 
Communist actions, but that their enmity should 
not be deliberately courted by continuing to aid 
Chiang, thereby furthe~ identifying the United 
States with his cause. 
Marshall and State Department officials understood that 
only all-out military intervention could save Generalissimo 
Chiang and decided against any action which might culminate 
in armed intervention. 5 Marshall began to pursue a 
4Koen, "China Lobby," P• 382. 
5Tsou America's Failure, pp. 356, 459; Van Slyke•s 
Introductio~· to u.s., Department of State, China White 
Paper, p. I-iii. In John Leighton Stuart, Fifty Years in 
.... 
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11 hands-offt1 policy during hi· s term as Secretary of State 
despite the rapid deterioration of the Nationalist Govern-
ment from a peak in military progress in early January, 
1947, to the political, military and economic nadir in 
the summer of 1947 and early 1948. 6 
On January 9, 1947, a Republican-controlled Senate 
had swiftly demonstrated its bipartisan support of General 
George C. Marshall by unanimously confirming Truman's 
nomination of him for Secretary of State. 7 Ironically, 
China (New York: Random House, 1954), pp. 178-79, the 
author recalled that prior to General Marshall's departure 
from China in January, 1947, he had told Marshall of three 
alternatives from which America could choose if peace 
negotiations failed. Ambassador Stuart's three alterna-
tives were: "• •• to give active assistance, especially 
in the way of military advice, to the National Government, 
in the expectation that the needed reforms would be under-
taken and to condition further aid at each stage upon 
evidence of this; to drift along with no strong program of 
our own but only an opportunistic one of •wait and sec•; 
and to withdraw entirely from participation in China's 
internal affairs." 
6u.s., Congress, Senate, Hilitar! Situation, Part 1, 
Testimony of General George c. Marshal, P• 659; u.s., 
Department of state, China White Paper, I, Dean Acheson's 
"Letter of Transmittal" of July JO, 1949, P• xi. 
7Ferdinand Kuhn, .Jr., "Gen. Marshall Unanimously 
Confirmed by Senate," Washington Post, Jan. 9, 1947, P• 1. 
In the Man of Independence, P• 309, Jonathan Daniels 
recalled that during General Marshall's visit to the United 
States in April, 1946, President Truman asked the General 
to become the next secretary of State. See also De Conde, 
11 George Catlett Marshall," PP• 245, 247. Alexander De 
Conde noted that Marshall brought to the office of Secre-
tary of state "the attitude of the in~ependent 'non-
partisan I one who relied on the confidence of legislators 
' f h. 1· ' 11 of both parties for support o is po icies. 
i 
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Senator Arthur Vandenberg, who as Chairman of the senate 
Foreign Relations Committee approved the nomination of 
George Marshall, announced a change in this bipartisan 
support of America's China policy in a speech before the 
Cleveland Council of World Affairs on January 11. The 
Senator demanded that the Truman Administration "shift its 
emphasis" from the policy of broadening the base of the 
Chinese Government with the inclusion of "a rival armed 
party, the Chinese Communists. 118 "While still recommending 
unity, it might well encourage those," announced Vandenberg, 
"who have so heroically set their feet upon this road, and 
discourage those who make the road precarious. 11 The 
Senator dramatically concluded: "There will never be a 
minute when China's destiny is not of acute concern to the 
United States and to a healthy world." Vandenberg's speech 
was to be echoed and reechoed until criticism of the 
Administration's China policy culminated in the passage of 
the China Aid Act of April, 1948. 
Joseph and Stewart Alsop, two columnists for the 
Washington Post, incorrectly believed that Secretary of 
State Marshall would "have no difficulty in harmonizing 
Vandenberg's view with his own, since Vandenberg will be 
8uvandenberg on World Peace," 
Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg before 
of World Affairs, January 11, 1947, 
Report, January 28, 1947, P• 45, in 
Text of Speech by 
the Cleveland Council 
as printed in \'lorld 
the Seedlock Collection. 
... 
......, 
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the first to acknowledge that there is no sense in aiding 
a regime which is inherently a bad investment.11 9 Vandenberg 
did not stray from his Cleveland position. He thought that 
the United States must "firmly sustain" and provide "the 
moral support it deserves" to the Chinese Nationalist 
Government to 11 put its own house in better order.1110 
In a speech which was delivered on January 25 to the 
National Publishers' Association, Republican foreign policy 
adviser John Foster Dulles warned the Administration that 
its foreign policy was going to be administered by a 
Republican-controlled Congress. Dulles• fiery speech 
reminded the Administration: 
A Democratic President and his Secretary of State 
can propose, but a Republican Congress can dis-
pose. Foreign diplomats know that, and they sus-
pect what we know--that two years from now a 
Republican will be in the White House. So these 
foreign governments will not take very seriously 
American proposal! which are backed only by the 
Democratic Party. 1 
9Joseph and Stewart Alsop's article in the Wnshin~on 
Post Jan. 15 1947 as reprinted in U.S., Congress, Senate, 
_, , ' . f R k f 
11 America•s Foreign Relations," Extension o emar so 
Senator Claude Pepper, 80th Cong., 1st sess., Jan. 15, 1947, 
Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 1, 369. 
lOLetter from Senator Arthur Vandenberg to J.B. 
Montgomery, Detroit, January 27, 1947, as quoted in 
Vandenberg, Private Papers, P• 523. 
11John Foster Dulles' address in the New York Herald 
Tribune Jan 26 1947 as reprinted in u.s., Congress, 
~-~.;.;.., • ' ' • d R bl. A · n Senate "Trend of Foreign Policy un er epu ican uspices, 
Extension of Remarks of senator Claude Pepper, 80th Cong., 
1st sess., Feb. 5, 1947, Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 
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Senator Claude Pepper, a Democrat from Florida, attacked 
Dulles• speech. Pepper angrily stated that John Foster 
Dulles has 11 ser.ved notice on the people of the United 
States and the world in unmistakable words that the only 
bi-partisan foreign policy his party will agree to must be 
their policy.1112 
Unlike John Foster Dulles• speech, Senator Arthur 
Vandenberg's speech had attacked the Administration's China 
policy. Dulles• speech made no mention of any foreign 
country but emphasized the importance of the role of the 
Republican-controlled Congress. Senate Appropriations 
Committee Chairman Styles Bridges intensified Vandenberg's 
attack on the Administration's China policy by acknowledg-
ing that the United States 11 cannot afford to push China 
into the Soviet orbit. 1113 Senator Dridgcs emphasized one 
point which Democratic President Truman had urged in his 
two China statements: 11 A free, sovereign, independent 
China is vitally important to the future of freedom in any 
part of the world. 11 
Although Bridges• address on January 31 had warned 
Americans of the power of the Soviet Union, John Foster 
130 .s., Congress, senate, 11 Statement by Sen~tor Bridges 
on International Affairs, 11 Jan. 31, 1947, Extension of 
Remarks of senator styles Bridges, 8~th Cong., 1st sess., 
Feb. 3, 1947, Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 1, 734 • 
...... 
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Dulles, a member of the United States delegation to the 
United Nations General Assembly, proposed to the Inland 
Daily Press Association on February 10 a six-point program 
11 to meet the challenge of the Soviet Union's 'dynamism' in 
world affairs. 1114 Dulles' fifth point applied to America's 
China policy. Dulles advised that the United States "con-
tinue to safeguard the integrity of China, which calls for 
continued support of the National Government as distin-
guished from the opposing Yenan regime." 
Announcing that Uit must be the policy of the United 
States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted 
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures, 11 
President Truman on March 12 requested before a joint ses-
sion of Congress that it appropriate $400,000,000 in mili-
tary and economic aid for Greece and Turkey in order to 
11 assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in 
their own way.111 5 Truman also asked for congressional 
authority to send military and civilian personnel to Greece 
and Turkey to supervise the use of this aid. 
Republican leaders immediately attacked the 
President's China policy. In a speech on the floor of the 
14uoulles Urges u.s. Match soviet Zeal, 11 New York ,, 
Times, Feb. 11, 1947, P• o. 
lSu.s., Congress, senate, United States Relations 





House at the time of the hearings of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee on assistance to Greece and Turkey, Representative 
Walter Judd pointed to the National Government's refusal 
"to yield to such internal and external pressures as today 
threaten Greece and Turkey. 1116 Judd reminded his Democratic 
colleagues., particularly former Majority Lender John 
McCormack, that 11 in some degree l'le have been assisting a 
Communist minority in China in its efforts to overthrow the 
Chinese Government. 11 11Whatever our intentions were," 
expressed Judd., 11 has not our policy resulted in wcnkenin6 
our ally, the Government of China, and strengthening the 
Communist minority?" Representative HcCormack repliecl that 
no assistance was being given to the Chinese Communists but 
Judd refused to accept his answer. Judd informed his 
colleagues: 
I want to make quite clear I ,.,,.as not suggesting 
that the United States has been giving direct 
assistance to the Communists of China; but the 
inevitable inescapable result of our policy of 
trying to brin~ the minority Communists into the 
Chinese Gover~ent and failing to support 
effectively that government while helping to 
correct its weaknesses ~as been to strengthen 
the Communist position. 7 
16u s Conrrress House 11 In Reference to Addresses 
• ., 
0 
' ' t G ,., l to the President of the United Sta es-- reece, ~ur<ey, 
and the Middle East,11 80th Cong., 1st sess., Har. 12, 
1947, Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 2, 1984. 
17~ • ., 1985 • 
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Representative .Judd 1 s position was strongly advocated by 
Senator Owen Brewster, who declared "it an anomaly for the 
United States to help King George fight the Conununis-ts 
while urging Chiang to embrace -them.11 18 
Assistance to Greece and Turkey was the ammunition 
which provided Republican leaders with further proof that; 
the Administration's 11 hands-off 11 China policy of wait and 
see was disastrous. In Dean Acheson's testimony before 
the House Foreign Affairs Conunittee on March 20, the Acting 
Secretary of State explained that China's situation could 
not be compared to that of Greece. Acheson described 
Greece and Turkey as one problem while China was another 
problem. 
The Chinese Government is not in the position at 
the present time that the Greek Government is in. 
It is not approaching collapse. It is not 
threatened by defeat by the Communists. The war 
with the Communists is goi~ on much as it has 
for the last twenty years. 
Representative James G. Fulton, a Republican from 
Pennsylvania, asked Acheson 11 if China's Government were 
20 
facing defeat ••• , what is your comment then?" Acheson 
18This speech was delivered on March 13 and is quoted 
in Tsou, America's Failure, P• 449. 
19u.s., Congress, House, Commit~ce on Foreign Affairs, 
Assistance to Greece and Turkey, Hearings, bcfo:e the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, on 
H.R. 2616, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947, P• 17. 
20~., P• 18. 
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responded that his 11 comment would be that China would be 
much worse off than it is now.11 Acheson was severely 
criticized for these statements before the Foreign Affairs 
Committee. 21 
Representative Walter Judd spoke for many Republican 
congressmen when he said that assistance to Greece and 
Turkey as opposed to the lack of aid to China was a 
contradiction in America's foreign policy in regard to 
22 Communist-dominated governments. China belonged in the 
same category as Greece and should receive military and 
advisory assistance. To Foreign Affairs Committee members 
on March 22, Dean Acheson explained that Marshall's fare-
well statement urged the Kuomintang to become more effi-
cient and representative. 11 That was not directed toward 
including Communists in the Govcrnment, 11 assured Acheson, 
"but making the Government more effective in carrying out 
the purposes of the Government. 1123 Acheson cautioned 
Republican leaders who bitterly complained of the lack of 
an effective China policy and announced briefly to them 
America's role in the Chinese civil war. 
Those people who lightly describe our attitude 
toward China as a hands-off policy do not 
21Tsou, America's Failure, P• 449. 
22 House, Assistance to Greece and U.S., Congress, 
Turkey, p. 16. 
23~., P• 17 • 
l 
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accura-t:ely des<:rib<; it. We have given great and 
vast aid to China in this effort to reoccupy its 
areas and to establish the authority of the 
Government in the country.24 
Dean Acheson emphasized that American assistance to China 
through Lend-Lease and surplus property agreements was a 
clear indication that America was not pursuing a "hands-
off11 policy toward China. 
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During this congressional debate on the Greek-Turkish 
aid bill, the Chinese National Government requested on 
numerous occasions large-scale economic assistance and 
attributed this need to 11 the dangers of a Communist-
dominated China.11 25 Two Republican Representatives, 
Howard H. Buffett of Nebraska and George H. Bender of 
Ohio, criticized the manner in which 11 the present Fascist 
Chinese government" was pressurine the State Department and 
was attempting "to blackmail America. 1126 Secretary James 
Forrestal noted in June in his diary that the Nationalists 
used "the danger of Communism" as their chief argument in 
b . . A . "d 27 support of their attempts too tain massive merican ai. 
During a June Cabinet meeting, Secretary Forrestal urged 
24~., p. 16. 
2 5Tsou, .America's Failure, P• 452. 
26u.s., Congress, House, 80th Cong., 1st sess., May 7, 
1947, Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 4, 4694, 4722, as 
quoted in Koen, 11 China Lobby," PP• 89-90. 
27Forrestal, Forrestal Diaries, P• 285. 
(. I . I . 1ti l lU !ld , 1£.Jl(§ffllf1W~ 
continued support of the National Government and warned 
that America 11 no matter how difficult the situation 
became• • • should not withdraw entirely from China" 
even though our support might indicate intervention in 
Chinese internal affairs. 28 
In the midst of the National Government's pleas for 
assistance, the State Department was analyzing, reviewing 
and reconsidering the insoluble situation in China. In 
June, Secretary of State George :Marshall succinctly 
explained his exasperating search 11 for a positive and 
constructive formula to deal with the Chinese situation" 
to the Business Advisory Council of the Department of 
Commerce: III have tortured my brain and I can't now sec 
the answer. 1129 
146 
Believing that Europe was, in the words of Ross Koen, 
"the decisive area of the world in the power struggle," the 
Truman Administration decided that 11 if concessions had to 
be made on China policy in order to carry through the 
European program, then the sacrifice had to be madc.
1130 
A 
decrease in funds for Europe Hould hamper European recovery 
ZSibid., pp. 286-87. 
29Ibid., p. 285; David Eli Lilienthal, The Jo~rnals 
of David~Lilienthal, 3 vols., Vol. II: The Atomic 
Energy Years, 1945-1950 (New York: Harper & RO\~', 
Publishers, 1964), P• 201. 
30Koen, "China Lobby, 11 P• 383. 
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efforts. Administration leaders learned from Republican 
leaders that their European programs, going beyond Greece 
and Turkey, would be approved only under the condition 
that assistance be forthcoming to China.31 
Pressures from Republican leaders also brought about 
the termination of the ten-month embargo on combat items to 
China.
32 
Pressure from China advocate Walter .Judd cul-
minated in Secretary Marshall 1 s request to President Truman 
for another survey of the situation in China. Another 
survey of China's difficulties would undoubtedly uncover 
facts already known by Administration leaders but pressure 
on the Administration had forced "a modification in the 
Administration's opposition to aiding Chiang.11 33 
A survey of the situation in China was not the only 
proposal offered to the Truman Ad.ministration. Foreign 
Service Officer George Atcheson, .Jr., an old China hand, 
informed General of the Army Douglas MacA.rthur in February, 
1947, that in the State Department "there was a suggestion 
floating around ••• that you be asked to visit China to 
31Tsou, America's Failure, P• 463. 
3 2westerfield, Foreign Policy, P• 259. 
33Koen "China Lobby," pp. 282-83; u.s., Cong-ress, 
Senate, Military situation, Part 3, Testimony of General 
Albert c. Wedemeyer, P• 2296. 
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make a survey of the situation.1134 In a meeting in 
February with President Truman, Vice Admiral Charles M. 
Cooke, Jr., proposed that the President send to China a 
commission "composed of eminent members of high prestige, 
in the political field, ••• and thoroughly explore the 
situation and make the recommendation to the u.s. Govern-
ment of what should be done. 1135 Two months later, Maine's 
Republican Senator Owen Brewster proposed a "Unified 
American Program" in the Far East with General Douglas 
MacArthur, then Supreme Commander of American Forces in 
the Pacific, to serve as American Vice Regent of the entire 
Orient.36 Brewster's suggestion was partially adopted in 
William Bullitt•s China Report of October, 1947, which 
informed Americans that General. MacArthur was the only 
American who coul.d save China. 37 Whether or not President 
Truman was influenced by these proposals, he ultimately 
sent a personal envoy to China. 
34Letter from George Atcheson, Jr., Feb. 17, 1947, 
to General Dougl.as MacArthur, in the Douglas MacArthur 
Papers, s.c.A.P. File, Record Group No. 5, Box 1. 
35u.s., Marine Corps Head9-uarters, Marine Corps 
Operations, Victory and Occupation, PP• 622-23. 
36Incoming Unsigned Message from the Sta~e Department, 
April 20, 1947, to General Douglas MacArthur! in the 
Douglas MacArthur Papers, State Department File, Record 
Group No. 9, March-April, 1947• 
37William c. Bullitt, "A Report to the American 
Peopl.e on China, 11 ~, October 13, 1947, P• 154. 
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Alth0ugh these proposals mentioned the selection of 
General Douglas MacArthur as the personal envoy of the 
President, General Albert Wedemeyer, long experienced in 
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China's difficult postwar problems, was chosen as Special 
Representative of President Truman to appraise Uthe 
political, economic, psychological and military situations--
current and projected. 1138 In a conversation with Chinese 
Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Shih-chieh, Secretary of 
State Marshall recalled his reasons for selecting General 
Wedemeyer. 11 I had selected Wedemeyer," said the Secretary 
of State, 11 because of his known anti-Chinese Communist bias 
and his devotion to the Generalissimo, and also because of 
the Generalissimo's expressed confidence in Wedemeyer.1139 
General Wedemeyer reluctantly accepted his new 
assignment, realizing that his views on America*s China 
38u.s., Department of State, China White Paper, I, 
P• 774. Directive of July 9, 1947, from President Truman 
to Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer. 
39u.s., Department of state, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1947, Vol. VI: The Far East (Washington, 
D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), P• 518. Memo-
randum of Conversation on September 14, 1947, by Secretary 
of State Marshall. See also u.s., Congress, Senate, 
Military Situation, Part 1, Testimony of General Georee C. 
Marshall P• 461. In u.s., Congress, House, 11 New American 
Initiati~e 11 Extension of Remarks of Representative Walter 
Judd 80th 1 Cong. 1st sess., July 18, 1947, Congressional 
Reco:d, XCIII, P~rt 12, A3623, Representative Judd reprinted 
an editorial from the lvashington News, July 17, 1947, 
entitled "New American Initiative." This editorial noted 
that the "Wedemeyer mission to China offers promise of a 
constructive substitute for our policy of drift there." 
31!2 
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policy 11 were diametrically opposite to those of the state 
Department which General Marshall tried so hard to imple-
ment for over a year. 11 40 II b 1 · -e e ieved that during Marshall's 
M• • II . 1ss1on our government by economic and diplomatic pres-
sures tried to coalesce Communist and Nationalist Forces, 
[and] the government of China was unable to strengthen 
itself politically, economically and militarily.11 
Wedemeyer hoped that his new assignment 11 would afford [him] 
an opportunity to help formulate a realistic u.s. policy in 
China and the Far East. 1141 His presidential directive 
focused his attention on the situation in China in esti-
mating 11the character, extent, and probable consequences of 
assistance which you may recommend, and the probable con-
sequences in the event that assistance is not givcn.
1142 
Learning of Wedemeyer 1 s Mission, Foreign Affairs 
Minister Wang Shih-chieh noted that his Government believed 
that the mission uwould result in immediate and substantial 
military aid.1143 Chinese Communists attacked Hcdcmeyer's 
40Letter from General Albert C. Wedemeyer to General 
Douglas MacArthur, in the Douglas MacArthur Papers, ~.r.r. 
Correspondence File, Record Group N~. 10, nox 8. This 
letter which ,-ms not dated, was written on State Depart-, 
ment stationery. 
4¾vedemeyer, ,vedemeyer Reports!, P• 379. 
42u.s., Department of state, China White Paper, I, 
p. 256. 
43Ibid. 
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appointment as the American means "to prop up Chiang Kai-
shek I s moribund rule. 11 44 Ch · inese splinter parties, 
skeptical of the upcoming mission, feared that assistance 
to China 11 would only prolong the civil war.1145 
151 
After surveying China's insurmountable difficulties 
for one month, General Wedemeyer addressed a joint meeting 
of the State Council and all Ministers of the National 
Government, Chiang, Madame Chiang and Ambassador Stuart on 
August 22, 1947. Wedemeyer told his audience that "the 
Central Government cannot defeat the Chinese Communists by 
the employment of force, but can only win the loyal, 
enthusiastic and realistic support of the masses of the 
people by improving the political and economic situation 
immediately.11 46 He emphasized Chinese Nationalist ineffi-
ciency and incompetence and 11 hoped to jolt the Nationalist 
leaders into taking action which would convince America 
that they were worth supporting. 1147 
Wedemeyer•s speech greatly offended Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai-shek, who was convinced that the United States 
4~vedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!, P• 387 • 
45u.s., Department of state, China \vhite Paper, I, 
p. 256. 
46 759 summary of Remarks Made by Ibid., II, P• • 
General Albert c. Wedemeyer before the Joint Meeting of the 
State Council and All Ministers of the National Government 
on August 22, 1947. 
47wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!, P• 391. 
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was trying to force him to retire.48 Chiang had originally 
asked Wedemeyer to discuss frankly with him his observa-
tions.49 Ambassador John Leighton Stuart, who later 
criticized General Wedemeyer 1 s speech at Nanking, had also 
urged the General to give this address. Stuart informed 
Wedemeyer that his criticism 11 would be accepted in the 
spirit in which it was given as a friend. 11 50 Had \'iedemeyer 
known that his subsequent report would be suppressed by 
Secretary Marshall, he would have never made his first 
Nanking speech. General Wedemeyer delivered another 
equally explosive speech at the time of his departure from 
China. He announced that the Central Government must 
11 effect immediately drastic, far-reaching political and 
economic reforms" for it 11 to regain and maintain the 
confidence of the people. 
1151 
As the Central Government's position deteriorated 
further, General Wedemeyer 1 s statements went unheeded and 
48u.s., Department of state, C~ina \•;hite Paper, II, 
p. 826. Letter of August 26, 1947, from Ambassador John 
Leighton Stuart to secretary of State George C. Marshall. 
49Ibid., I, P• 256; u.s., Congress, Senate, Military 
Situation, Part 3, Testimony of Albert c. Wedemeyer, P• 
2310. 
50Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!, PP• 386-87. 
also Stuart, Fifty Years, P• 186. 
See 
Slu s Department of state, China \'lhite Paper, II, 
• •, t 24 1947 by General Albert C. 
p. 764 Statement of Augus '· .' . h" • 1 · of his mission to Cina. 
Wedemeyer on the cone usion 
., 3. UJUUm;:; J&WiiJ~ 
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were presented in a lengthy report on September 19 to 
President Harry Truman. Th e urgency of action in the 
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Manchurian situation to prevent the area "from becoming a 
Soviet satellite" necessitated Wedemeyer•s most significant 
recommendation in his report.5 2 
_That China be advised to request the United 
Nation~ to take immediate steps to bring about a 
cessation of.hostilities in Manchuria and request 
that Manchuria be placed under Five-Power 
Guardianship or, failing that under a Trustee-
ship in ~
3
ccordance with the U~ited Nations 
Charter.5 
Wedemeyer had originally proposed a trusteeship for 
Manchuria in November, 1945, knowing that the creation of 
a buffer zone denied the Soviet Union 11 the opportunity to 
penetrate effectively to the South" and 11 confined their 
influence.11 54 
Wedemeyer 1 s Report constantly reiterated the impor-
tance of assistance to China by declaring that a "removal 
52Ibid., p. 766. Report of September 19, 1947, from 
LieutenantGeneral Albert C. Wedemeyer to President Truman. 
53~., P• 814. see also.same refere~ce so~rce on 
P• 767. The five powers were China, the Soviet Union, the 
United States Great Britain and France. This recommenda-
tion was considered as a policy alternative to halt the 
Chinese civil war by New York Times correspondent Henry R. 
Lieberman who advocated an understanding with the Soviet 
Union either through the Foreign Ministers' Council or 
the United Nations. see Henry R. Lieberman, 11 u.s. Bases 
in China Held To Be Vital, 11 New York Times, Sept. 1, 1947, 
p. 6. 
54u.s., congress, senate, Military Situation, Part 3, 
Testimony of General Albert c. Wedemeyer, P• 2367. 
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of American assistance ·th h 
wi out t e corresponding Soviet 
removal of assistance'' would lay China "open to eventual 
Communist domination. 1155 
Wedemeyer's controversial report 
also envisioned a program of military assistance over a 
period of at least five years "under the supervision of 
American advisers in specified areas."5 6 General Wedemeyer 
later admitted that these advisers would have entered 
Chinese areas of conflict.57 
If Congressman Walter Judd, the instigator of 
Wedemeyer•s Mission, believed that Wedemeyer•s Report 
would support his campaign for aid to China, his plans 
were thwarted by Secretary of State George Marshall, who 
personally suppressed the report. 58 Marshall contended 
55u.s., Department of State, China White Paper, II, 
p. 779. See also u.s., Congress, Senate, "A Guide to Ten 
Years of Secrecy in Our Foreign Policy," Extension of 
Remarks of Senator Owen Brewster, 82d Cong., 1st sess., 
June 5, 1951, Congressional Record, XCVII, Part 5, 6142; 
Kubek, How the Far East Was Lost, p. 391. 
56u.s. Department of State, China White Paper, II, , . 6 p. 814. See also Forrestal, Forrestal Diaries, p. 2 O; 
Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, U.S.A., "Korea 
Truce Will Not Be Lost," U.S. News & World Report, 
September 14, 1951, p. 39; u.s., Congress, Senate, Insti-
tute of Pacific Relations, Part 3, P• 834. 
57Tsou, America's Failure, P• 759° 
SSSee Secretary George C • .Marshall's letter of 
September 25 1947 to Senator Tom Connally and endorsed by 
President Ha;ry Tr:Wan as printed in Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer 
Reports!, p. 446; u.s., Congress, Senate, .Military Situa-
tion Part 1 Testimony of General George C • .Marshall, pp. 
372-;3; and u.s., President, Public Papers, Truman, 1947, 
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that Wedemeyer had been sent to Chi· na to obt · · f t · ain in orma ion 
for the Secretary of State and "not for 59 a public speech. 11 
Walton Butterworth, the new Director of the Office of Far 
Eastern Affairs and successor to J h c t · on ar er Vincent, asked 
General Wedemeyer unsuccessfully to delete certain poten-
tially embarrassing portions of his report. 60 Secretary 
Marshall was particularly opposed to Wedemeyer•s trustee-
ship proposal, which 11 would be a great embarrassmentu to 
the United States in view of our relations with Greecc. 61 
Marshall knew from his thirteen months of experience in 
China and from his discussions with Chiang Kai-shek that 
11 he [Chiang] would resign before he would accept any 
P• 466, President Truman's news conference of October 16, 
1947. At this press conference, the President was ques-
tioned: "Do you intend to make public General Wedemeyer's 
report on China?" President Truman replied: "General 
Marshall will have a statement to make on that in a few 
days. The report was made to General Marshall. 11 
59u.s., Congress, Senate, Nomination, P• 23. 
60wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!, PP• 397-98; 
Westerfield, Foreign Policy, p. 259; Tsou,.America•~ 
Failure, p. 453; u.s., Congress, Senate, Military Situation, 
Part 3, Testimony of General Albert C. Wedemeyer, P• 2365. 
John Carter Vincent was succeeded by Walton Butterworth as 
Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs on Septem-
ber 15, 1947. In Tang Tsou, America's Failure, P• ~53, the 
historian noted that "Vincent's transfer from that impor-
tant office to serve as minister to Switzerland was a 
concession to the Republicans." 
61u.s., congress, senate, Military Situation, Part 1, 
Testimony of General George c. Marshall, P• 547. See also 
same reference source, PP• 372-73; U.S., Congress, Senate, 
Nomination, PP• 22-23. 
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relationship in connection with China in which the Russians 
or the British had a part." 62 The Secretary also rejected 
Wedemeyer•s proposal for an advisory group in China since 
America could not, at that time, commit 10,000 men to 
Ch 1• na. 6 3 If h t ese men had been sent to China, this action 
would have been a step toward full-scale American involve-
ment in the Chinese civil war. 
The suppression of the Wedemeyer Report, as well as 
the silencing of the members of his mission, aroused wide-
spread suspicion and condemnation by members of Congress, 
by members of the press, and by the American people. 64 
Senator Arthur Vandenberg, Chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Committee, admitted that he never saw the report 
b t 1 . t d t h of 1.·t.
65 Representat1·ve u is ene o a parap rase 
Frank B. Keefe, a Republican from Wisconsin, declared on 
62u.s. Congress, Senate, Nomination, p. 23. See 
also u.s., C~ngress, Senate, Military Situation, Part 1, 
Testimony of General George C. Marshall, P• 547° 
63Tsou, America's Failure, P• 459. 
64For further information on Wedemeyer and his 
staff's silencing see Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!, P• 
396; u.s., Congre~s, Senate, Military situation, Part 1, 
Testimony of General George C. Marshall, P• 54° ■ 
6Su s Congress senate, Military Situation, Part 3, 
Testimony.of'General Aibert c. Wedemey:r, P• 540. In 1951, 
General Wedemeyer recalled in hi~ testimoi:iy before the . 
A d S · d Forei'gn Relations Committees that he did rme ervices an 
not discuss his report with President Truman. See U.S., 




the floor of the House that the l·1edemeyer , Report 11 was asked 
for and paid by the people of America.11 66 
American criticism of the Administration's suppres-
sion of the Wedemeyer Report was heightened by the publica-
tion in Life of a "Report on China," written by the former 
Ambassador to France and the Soviet Union, William c. 
Bullitt. Bullitt had visited China and viewed the coun-
try's problems firsthand at the time Wedemeyer was also 
surveying the situation in China. Bullitt•s Report was 
released one month after Wedemeyer addressed his recom-
mendations to President Truman. Bullitt also found 
deteriorating conditions and announced that China could be 
11 kept from the hands of Stalin ••• at a cost to ourselves 
which will be ·small compared to the magnitude of our inter-
est in the independence of China. 1167 Bullitt•s three-year 
proposed plan would cost $250,ooo,ooo a year for both 
. . t 68 military and economic assis ance. Bullitt, like 
Wedemeyer, emphasized the importance of Nationalist troops 
remaining in Manchuria. 11 If Manchuria should be abandoned 
to the Communists or should fall into their hands by 
660 .s., Congress, House, Extension of Remarks of 
Representative Frank a. Keefe, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 
Nov. 25, 1947, Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 9, 10875. 
67Bullitt, 11 Report, 11 P• 1.35. 





conquest," said the former Ambassador, "a course of events 
fatal to China would follow. 1169 Unlike Bullitt•s Report, 
Wedemeyer•s undisclosed report did not recommend 1tall-out 
aid to Chiang. 11 11 It is my belief,11 said General \'ledemeyer, 
11 that aid given to any country should be subject to careful 
supervision to insure that it is used for the purposes for 
which it is intended. 1170 Wedemeyer•s proposed assistance 
was to be carefully supervised by American advisers. 
William Bullitt demanded that President Truman act at 
once on two points. First, the former Ambassador said that 
President Truman should send munitions to China 11 to keep 
Manchuria out of the hands of the soviet Union. 1171 If this 
action was not taken, Bullitt believed that when Congress 
reconvened it should investigate American foreign policy 
toward China. Second, Bullitt requested that President 
Truman designate General Douglas MacArthur as Personal 
Representative of the President to China 11 to organize with 
the Generalissimo a joint plan to prevent subjugation of 
. 1172 
China by the Soviet Union. 
69~., P• 142. 
70Letter from General Albert c. Wedemeyer, Commanding 
General, Ft. Meade, Maryland, Oct. 20, 1947, to General 
Douglas MacArthur, in the Douglas MacArthur Papers, ~.I.P. 
Co d F ·1e Record Group No. 10, Box 8. This let-rrespon ence 1 , 11 
ter was entitled nPersonal--Eyes Alone. 
71Bullitt, 11 Report, 11 P• l45• 
72~., P• 154• 
L 
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Bullitt•s Report was 11 the opening in the long great 
assault on the administration's conduct of relations with 
China. 1173 Mounting pressure was exerted on the President 
and the Secretary of State to reveal the contents of the 
Wedemeyer Report. Had the Truman Administration not sup-
pressed this report, it might not have been faced with its 
concession to the Republican Congress--the China Aid Act. 
Through the widespread discussion of these reports, which 
called for America's immediate attention toward assistance 
to China, the China issue was repeatedly placed before the 
American people and was the center of congressional atten-
tion when President Truman called a special session of 
Congress in November, 1947, 11 to provide emergency aid for 
Europe in anticipation of consideration of the full 
Marshall Plan program of the following year. 1174 
73 f. ld Forei,...,., Policy, P• 261 Wester ie , t,•• -
74Koen, t1China Lobby," P• ZOO. 
L 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE CHINA AID ACT 
In calling for a special session of Congress in 
November, 1947, to provide interim aid for Europe, 
President Harry S. Truman faced a Republican-controlled 
House, which was basically interested in including a provi-
sion in the Aclministration 1 s program for financial aid to 
the National Government of China. 1 House Military Affairs 
Committee members, especially Walter .Judd, had traveled to 
China during the congressional recess, at which time 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek appealed to them for greater 
American assistance. Chiang cautioned the congressmen that 
if the Chinese Government 11 were finally defeated it would 
not be because of Russia or the Chinese Communists, but 
because the United States failed to give promised assist-
2 
ance at a time of desperate need. 11 Two Republican members 
of this committee, Representatives Walter Judd of ~tinncsota 
and .John Vorys of Ohio, returned to the United States 
~vesterfield, Foreign Policy, P• 262. 
20 • 5 ., Department of state, China ,vhite Paper, I, 
p. 264. 
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11 determined to include China among the nations destined to 
receive American aid."3 
In late October in response to Republican demands for 
aid to China, the State Department began to redefine 
American policy toward China by devising a program of 
economic assistance to China. This new policy became 
apparent in Secretary of State George c. Marshall's 
endeavors to overcome Judd and Vorys' pressure. 4 In 
Marshall's testimony on November 10 before the joint ses-
sion of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House 
Foreign Affairs Committee, the Secretary of State reaf-
firmed his deep concern for the situation in China. Ile 
reminded the legislators: 
The United States Government and all other world 
powers recognize the National Government as the 
sole legal Government of China. Only the Govern-
ment and the people of China can solve their 
fundamental problems and regain for China its 
rightful role as a major stabilizing influence 
in the Far East.5 
Secretary Marshall next announced a point which he knew 
would be welcomed by Republican Foreign Affairs Committee 
3Koen, "China Lobby," P• 200. 
4u. s. , Department of state, China White raper, I, 
p. 269. 
Su.s., Congress senate, Committee on Foreign 
tions Interim Aid fo; Europe, Hearings, before the 
' 1 t· ns Senate, 80th Cong., Committee on Foreign Re a 10 , 
sess., 1947, P• 7. 
Rcla-
lst 
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members: "We can be of help and, in the light of our long 
and uninterrupted record of friendship and international 
cooperation with China, we should extend to the government 
and its people certain economic aid and assistance.11 6 
definite proposal," said Marshall, "is under preparation 
for early submission.11 
On the following day, the General appeared before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which questioned him on 
his estimate of the cost of economic aid to China. 
Secretary Marshall estimated $300,000,000 for fifteen 
months. 7 This figure was slightly higher than Ambassador 
William Bullitt•s proposed amount of $250,ooo,ooo for one 
year. Republican Senators welcomed Marshall's estimate and 
decided not to endorse China's inclusion in the interim aid 
bill. 8 
In Marshall's subsequent testimony on November 12 
before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Secretary 
informed Congressman Judd that there had been a "great 
deteriorationu in the situation in China since Acting 
Secretary of state Dean Acheson's testimony on the Greek-
Turkish aid bill before the same House Committee. Like 
6Ibid. 
7~., P• 43. 
8westerfield, Foreign Policy, P• 262 • 
l. 
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Acheson, the Secretary of State emphasized that China's 
situation differed from that in Western Europe. Marshall 
contended that Europe was one problem and China was another 
problem. In speaking of assistance to Europe as opposed to 
assistance to China, Representative Judd reminded his 
colleagues that he would not vote 11 to put $20,000,000 into 
holding the line on one front and then ignore another front 
equally vital to our future. 119 Judd tied the two areas of 
the world together and reminded his colleagues that our 
loss in Asia would mean our loss of Europe. 
Secretary of State George Marshall told Congressman 
Judd, the leading Nationalist China supporter, that his 
detailed proposal for economic assistance to China would be 
submitted to Congress in January, 1948. He admitted later 
to Representative John Kee, a Democrat from West Virginia 
and a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, that 11 we 
have been trying to find some practical basis which would 
justify the expenditure of American funds on the basis ••• 
of getting about a seventy percent return in effectiveness 
10 of use.11 Under the leadership of Representatives Judd 
9 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
u.s., Congress, IIeari~cs, before the Committee on 
~E:!!m!!:e~r:.:,ig~e~n~c:iiy~F~o~r,.::e:=,,:1!:;· g~-~n~A!.;1:.· d~,~~~~~!2::::, 
Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 80th Cong., 1st 
sess., 1947, Testimony of Representative \'/alter Judd, p. 
239. 
lOibid., Testimony of General George c. Harshall, 
p. 14. -
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and Vorys, the Foreign Affairs Committee proposed an 
interim aid bill which included China as one of the recipi-
ent countries to receive economic assistance. 
l•Jhile Walter Judd was the most active Republican 
supporter for economic and military assistance to 
Nationalist China., House Speaker Joseph w. Martin, Jr • ., 
felt that it was imperative 11 to fight Communism anywhere in 
the world, not just in Europe. 1111 Senator Robert A. Taft 
of Ohio believed that 11 the United States could not deal 
with Europe without considering China and Latin America.11 12 
This view was reiterated by Representative Judd during the 
Foreign Affairs hearings. The climax of this Republican 
criticism occurred on November 24, 1947., when Governor 
Thomas Dewey of New York delivered an address to the alumni 
of Columbia University Law School. Governor Dewey demanded 
that 11 we change our national policy immediately" or face 
the possibility that China 11 will fall wholly into the 
. 13 
Communist hands. 11 He described the free world as a 
patient with gangrene in both legs, naming these two legs--
llRobert F. Whitney, "Marshall To Push Europe Plan 
Today in Capitol Hearing.,11 New York Times, Nov. 10, 1947, 
p. 1. 
12 • "Chi· na Policy and the 1948 Lawrence K. Rosinger., 
Elections," Far Eastern survey., XVII (October 20., 1948)., 
235. 
13"Dewey•s Talk Demanding u.s. Help To Combat 
York Times., Nov. 25., 1947, P• 18. Communists, 11 :,:N~e:.:,W::....,;:.;:;.;;.,;;,;;......;_...--
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Western Europe and Asia. Dewey announced that "our govern-
ment is telling the world we have d a very goo cure for 
gangrene but will apply it to one leg while the gangrene in 
the other leg destroys the patient. 11 
Classified by historian Ross Koen llas the opening gun 
for the 1948 Republican presidential nomination," Governor 
Dewey's address emphasized that the American Government 
11has no discernible Chinese policy whatsoever. We are 
bankrupt so far as Chinese policy is concerned.11 14 Dewey 
criticized President Truman for not including China in the 
interim aid program and attacked his Administration for the 
lack of consultation and bipartisanship in American foreign 
policy toward China. This last issue had been espoused by 
Senator Arthur Vandenberg on the same day on the floor of 
the Senate, at which time the Senator observed that 11 I do 
not believe that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has 
been consulted in any substantial degree regarding Asiatic 
15 
policy during the past year or two. 11 The Foreign Rela-
tions Committee., according to Vandenberg, had "not hacl the 
China problem before us in any detail whatsoever." 
14i<_oen., "China Lobby," p. 205; 11 Dewey 1 s Talk Demand-
ing U.S. Help, 11 P• 18. 
l5u s Congress senate, 11 Interim European Aid 
p • •t · of'Remarks of Senator Arthur Vandenberg, 
8
rogram,". Ex ensi.on Nov 24 1947 Congressional Record, 
0th Cong., 1st sess., • , ' 
XCIII, Part 9, 10708. 
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Republican Senators regretted that rresidcnt Trwnan's 
interim aid program had not included China but were satis-
fied that China was to be the subject of a forthcoming 
economic assistance program instead of the Administration's 
continuance of its program of watchful ·t· 16 wai ing. Demo-
cratic Senator Tom Connally commented to his colleagues on 
the floor of the Senate on December 15 that the State 
Department desired 11 a concrete plan for China11 to be com-
pleted in January, 1948. 17 Connally supported Secretary 
Marshall's position by stating that the State Department 
11 is already at work, and ••• has been for some time, on 
the details of the proposed plan for aid to China. 11 
Republican Senator Styles Bridges of New Hampshire coun-
tered Connally's support for the Truman-Marshall policy by 
expressing his concern over the "continual bunglinG" of the 
China policy. Senator Arthur Vandenberg admitted to 
Bridges and Connally that he had 11 for some time been out of 
harmony with our official attitude toward China" and had 
"repeatedly urged a different attitudc.
1118 
16~., 10704. 
17 C s senate "Interim European Aid u. s. , ongres , , f t 
P f II Extension of Remarks o Sena ors rogram--A Con erence, d b 80tl 
st les Brides Tom Connally and Arthur V~n en erg, 1 
Y g ' 15 1 947 congressional Record, Cong., 1st sess., Dec. , , -
XCIII, Part 9, 11351. 
18Ibid. -
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In this Senate debate on December 15, Senate Republi-
can leader Arthur Vandenberg, adhering to the pleadings of 
Representative John Vorys, added China to the list of 
recipient countries under the interim aid bill. 19 
Vandenberg noted that China had been included in the House 
bill and thought "it would be distinctly misunderstood and 
would be almost an act of negation in respect to China, if 
it were not also recognized by the Senate in the ultimate 
conference report. 11 Representative Vorys had won one 
battle by succeeding in including China as an interim aid 
recipient, although he lost another fight when House 
Appropriations Committee Chairman John Taber of New York, 
who had not received a definite plan for China from the 
Administration, failed to include China as a recipient of 
. t 20 assis ance. 
In his testimony on December 18, before the Senate 
Appropriations Committee under the chairmanship of Styles 
Bridges, Assistant Secretary of State Willard L. Thorp told 
a stunned audience that "the State Department has no 
19\'lesterfield, Foreign Policy, p. 262f; u.s.,RCongtre~s, 
Senate "Interim European Air Program--Con·erence epor, 
Extension of Remarks of senator Arthur vai:3denberg, 80th 
C 1 t Dec 15 1947, Congressional Record, ong., s sess., • , 
XCIII, Part 9, 11346. 
20westerfield, Foreign Policy, P• 263• 
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program of American aid to China today.11 21 The Senate 
Appropriations Committee decided to earmark $20,000,000 for 
aid to Chi"na. 22 At Senator Vandenberg's suggestion, this 
figure was changed to $18,000,000 to coincide with a 
previously authorized 11 post-UNRRA 11 relief bill, Public 
Law 84. 23 
Realizing that congressional pressure was mounting 
for the Administration's proposal of economic assistance to 
China, the National Government in late December requested 
from the United States a long-range four-year program of 
economic assistance totaling $1,500,000,000 with 
$SOO,ooo,ooo for the first year. 24 This figure was higher 
than Marshall's estimate of $300,000,000 for fifteen months 
or Bullitt•s estimate of $250,000,000 for twelve months. 
At the time of this Nationalist request, the Chinese Com-
munists launched their largest offensive in Manchuria, with 
21u.s., congress, 1tAid to China," Extension of 
Remarks of Representative Charles R. Clason, 80th Cong., 
1st sess., Dec. 18, 1947, Congressional Record, XCIII, 
Part 13, A4855. 
22westerfield, Foreign Policy:, P• 263. 
23Ibid.; u.s., congress, senate, •~Interim Eur~pcan 
Aid Program--Conference Report," Extension of Remarks of 
Senator Arthur Vandenberg, 80th Cong., 1st scss6, Dec. 15, 
1947, Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 9, ll34 • 
24u.s. Department of state, China White P?per, I, 
Pp 376
-77 ,The cost for the second year would oe 
• • th th' d year and 
$500,000,000, $300,000,000 for c ir 
$200 000 000 for the fourth year. , , 
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their goal the isolation of the Central Government's forces 
at Changchun, Mukden and Chichow. 2 5 
:Mounting Republican pressure for the long-m•mited 
Administration China aid bill provoked Senator Styles 
Bridges' letter of January 20, 1948, to Secretary of State 
George Marshall. Bridges reminded the Secretary of his 
testimony before the joint session of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
on November 10 and demanded that the China aid program be 
26 submitted at once to Congress. On January 21, former 
President Herbert Hoover joined Republican congressmen in 
suggesting that aid be given to China in addition to 
Germany, Japan and Korea. 
Senator Bridges and former President Hoover did not 
receive a response from the Truman Administration until 
February, 1948. At a meeting of the National Security 
Council on February 12, secretary of State Marshall revealed 
the contents of two China documents which would soon be 
released. secretary of Defense James Forrestal recalled 
the contents of these two documents: 11 The gist of both is 
that we regard the China problem under present conditions 
· 1·nefficiency and impotence of the of disorder, corruption, 
2 5Tsou, America's Failure, P• 477. 
2 6Rosinger, 11china Policy, 11 235 • 
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Central Government as being practically unsolvable; that we 
cannot afford to be drawn in on an unending drain upon our 
resources.11 27 
The Truman Administration's program of economic aid 
to China was submitted by President Harry Truman to Con-
gress on February 18, 1948. This presidential address 
reaffirmed America's faith in the Chinese Government "to 
provide the framework within which efforts toward peace 
and ••• economic recovery may be effective" and recom-
mended that Congress appropriate $570,000,000 to provide 
assistance to China for fifteen months.
28 
President Truman 
told his Republican critics that the problem of assistance 
to China had been the subject of continuous study since 
General George Harsha11 1 s return from China in January, 
1947. "The agreement," considered Truman, 11 should include 
assurances that the Chinese Government will take such 
economic, financial and other measures as arc practicable, 
looking toward the ultimate goal of economic stability and 
recovery.u 2 9 President Truman understood that the 
27Forrestal, forrestal Diaries, P• 371. 
Forrestal served as secretary of the Navy from 
to July, 1947, and then served as secretary of 





p. 379; u.s., 
nepnrtment of state, China White Paper, I, 
President, Public Papers, Truman, 1948, P• 145. 
29u.s., President, Public Papers, Truman, 1948, P• 146. 
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assistance which the United States proposed to give China 
could not 11 be a substitute for the necessary action that 
can be taken only by the Chinese Government • 11 
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Following Trwnan•s address to Congress, Secretary of 
State Marshall appeared again before a joint session of the 
Committees of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations. 
Secretary Marshall reiterated his and the Administration's 
opposition to American involvement in Chinese internal 
affairs. 11It involves obligations and responsibilities on 
the part of this Goverrunent, 11 said Marshall, 11 which I am 
convinced the American people would never knowingly 
accept.11 30 "It would involve this Government in a con-
tinuing commitment from which it would be practically 
impossible to withdraw, and it would very probably involve 
grave consequences to this nation by making China an arena 
of international conflict.11 31 Marshall reemphasized to 
congressional committee members that the Chinese Government 
had to maintain itself against the Communists.
32 
Historian 
Robert Payne noted that Secretary Marshall mentioned 11 for 
the first time the possibility of their [the Nationalists•] 
30u.s., Department of State, China White Paper, I, 
p. 380. 
31~., P• 382. 
32Ibid. -
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defeat. 1133 Americans should be prepared ttto face the pos-
sibility that the present Chinese Government may not be 
successful in maintaining itself against the Communist 
forces or other opposition that may arise in China.11 34 
Secretary of State l•Iarshall believed that the United 
States could not afford 11 economically or militarily, to 
take over the continued failures of the present Chinese 
Government 11 or to reduce our strength in more vital areas, 
especially in the industrial areas of ,'le stern Europe, 
11 where we now have a reasonable opportunity of successfully 
meeting or thwarting the Communist threat. 1135 Marshall 
believed that Western Europe was number one on America 1s 
Pr1·or1·t 1· t He resolved to avoid a long-term Chinese y 1S • 
commitment which might involve the United States in a 
fratricidal civil war to the detriment of European 
recovery. 36 
While the Administration had yielded to the wishes of 
Republican critics, its China aid bill provided solely for 
economic assistance. Republican critics once again 
expressed their opposition to the lack of military 
33Payne, :Marshall story_, P• 3°6 • 
34u.s., Department of state, China Hhite Paper, I, 
p. 382. 
35rbid., P• 383. -
36 • uchina Policy, 11 236. Rosinger, 
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assistance in the Administration's proposed program even 
though it was inconsistent with our foreign policy of non-
involvement in a civil war. Two exceptions in this list of 
Republican critics were John Foster Dulles and Senator 
Arthur Vandenberg, both of whom had, by now, 11bcen 
privately won over to the State Department's view of the 
hopelessness of American intervention on behalf of Chianc 
Kai-shek in China.11 37 
Two loyal proponents of Chiang's Government, Senator 
Bridges and Representative Judd, urged that the Administra-
tion program include military aid as well as economic aid. 
Senator Robert Taft urged that the United States supply the 
Chinese Government with military assistance to repel the 
Communist forces in Manchuria, similar to what had been 
· t . G 3 S S t T ft undertaken by the United Sta es in reece. ena or a · 
was convinced "very strongly that the Far East is ulti-
mately even more important to our future peace than is 
Europe.11 39 
While the Administration had submitted its China aid 
bill of economic assistance to the Conarcss, the House and 
37westcrfield, Foreign Polic;:, p. 248; Vandenberg, 
Private Papers, P• 523. 
3SRosinger, "China Policy," 236. 
39Quoted in~• 
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Senate reported their own China aid bills. 40 The House 
Foreign Affairs Committee proposed that $150,000,000 over a 
fifteen-month period be designated for military assistance 
to China under the supervision of American military 
advisers, while $420,000,000 was to be earmarked for 
economic aid ,dth a portion of that possibly to be diverted 
also to military aid. 41 American military advisers, who 
were to be stationed in combat areas, were to provide the 
Chinese military officers with "strategic advice. 1142 This 
bill was not approved by the Senate, since it implied that 
the United States would be "underwriting the military of 
the National Government" at a time when our military 
strength could not have even spared General Wedemeyer 1 s low 
estimate of 10,000 men for China. 43 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended a 
bill which would provide $363,000,000 for Chinese relief 
and rehabilitation and $100,000,000 to be used as President 
Truman chose. In a speech on the floor of the Senate on 
Harch 30, Chairman Arthur Vandenberg, who now understood 
40 1 ·"' of the House and Senate China aid For an ana ys1° 66 · 
bills see Westerfield, Foreign Policy, PP• 263- ; h.ocn, 
11 Chin~ Lobby," PP• 67-70, 205-07. 
41westerfield, Foreign Policy_, P• Z63. 
42Koen, "China Lobby, 11 P• 67 • 
43Quoted in~-, P• 6S. 
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the unsolvable Chinese situation, spoke for other ForciGn 
Relations Committee members in declarinG that "in this, as 
in all other relief bills, • • • there is no implication 
that American aid involves any continuity of obliGation 
beyond specific current commitments which Congress nwy sec 
fit to make. 1144 Vandenberg further declarecl that "we do 
not--we cannot underwrite the future. Events arc unpre-
dictable in this tragically fluxing age. 11 The man who had 
launched the criticism within his party fourteen months 
earlier was now supporting the Administration 11 in express-
ing doubts about the Chinese situation and fears of too 
deep an involvement. 1145 
The final bill, which was passed by the Conr;rcss on 
April 2 and signed by President Harry Truman on April 3, 
incorporated both House and Senate versions of the China 
aid bill by agreeing on a twelve-month program of 
$338,000,000 for economic aid and $125,000,000 for special 
grants or military aid to be used at the discretion of the 
Chinese Government.46 The passage of the China Aid Act of 
1948 marked the return of the United States to the policy 
44u S Congress senate, Extension of Remarks of 
Senator A;th~r Vandenb~rg, 80th Cong., 2d sess., Har. 30, 
1948, Congressional Record, XCIV, Part 3, 3668. 
45Ibid.; Rosinger, nchina Policy," 237. 
46 t of state, China Hhitc Paper, I, u.s., Departmen 
p. 389. 
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of 11 limited commitment" to the National Government47 In a 
letter to Secretary of State Marshall one month after the 
passage of the China Aid Act, Ambassador John Leighton 
Stuart analyzed the significance of the Act: II.Any broad 
or powerful bargaining position vis-a-vis the Chinese 
Government disappeared on the date Congress passed the 
China Aid Act of 1948.11 48 
Whether or not the United States was in a bargaining 
position, Europe still held priority over China. The 
China Aid Act only delayed the inevitable--the doom of 
Chiang's Nationalist Government. The Generalissimo's 
corrupt and incompetent regime had 11 been kept breathing 
with a golden pulmotor operated by the Republican-
controlled Congress •• Republican opponents of the 
Administration's China policy pressured Secretary Marshall 
until a shift in our foreign policy became imperative in 
order to assure the adoption of the European Recovery 





Slyke's Introduction, P• I-iii. 
481 Letter from Ambassador John P• • 
May 10, 1948, to Secretary of State 
49Incoming Message from the Chief of Staff _of the 
Public Information Division, Nov._3? 1948, t<:> Ha3or Gcner':11 
David Barr of the United states Mil~tary Advisor~ Group~ in 
the Douglas MacArthur Papers, Incoming Hessages in the UCL 
File, November, 1948. 
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criticism toward the Trwnan Administration. This Act was 
to become the subject of great criticism in the United 
States, particularly with regard to the delays in American 
shipments of military goods to China. 50 
h • II 50 senate "Aid to Cina, 
See u.s., Congress, t Sty'les Bridges, 80th Cong., 
. f R ks of Sena or "CIV p t 
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12, A5079-82. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
Secrecy loomed heavily over American diplomacy toward 
China in the postwar years of 1945 through 1948. In 
General Patrick Hurley's testimony before the MacArthur 
Hearings in 1951, he objected greatly to the prevalence of 
secrecy in the government. "In n government by the 
people," said Hurley, 11 the people cannot make correct con-
clusions if they are not given all the facts.« 1 American 
foreign policy toward China might have taken a different 
course if the American people had learned of such sup-
pressed documents as the Yalta Far Eastern agreements, the 
Wedemeyer Report and the foreign service officers' memor.:m-
dwns from 1944 through 1946 relating to the Yenan Govern-
ment's interest in establishing relations with the United 
States to avoid their dependence on the soviet Union. The 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee's investigation into the 
resignation and charges of Ambassador Hurley should have 
been followed by further public debates and a top-to-bottom 
congressional investigation, as envisioned by Senator 
Kenneth Wherry, to analyze America's role in postwar China. 




With the American people and their elected repre-
sentatives uninformed of their commitments, Americans were 
misled by Dean Acheson's 11 Letter of Transmittal" into 
believing that only three alternatives toward China existed 
after the termination of the Second \vorld War. Foreign 
service officers advocated that the United States pursue a 
flexible policy toward China by working with the National-
ists and the Communists while America adapted itself to 
d 1 t . Ch" 2 eve opmen sin ina. This approach would have produced 
the best results if it had been implemented immediately 
after the War. 11 The agonizing question11 ,dthin the 
acceptance of this alternative., as viewed by historian 
Barbara Tuchman, was "why people who report the scene arc 
not listened to by the policy makers in \'/ashington. 113 
Americans would have realized that Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai-shek•s National Government was run by incompe-
tent and dishonest officials who would never be able to 
unify all Chinese .political elements. The magnitude of 
this corruption and of the inability of the Central Govern-
ment to succeed in unifying all factions would have encour-
aged Americans to look favorably at the Chinese Communists, 
2 C senate United States-China u.s • ., ongress., , . 33 Relations., Testimony of John Stewart service, P• • 
3 . 1 Berger II Return of an Old China Quoted by Mari yn ' Bl 
Hand, 11 Washington Post., Jan. 31 , 1973, P• • 
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who were not at this time subservient to the Soviet Union, 
as claimed by Dean Acheson in his "Letter of Transmittal." 
An alternative to the leadershi·p of h t e Generalissimo 
was rarely mentioned and never seriously considered. In 
the Department of State 1 s discussion on American policy 
toward China on October 8, 1949, General George c. Marshall 
recalled that "no one ever suggested anyone could take his 
place; at least, they never made a suggestion to me, that 
made any impression on my mind of a man who could handle 
the situation. 114 
The United States chose a policy of friendly 
persuasion in an attempt to assist the Nationalists to 
broaden the base of their government to include other 
political elements, cease the fighting in China and amal-
gamate the armies of the Communists and the Kuomintang. As 
Special Representative of President Harry s. Truman, the 
eminent General Marshall left for China in December, 1945, 
on a thirteen-month mission, with the American people and 
the President believing that only he could resolve the 
situation.5 ~1arsha1l's first three months supported their 
4u.s., Congress, Senate, Institute of Pacific Rela-
tions, Part 5, Appendix, p. 1657° 
5u s Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, 
The Far ia;l, p. 764. Draft of letter from President 
Truman to General Marshall. This letter.was dated 
December 10 1945 and was apparently written by John 
Carter Vinc;nt. This draft stated: 11 The fact that I have 
□nren: »st1tt•111¥Nw,itWftl•MWM111MvwJ4tuWmuUUwHtiliuaN!MiMl.i.s 
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hopes, but his return to the United states at 
a critical 
time to obtain assistance for China coincided with the 
exploding crisis in Manchur1.·a. M h 1 ars a l•s role as mediator 
and peacemaker between the Communists and the Nationalists 
decreased upon his return and dwi"ndled h upon t e failure of 
the June truce negoti"ati"ons. A e · · m rican assistance to Chiang 
damaged Marshall's role as an impartial mediator throughout 
the summer and fall of 1946. 
America turned from a policy of involvement in 
December, 1945, by attempting to mediate the two dissident, 
divergent and irreconcilable forces to a "hands-off" policy 
of wait and see initiated upon the termination of the 
Marshall Mission in January, 1947. The bipartisan support 
of the Truman Administration's China policy began to erode 
immediately after Marshall's confirmation as Secretary of 
State as the Administration turned its attention to the 
problems of European postwar recovery. Containing 
Communism in Europe had higher priority than containing it 
in China. President Truman, who had no desire to support a 
asked you to go to China is the clearest evidence of my 
real concern with regard to the situation there." Sec also 
the November 29 1945 editorial in the Manchester Union 
entitled l!Hurle; • s Re~ignation 11 as reprinted in U .s., 
Congress House . "Hurley's Resignation--The Muddle," 
Extensio~ of Rei:iarks of Representative Chester E. Merrow, 
79th Cong., 1st sess., Nov. 3?, 1?45, Congressional Record, 
XCI, Part 13, A5223. This editorial spoke of.General 
George c. Marshall as "the right man for the Job. : •.• If 
11 any man can bring order out of the present chaos, it is he. 
•-mxrar ,--•n11tteiM!tsJ:t:HK◄AA!1Wtlttsd~llililtiU:LlWj~ 
moribund regime, did not want to apply a Truman Doctrine 
to China.
6 
Republican criticism of the Administration's 
China policy reached its zenith when the Administration 
suppressed General Albert Wedemeyer 1 s Report and silenced 
the members of his mission. 
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Secretary of State Marshall faced a determined 
Republican opposition when he asked for their support in 
endorsing an Administration bill on interim aid for Europe. 
Marshall contended that China was 11 an entirely different 
problem and should be handled in a different way. 117 His 
critics disagreed and he was forced in November, 1947, to 
promise Administration legislation on assistance for China 
to assure passage of the European recovery legislation. 
Three months later, President Truman submitted his China 
aid program to Congress. 
Some historians have noted that during the year 1947 
America's priority in foreign policy in the Far East 
6U 5 Congress senate, Committee on Foreign 
Relation; •china and the United States: To~ay and Y:stcr-
d H ? b fore the Committee on Foreign Relations, ay, earings, e 72 T t · of John Senate, 92d Cong., 2d sess., 19 , es imony 
Stewart Service, P• 66. 
7 House Extension of Remarks of u.s., Congress, . h, ds 80th Cong., 1st sess., 
Representative James P. Ric
1
ar 'd XCIII Part 9 11287. 
D 11 1947 Congressiona Recor, , , ec. , , ocrat from south Carolina, 
Representative Richards, a ~em th congressional debate 
recalled this statement du~i1inin~stration assistance to 
on the probable proposal o 
China. 
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shifted from China to Japan. 8 The United states refused to 
allow the Soviet Union to have a part in controlling Japan, 
and Russia looked to China as an alternate.9 This theory 
explains America's reluctant policy toward China during 
that critical postwar year. In a speech to the National 
War College on May 6, 1947, George Kennan told his audi-
ence: "If at any time in the postwar period the Soviet 
leaders had been confronted with a choice between control 
over China and control over Japan, they would unhesitat-
ingly have chosen the latter.11
1° Following General 
Wedemeyer 1 s departure from China after his fact-finding 
survey, Ambassador John Leighton Stuart in a letter to 
Secretary of State George Marshall spoke of an "added ele-
ment increasing Chinese fear that the United States is 
tending more and more to shift the center of gravity of its 
11 
Far Eastern policy from China to Japan." 
While this theory was not mentioned by many American 
leaders and historians, no one can underestimate the role 
of Special Representative and Secretary of State George C. 
8aardner, Architects of Illusion, P• 164. 
9Tsou, America 1 s Failure, P• 370. 
10 George 
Little, Brown 
F. Kennan, :Hemoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston: 
and Company, 1967), PP• 374-75• 
llu.s., Department of state, China \'lhite Paper, II, p. 
830. Letter of September 20, 1947, from Ambassador John 
Leighton Stuart to secretary of State George C. Marshall. 
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Marshall in America's foreign policy toward China during 
the postwar years. Foreign Service Officer John Paton 
Davies recalled that 11 no other American of that period had 
the influence that Marshall did. 1112 President Truman 
relied entirely upon Marshall's advice while the General 
was serving in China. Historian Alexander De-Conde thought 
that the General "had a voice, probably the decisive one, 
in every major foreign policy during the years of 1947 and 
1948. 1113 Unlike Patrick Hurley and Secretary of State 
James Byrnes, President Truman relied on Marshall whose 
experience in China demonstrated that Chiang's policy of 
rule or ruin would bring about the Generalissimo's eventual 
downfall. John Paton Davies recalled in his testimony 
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1971 that 
Secretary of State George Marshall "made the ••• basic 
decision that we should disengage in China. 1114 
American assistance to Chiang's National Government 
from 1945 through 1948 merely delayed the inevitable 
outcome--the deterioration and ultimate downfall of Chiang 
12u.s., Congress senate, United States-China 
Relations, p. 36. see'also u.s., President, Public Papers, 
Truman, 1946, P• 213. President Harry Truman's press con-
rerence of April 18, 1946. 
1 3ne Conde, "George Catlett Marshall, 11 P• 265. 
14u.s., Congress, senate, United states-China 




and his tired and decayed Government. Many Americans 
repeatedly advocated increased military assistance to the 
Central Government. Historian Lyman P. Van Slyke observed: 
"To the Nationalists and their supporters, any amount of 
aid would have been insufficient if it failed to defeat the 
Communists. 1115 Colonel Ivan Yeaton, the head of the Mili-
tary Observers Mission in Yenan, had wisely predicted in 
August, 1945, that Kuomintang troops "cannot hold out even 
with United States help11 against the Communist Army. 16 
While American assistance to Chiang's Government 
delayed the outcome of the Chinese civil war, President 
Harry Truman's three China statements emphasized the 
importance of a strong and unified China as well as 
America's attempts as intermediary to cease the fighting in 
the fratricidal Chinese war. From 1945 through 1948 unity 
and peace in China were not achieved. On March 11, 1948, 
President Truman announced his interpretation of his 
December 15, 1945, policy statement on the broadening of 
the base of the Chinese Government. Truman's analysis, 
which was similar to that of forme~ Director of the Office 
of Far Eastern Affairs John Carter Vincent, stated that the 
broadening was not to include the Chinese Communists but 
15u.s., Department of stat:, China White Paper, I, 
Van Slyke•s Introduction, P• I-xi. 
l6Tsou, America's Failure, P• 358. 
. I _.WWWl@W.$!( A# USAGJ¥@\M1WJJ4Mf_~PIH ~. t~'!!.iilfflf~ 
r: n a 12 t11t1t'ttHtttet iW:HHiii411t t1 li4'•11W uw:+4/!>il:dt®H G1:@lli1muilWlH.il.i lthkw.iA iJ U tl · ' 
Chinese liberals.
17 
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